Generalizations of the Kolmogorov-Barzdin embedding estimates

We consider several ways to measure the `geometric complexity' of an embedding from a simplicial complex into Euclidean space. One of these is a version of `thickness', based on a paper of Kolmogorov and Barzdin. We prove inequalities relating the thickness and the number of simplices in the simplicial complex, generalizing an estimate that Kolmogorov and Barzdin proved for graphs. We also consider the distortion of knots. We give an alternate proof of a theorem of Pardon that there are isotopy classes of knots requiring arbitrarily large distortion. This proof is based on the expander-like properties of arithmetic hyperbolic manifolds.Comment: 45 page

Combinatorial Voting

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi-issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner. © 2012 The Econometric Society