3 research outputs found
A Cryptographic Escrow for Treaty Declarations and Step-by-Step Verification
The verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements requires states
to provide declarations, including information on sensitive military sites and
assets. There are important cases, however, where negotiations of these
agreements are impeded because states are reluctant to provide any such data,
because of concerns about prematurely handing over militarily significant
information. To address this challenge, we present a cryptographic escrow that
allows a state to make a complete declaration of sites and assets at the outset
and commit to its content, but only reveal the sensitive information therein
sequentially. Combined with an inspection regime, our escrow allows for
step-by-step verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial
declaration so that the information release and inspections keep pace with
parallel diplomatic and political processes. We apply this approach to the
possible denuclearization of North Korea. Such approach can be applied,
however, to any agreement requiring the sharing of sensitive information.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figure