Aerial Vehicle Tracking by Adaptive Fusion of Hyperspectral Likelihood Maps

Hyperspectral cameras can provide unique spectral signatures for consistently distinguishing materials that can be used to solve surveillance tasks. In this paper, we propose a novel real-time hyperspectral likelihood maps-aided tracking method (HLT) inspired by an adaptive hyperspectral sensor. A moving object tracking system generally consists of registration, object detection, and tracking modules. We focus on the target detection part and remove the necessity to build any offline classifiers and tune a large amount of hyperparameters, instead learning a generative target model in an online manner for hyperspectral channels ranging from visible to infrared wavelengths. The key idea is that, our adaptive fusion method can combine likelihood maps from multiple bands of hyperspectral imagery into one single more distinctive representation increasing the margin between mean value of foreground and background pixels in the fused map. Experimental results show that the HLT not only outperforms all established fusion methods but is on par with the current state-of-the-art hyperspectral target tracking frameworks.Comment: Accepted at the International Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops, 201

A particle filtering approach for joint detection/estimation of multipath effects on GPS measurements

Multipath propagation causes major impairments to Global Positioning System (GPS) based navigation. Multipath results in biased GPS measurements, hence inaccurate position estimates. In this work, multipath effects are considered as abrupt changes affecting the navigation system. A multiple model formulation is proposed whereby the changes are represented by a discrete valued process. The detection of the errors induced by multipath is handled by a Rao-Blackwellized particle filter (RBPF). The RBPF estimates the indicator process jointly with the navigation states and multipath biases. The interest of this approach is its ability to integrate a priori constraints about the propagation environment. The detection is improved by using information from near future GPS measurements at the particle filter (PF) sampling step. A computationally modest delayed sampling is developed, which is based on a minimal duration assumption for multipath effects. Finally, the standard PF resampling stage is modified to include an hypothesis test based decision step

Security of GPS/INS based On-road Location Tracking Systems

Location information is critical to a wide-variety of navigation and tracking applications. Today, GPS is the de-facto outdoor localization system but has been shown to be vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks. Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are emerging as a popular complementary system, especially in road transportation systems as they enable improved navigation and tracking as well as offer resilience to wireless signals spoofing, and jamming attacks. In this paper, we evaluate the security guarantees of INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation for road transportation systems. We consider an adversary required to travel from a source location to a destination, and monitored by a INS-aided GPS system. The goal of the adversary is to travel to alternate locations without being detected. We developed and evaluated algorithms that achieve such goal, providing the adversary significant latitude. Our algorithms build a graph model for a given road network and enable us to derive potential destinations an attacker can reach without raising alarms even with the INS-aided GPS tracking and navigation system. The algorithms render the gyroscope and accelerometer sensors useless as they generate road trajectories indistinguishable from plausible paths (both in terms of turn angles and roads curvature). We also designed, built, and demonstrated that the magnetometer can be actively spoofed using a combination of carefully controlled coils. We implemented and evaluated the impact of the attack using both real-world and simulated driving traces in more than 10 cities located around the world. Our evaluations show that it is possible for an attacker to reach destinations that are as far as 30 km away from the true destination without being detected. We also show that it is possible for the adversary to reach almost 60-80% of possible points within the target region in some cities