A coopetitive approach to financial markets stabilization and risk management

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the financial markets by adopting Game Theory, in particular, the Complete Study of a Differentiable Game and the new mathematical model of Coopetitive Game, proposed recently in the literature by D. Carfì. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. For this purpose we will discuss about an interaction between the two above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The only solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one collectively desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects: the Enterprise artificially causes an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute, who was unable to make arbitrages alone, because of the introduction by the normative authority of a tax on economic transactions (that we propose to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations), takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective (social) sum, which later will be divided with the Enterprise by contract. We propose hereunder two kinds of agreement: a fair transferable utility agreement on the an initial natural interaction and a same type of compromise on a quite extended coopetitive context

Strategic Alliances as a form of Coopetition and its impact on the Performance of Airlines: A Case Study analysis of Lufthansa, Finnair, and Alitalia

The research on coopetition (i.e., simultaneous cooperation and competition) has increased significantly over the last two decades. Noteworthy findings have been made, including the benefits that a firm gains from such a relationship. However, only limited studies centralize the impact on performance through coopetition. Existing studies on coopetition and the effect on performance show mixed outcomes, and researchers claim that the results depend on the firm's industry. Thus, it is relevant to analyze the impact of coopetition on market performance. The following study will examine the aforementioned research gap by looking into the airline industry where coopetition relationship has been practiced in the form of strategic alliances for more than 20 years. The empirical analysis was based on a multiple case study of three airlines, from three different countries, operating in three different alliances. That allowed to investigate similarities and differences among the diverse sized companies in terms of the performance impact. Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews. Additionally, annual reports were used as secondary data and to enhance credibility through triangulation. Findings show that in general, coopetition through strategic alliances contributes positively to airlines. Nevertheless, the degree of how much airlines benefit from alliances depends on the position in the network and the airline's size. Airlines of small size gain most from the relationship, and airlines with a central position in the alliance give more to the strategic alliances than they get out. The findings reveal that airlines of large size gain less from alliances and increasingly form other types of partnerships like joint ventures that create a more balanced give and gain relationship. Notwithstanding, the COVID epidemic will have a crucial impact on airlines and increase the importance of strategic alliances and partnerships further

An environmentally sustainable global economy. A coopetitive model

This paper proposes a model representing a global economy which aims to become environmentally sustainable. The model looks both at the production side and the consumption side of the economy. Regarding the production side, the suggested model considers investment and innovation in climate technologies, whereas on the side of the consumption it takes into account economic and policy instruments to change the patterns of consumption of the households. The model follows a game theory approach and applies a theoretical framework à la Cournot. The results of the paper are the following: the model provides win-win solutions, namely strategic situations in which each country takes advantages by cooperating and competing at the same time within the global economy, and where each country gets a positive return. In fact, the model shows the convenience for each country to cooperate and suggests the implementation of policies in order to satisfy the basic requirements of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in terms of production, consumption and climate change

Sustainability of global feeding.Coopetitive interaction among vegan and non-vegan food firms

In this paper, we face the problem of global feeding sustainability and related environmental issues, with a strong attention to possible public heath improvements. Specifically, we shall consider food producers and sellers of vegan (or vegetarian) and non-vegan (or non-vegetarian) food. We propose possible quantitative agreements among different food producers, in order to develop a sustainable healthier diet for future generations, by using a mathematical co-opetitive approach and game theory. The co-opetitive approach used by the authors provides a game theory model, which could help producers of vegan food an easier entry in global market and obtain a considerable free publicity. Meanwhile, the model could allow big producers/sellers of non-vegetarian food a smooth rapid transaction to more sustainable and healthier vegan or vegetarian production/supply. In particular, we propose an exemplary complex agreement setting among McDonald's and Muscle of Wheat, a small but strongly innovative Italian food producer. We think that, on one hand, Muscle of Wheat cannot enter a global market without the help of a large globalized food producer already present in the market, on the other hand, we think equally difficult that a large static and poorly innovative producer cannot follow credibly and rapidly enough the increasing and challenging issues of global food sustainability. We remark that our game model represents an asymmetric R&D alliance between McDonald's and Muscle of Wheat. The aim of our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we explain the advantages of a vegan diet for the human health, environmental issues, food sustainability, population sustainability; in fact, the model explain how global food producers could improve environmental, social and health conditions of world population. Secondly, we show how game theory normal-form and extensive-form games can be used in coopetition studies in order to increase health conditions of people, address climate change, address hunger in the world, improve welfare in a particular market. The results of the mathematical study prove that we can find win-win solutions for both firms, which are also good for world environment, human healthy, human population sustainability and climate change

Balancing Bilinearly Interfering Elements

Many decisions in various fields of application have to take into account the joined effects of two elements that can interfere with each other. This happens for example in Medicine (synergic or antagonistic drugs ), in Agriculture (anti-cryptogamics), in Public Economics (interfering economic policies),  in Industrial Economics (where the demand of an asset can be influenced by the supply of another asset), Zootechnics and so on. When it is necessary to decide about the dosage of such elements, there is sometimes a primary interest for one effect rather than another; more precisely, it may be of interest that the effects of an element are in a certain proportion with respect to the effects of the other. It may be also necessary to take into account minimum quantities that must be assigned.In Carfì et al (2013) a mathematical model was proposed to solve the above problem in exact form. In this paper we present the solution in closed form for the case in which the function of the effects is bilinear

