19,928 research outputs found

    A society of mind approach to cognition and metacognition in a cognitive architecture

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    This thesis investigates the concept of mind as a control system using the "Society of Agents" metaphor. "Society of Agents" describes collective behaviours of simple and intelligent agents. "Society of Mind" is more than a collection of task-oriented and deliberative agents; it is a powerful concept for mind research and can benefit from the use of metacognition. The aim is to develop a self configurable computational model using the concept of metacognition. A six tiered SMCA (Society of Mind Cognitive Architecture) control model is designed that relies on a society of agents operating using metrics associated with the principles of artificial economics in animal cognition. This research investigates the concept of metacognition as a powerful catalyst for control, unify and self-reflection. Metacognition is used on BDI models with respect to planning, reasoning, decision making, self reflection, problem solving, learning and the general process of cognition to improve performance.One perspective on how to develop metacognition in a SMCA model is based on the differentiation between metacognitive strategies and metacomponents or metacognitive aids. Metacognitive strategies denote activities such as metacomphrension (remedial action) and metamanagement (self management) and schema training (meaning full learning over cognitive structures). Metacomponents are aids for the representation of thoughts. To develop an efficient, intelligent and optimal agent through the use of metacognition requires the design of a multiple layered control model which includes simple to complex levels of agent action and behaviours. This SMCA model has designed and implemented for six layers which includes reflexive, reactive, deliberative (BDI), learning (Q-Ieamer), metacontrol and metacognition layers

    Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues

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    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes

    These confabulations are guaranteed to improve your marriage! Toward a teleological theory of confabulation

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    Confabulation is typically understood to be dysfunctional. But this understanding neglects the phenomenon’s potential benefits. In fact, we think that the benefits of non-clinical confabulation provide a better foundation for a general account of confabulation. In this paper, we start from these benefits to develop a social teleological account of confabulation. Central to our account is the idea that confabulation manifests a kind of willful ignorance. By understanding confabulation in this way, we can provide principled explanations for the difference between clinical and non-clinical cases of confabulation and the extent to which confabulation is rational

    Challenging the Computational Metaphor: Implications for How We Think

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    This paper explores the role of the traditional computational metaphor in our thinking as computer scientists, its influence on epistemological styles, and its implications for our understanding of cognition. It proposes to replace the conventional metaphor--a sequence of steps--with the notion of a community of interacting entities, and examines the ramifications of such a shift on these various ways in which we think

    Hierarchical control over effortful behavior by rodent medial frontal cortex : a computational model

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    The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been the focus of intense research interest in recent years. Although separate theories relate ACC function variously to conflict monitoring, reward processing, action selection, decision making, and more, damage to the ACC mostly spares performance on tasks that exercise these functions, indicating that they are not in fact unique to the ACC. Further, most theories do not address the most salient consequence of ACC damage: impoverished action generation in the presence of normal motor ability. In this study we develop a computational model of the rodent medial prefrontal cortex that accounts for the behavioral sequelae of ACC damage, unifies many of the cognitive functions attributed to it, and provides a solution to an outstanding question in cognitive control research-how the control system determines and motivates what tasks to perform. The theory derives from recent developments in the formal study of hierarchical control and learning that highlight computational efficiencies afforded when collections of actions are represented based on their conjoint goals. According to this position, the ACC utilizes reward information to select tasks that are then accomplished through top-down control over action selection by the striatum. Computational simulations capture animal lesion data that implicate the medial prefrontal cortex in regulating physical and cognitive effort. Overall, this theory provides a unifying theoretical framework for understanding the ACC in terms of the pivotal role it plays in the hierarchical organization of effortful behavior

    A canonical theory of dynamic decision-making

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    Decision-making behavior is studied in many very different fields, from medicine and eco- nomics to psychology and neuroscience, with major contributions from mathematics and statistics, computer science, AI, and other technical disciplines. However the conceptual- ization of what decision-making is and methods for studying it vary greatly and this has resulted in fragmentation of the field. A theory that can accommodate various perspectives may facilitate interdisciplinary working. We present such a theory in which decision-making is articulated as a set of canonical functions that are sufficiently general to accommodate diverse viewpoints, yet sufficiently precise that they can be instantiated in different ways for specific theoretical or practical purposes. The canons cover the whole decision cycle, from the framing of a decision based on the goals, beliefs, and background knowledge of the decision-maker to the formulation of decision options, establishing preferences over them, and making commitments. Commitments can lead to the initiation of new decisions and any step in the cycle can incorporate reasoning about previous decisions and the rationales for them, and lead to revising or abandoning existing commitments. The theory situates decision-making with respect to other high-level cognitive capabilities like problem solving, planning, and collaborative decision-making. The canonical approach is assessed in three domains: cognitive and neuropsychology, artificial intelligence, and decision engineering
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