16,673 research outputs found
[How] Can Pluralist Approaches to Computational Cognitive Modeling of Human Needs and Values Save our Democracies?
In our increasingly digital societies, many companies have business models that perceive usersâ (or customersâ) personal data as a siloed resource, owned and controlled by the data controller rather than the data subjects. Collecting and processing such a massive amount of personal data could have many negative technical, social and economic consequences, including invading peopleâs privacy and autonomy. As a result, regulations such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) have tried to take steps towards a better implementation of the right to digital privacy. This paper proposes that such legal acts should be accompanied by the development of complementary technical solutions such as Cognitive Personal Assistant Systems to support people to effectively manage their personal data processing on the Internet. Considering the importance and sensitivity of personal data processing, such assistant systems should not only consider their ownerâs needs and values, but also be transparent, accountable and controllable. Pluralist approaches in computational cognitive modelling of human needs and values which are not bound to traditional paradigmatic borders such as cognitivism, connectionism, or enactivism, we argue, can create a balance between practicality and usefulness, on the one hand, and transparency, accountability, and controllability, on the other, while supporting and empowering humans in the digital world. Considering the threat to digital privacy as significant to contemporary democracies, the future implementation of such pluralist models could contribute to power-balance, fairness and inclusion in our societies
Towards a Reference Terminology for Ontology Research and Development in the Biomedical Domain
Ontology is a burgeoning field, involving researchers from the computer science, philosophy, data and software engineering, logic, linguistics, and terminology domains. Many ontology-related terms with precise meanings in one of these domains have different meanings in others. Our purpose here is to initiate a path towards disambiguation of such terms. We draw primarily on the literature of biomedical informatics, not least because the problems caused by unclear or ambiguous use of terms have been there most thoroughly addressed. We advance a proposal resting on a distinction of three levels too often run together in biomedical ontology research: 1. the level of reality; 2. the level of cognitive representations of this reality; 3. the level of textual and graphical artifacts. We propose a reference terminology for ontology research and development that is designed to serve as common hub into which the several competing disciplinary terminologies can be mapped. We then justify our terminological choices through a critical treatment of the âconcept orientationâ in biomedical terminology research
An Introduction to Ontology
Analytical philosophy of the last one hundred years has been heavily influenced by a doctrine to the effect that one can arrive at a correct ontology by paying attention to certain superficial (syntactic) features of first-order predicate logic as conceived by Frege and Russell. More specifically, it is a doctrine to the effect that the key to the ontological structure of reality is captured syntactically in the âFaâ (or, in more sophisticated versions, in the âRabâ) of first-order logic, where âFâ stands for what is general in reality and âaâ for what is individual. Hence âf(a)ntologyâ. Because predicate logic has exactly two syntactically different kinds of referring expressionsââFâ, âGâ, âRâ, etc., and âaâ, âbâ, âcâ, etc.âso reality must consist of exactly two correspondingly different kinds of entity: the general (properties, concepts) and the particular (things, objects), the relation between these two kinds of entity being revealed in the predicate-argument structure of atomic formulas in first-order logic
Ontology as Product-Service System: Lessons Learned from GO, BFO and DOLCE
This paper defends a view of the Gene Ontology (GO) and of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) as examples of what the manufacturing industry calls product-service systems. This means that they are products (the ontologies) bundled with a range of ontology services such as updates, training, help desk, and permanent identifiers. The paper argues that GO and BFO are contrasted in this respect with DOLCE, which approximates more closely to a scientific theory or a scientific publication. The paper provides a detailed overview of ontology services and concludes with a discussion of some implications of the product-service system approach for the understanding of the nature of applied ontology. Ontology developer communities are compared in this respect with developers of scientific theories and of standards (such as W3C). For each of these we can ask: what kinds of products do they develop and what kinds of services do they provide for the users of these products
What Normative Facts Should Political Theory Be About? Philosophy of Science meets Political Liberalism
Just as different sciences deal with different factsâsay, physics versus biologyâso we may
ask a similar question about normative theories. Is normative political theory concerned
with the same normative facts as moral theory or different ones? By developing an analogy
with the sciences, we argue that the normative facts of political theory belong to a higherâ
more coarse-grainedâlevel than those of moral theory. The latter are multiply realizable by
the former: competing facts at the moral level can underpin the same facts at the political
one. Consequently, some questions that moral theories answer are indeterminate at the
political level. This proposal offers a novel interpretation of John Rawlsâs idea that, in public
reasoning, we should abstract away from comprehensive moral doctrines. We contrast our
distinction between facts at different levels with the distinction between admissible and
inadmissible evidence and discuss some implications for the practice of political theory
Referent tracking for corporate memories
For corporate memory and enterprise ontology systems to be maximally useful,
they must be freed from certain barriers placed around them by traditional
knowledge management paradigms. This means, above all, that they must mirror
more faithfully those portions of reality which are salient to the workings of the
enterprise, including the changes that occur with the passage of time. The purpose
of this chapter is to demonstrate how theories based on philosophical realism can
contribute to this objective. We discuss how realism-based ontologies (capturing
what is generic) combined with referent tracking (capturing what is specific) can
play a key role in building the robust and useful corporate memories of the future
Social Objects
One reason for the renewed interest in Austrian philosophy, and especially in the work of Brentano and his followers, turns on the fact that analytic philosophers have become once again interested in the traditional problems of metaphysics. It was Brentano, Husserl, and the philosophers and psychologists whom they influenced, who drew attention to the thorny problem of intentionality, the problem of giving an account of the relation between acts and objects or, more generally, between the psychological environments of cognitive subjects and the different sorts of external (physical, geographical, social) environments which they inhabit. The present essay addresses this environmental version of the problem of intentionality. It draws not only on the work of Husserl and Scheler but also on the Gestalt psychological writings of Kurt Koffka and Kurt Lewin. It considers the influential subjective idealist theory of animal environments put forward by J. von UexkĂŒll and contrasts this with a realist theory of organism-environment interaction based on the work of the ecological psychologists J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker. This realist theory is then exploited as a basis for an ontology of social objects of a range of different sorts. (This is the English original of the French translation.
Definitions in ontologies
Definitions vary according to context of use and target audience. They must be made relevant for each context to fulfill their cognitive and linguistic goals. This involves adapting their logical structure, type of content, and form to each context of use. We examine from these perspectives the case of definitions in ontologies
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