Sustainability of global feeding.Coopetitive interaction among vegan and non-vegan food firms

In this paper, we face the problem of global feeding sustainability and related environmental issues, with a strong attention to possible public heath improvements. Specifically, we shall consider food producers and sellers of vegan (or vegetarian) and non-vegan (or non-vegetarian) food. We propose possible quantitative agreements among different food producers, in order to develop a sustainable healthier diet for future generations, by using a mathematical co-opetitive approach and game theory. The co-opetitive approach used by the authors provides a game theory model, which could help producers of vegan food an easier entry in global market and obtain a considerable free publicity. Meanwhile, the model could allow big producers/sellers of non-vegetarian food a smooth rapid transaction to more sustainable and healthier vegan or vegetarian production/supply. In particular, we propose an exemplary complex agreement setting among McDonald's and Muscle of Wheat, a small but strongly innovative Italian food producer. We think that, on one hand, Muscle of Wheat cannot enter a global market without the help of a large globalized food producer already present in the market, on the other hand, we think equally difficult that a large static and poorly innovative producer cannot follow credibly and rapidly enough the increasing and challenging issues of global food sustainability. We remark that our game model represents an asymmetric R&D alliance between McDonald's and Muscle of Wheat. The aim of our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we explain the advantages of a vegan diet for the human health, environmental issues, food sustainability, population sustainability; in fact, the model explain how global food producers could improve environmental, social and health conditions of world population. Secondly, we show how game theory normal-form and extensive-form games can be used in coopetition studies in order to increase health conditions of people, address climate change, address hunger in the world, improve welfare in a particular market. The results of the mathematical study prove that we can find win-win solutions for both firms, which are also good for world environment, human healthy, human population sustainability and climate change

Improving competitiveness and trade balance of Greek economy: a coopetitive strategy model

In the present work, we propose a coopetitive model applied to the Greek crisis, which aims both at improving the competitiveness of the Greek productive system and rebalancing the current account balance of the country. Our model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) is conceived at a macro level, wherein there are two players: Greece and SNC (the Surplus Northern Countries of the euro area). We suggest a model that looks for a win-win solution. The win-win solution entails a cooperative bi-strategy in which SNC should contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece and, in addition,SNC should provide a certain amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) to improve the competitiveness and the growth in Greece. Thus we �nd a transferable utility and properly coopetitive solution, convenient for all the players

Improving competitiveness and trade balance of Greek economy: a coopetitive strategy model

In this work, we propose a coopetitive model applied to the Greek crisis, aimed both at improving the competitiveness of the Greek productive system and rebalancing the current account balance of the country. Our model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) is conceived at a macro level, wherein there are two players: Greece and SNC (the Surplus Northern Countries of the euro area). We suggest a model that looks for a win-win solution. The win-win solution entails a cooperative bi-strategy in which SNC should contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece and, in addition, SNC should provide a certain amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) to improve the competitiveness and the growth in Greece. Thus we find a transferable utility and properly coopetitive solution, convenient for all the players

Improving competitiveness and trade balance of Greek economy: a coopetitive strategy model

In this work, we propose a coopetitive model applied to the Greek crisis, aimed both at improving the competitiveness of the Greek productive system and rebalancing the current account balance of the country. Our model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) is conceived at a macro level, wherein there are two players: Greece and SNC (the Surplus Northern Countries of the euro area). We suggest a model that looks for a win-win solution. The win-win solution entails a cooperative bi-strategy in which SNC should contribute to re-balance its trade surplus with respect to Greece and, in addition, SNC should provide a certain amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) to improve the competitiveness and the growth in Greece. Thus we find a transferable utility and properly coopetitive solution, convenient for all the players

The crisis of euro’s governance: institutional aspects and policy issues

The European Monetary Union is characterized by a crisis of governance, this has become more evident with the crisis of the euro which has shown the weaknesses of the European institutions and stressed the heterogeneity of member countries. The global financial crisis struck the euro area very severely because it coincided with the lack of appropriate policy tools to manage the crisis and with a period of weak political leadership which have made crisis management even harder. Europe needs to build the institutions of its monetary union to avoid similar crises in the future. But it is necessary a greater European integration, with a central fiscal entity at European level which requires a transfer of sovereignty from the individual Member States. This contribution first discusses the issue concerning rules and discretion in the governance of the euro. In the following section it describes the euro crisis and examines the remedies put in place, noting that despite the statements and the efforts of the European authorities the confidence in the euro is diminishing. Thus the exit of Greece from the euro or even the breakdown of the single currency has become a hypothesis discussed more frequently among economists, politicians, central bankers and businessmen. The last section of the work focuses on what’s wrong in the governance of the euro and examines the institutional aspects and the economic policy issues suggesting that the European integration serves to ensure the European citizens independence and protect their historical freedom, but also to influence and thus affect the choices from which may depend the future prosperity of European nations involved