A Stackelberg Game Approach Towards Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing (Online report)

Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.Comment: Submitted for possible journal publication. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1711.0105

A crowdsensing method for water resource monitoring in smart communities

Crowdsensing aims to empower a large group of individuals to collect large amounts of data using their mobile devices, with the goal of sharing the collected data. Existing crowdsensing studies do not consider all the activities and methods of the crowdsensing process and the key success factors related to the process. Nor do they investigate the profile and behaviour of potential participants. The aim of this study was to design a crowdsensing method for water resource monitoring in smart communities. This study opted for an exploratory study using the Engaged Scholarship approach, which allows the study of complex real-world problems based on the different perspectives of key stakeholders. The proposed Crowdsensing Method considers the social, technical and programme design components. The study proposes a programme design for the Crowdsensing Methodwhich is crowdsensing ReferenceFrameworkthat includes Crowdsensing Processwith key success factors and guidelines that should be considered in each phase of the process. The method also uses the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) to investigate citizens’intention to participate in crowdsensing for water resource monitoring and explores their attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control on these intentions. Understanding the profiles of potential participants can assist with designing crowdsensing systems with appropriate incentive mechanisms to achieve adequate user participation and good service quality. A survey was conducted to validate the theoretical TB model in a real-world context. Regression and correlation analyses demonstrated that the attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control can be used to predict participants’ intention to participate in crowdsensing for water resource monitoring. The survey results assisted with the development of an Incentive Mechanism as part of the Crowdsensing Method. This mechanism incorporates recruitment and incentive policies, as well as guidelines derived from the literature review and extant system analysis. The policies, called the OverSensepolicies, provide guidance for recruitment and rewarding of participants using the popular Stackelberg technique. The policies were evaluated using simulation experiments with a data set provided by the case study, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. The results of the simulation experiments illustrated that the OverSenserecruitmentpolicycan reduce the computing resources required for the recruitment of participants and that the recruitment policy performs better than random or naïve recruitment policies. The proposed Crowdsensing Method was evaluated using an ecosystem of success factors for mobile-based interventions identified in the literature and the Crowdsensing Method adhered to a majority (90%) of the success factors. This study also contributes information systems design theory by proposing several sets of guidelines for crowdsensing projects and the development of crowdsensing systems. This study fulfils an identified need to study the applicability of crowdsensing for water resource monitoring and explores how a crowdsensing method can create a smart community