Viewer Discretion is Advised: Disconnects between the Marketplace of Ideas and Social Media Used to Communicate Information during Emergencies and Public Health Crises

In a sense, social media has become the ideal manifestation of the Marketplace of Ideas (hereinafter Marketplace ) that Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated. The Marketplace concept will be discussed in greater detail below, but in brief, it is the theory that truth will surface over falsehoods when all opinions and ideas are freely expressed, because the value or worth of that opinion or idea will be determined on the market of public opinion. Part I of this Note will examine the Marketplace concept through the works of various legal and philosophical theorists. Chief among them is Frederick Schauer\u27s work Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, in which he discusses the Marketplace theory and the concept\u27s reliance on freedom of speech in order to pursue the truth and increase knowledge. Schauer points out two major assumptions that are critical to the Marketplace theory: 1) that reason prevails amongst all members of society and 2) that open debate and discussion are always beneficial because society will eventually be guided towards the truth. Schauer argues that neither of these assumptions are necessarily true, and in the instance of an emergency, the Marketplace theory breaks down entirely. However, Schauer and other Marketplace theorists\u27 analyses do not end our inquiry into the disconnects between the Marketplace model and the utilization of social media during emergencies and public health crises. This Note next explores the use of limited regulatory structures in an adaptive Marketplace in the new environment of digital speech. This Note will examine the argument that freedom of speech in the digital age should have some form of regulatory structure in place, based on principles normally associated with collective self-government, to manage discourse and structure public debate. Additionally, this Note will explore Supreme Court opinions by former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan, in which the justices articulate the existence of mini-marketplaces, with the possibility of different regulatory schemes depending on each unique marketplace. Having established the background necessary for an understanding of the Marketplace theory, Part II of this Note will next turn to the application of these concepts in the context of social media. Social media\u27s design openly embraces the Marketplace theory; it enables virtually anyone to contribute his comments, thoughts, and ideas to the conversation. These characteristics are equally applicable to social media\u27s use as a resource during emergencies and public health crises. However, the intersection of social media and emergency situations is where the pure Marketplace theory begins to break down and the false assumptions of the model that Schauer exposed begin to show. Part III of this Note explores three main disconnects with the Marketplace theory and its application to social media and emergencies: 1) time for vast quantities of information to filter through the system, 2) potential negative effects as a result of false or counterproductive information, and 3) vetting the trustworthiness of sources.[...] Lastly, Part IV of this Note will propose self-regulation as a potential solution to the disconnects between the Marketplace and social media\u27s use during an emergency or crisis. This Note will argue for a system of freedom of expression where self-regulatory structures exist to manage discourse and structure public debate, rather than a dialectical free-for-all in a pure Marketplace model. Relying on the theories of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, this Note will then argue that social media use during an emergency or crisis creates its own mini-marketplace subject to its own unique regulatory scheme--a scheme of self-regulation. Having proposed this potential solution, Part V of this Note will then analyze case studies in which social media was used during an emergency or crisis. These case studies will reveal the use of self-regulation, thus demonstrating the Marketplace\u27s ability to adapt in order to overcome the disconnects that arise in the context of the use of social media during emergencies and crises

A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents

This paper focuses on the research field of machine ethics and how it relates to a technological singularity—a hypothesized, futuristic event where artificial machines will have greater-than-human-level intelligence. One problem related to the singularity centers on the issue of whether human values and norms would survive such an event. To somehow ensure this, a number of artificial intelligence researchers have opted to focus on the development of artificial moral agents, which refers to machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. To date, different frameworks on how to arrive at these agents have been put forward. However, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which framework would likely yield a positive result. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers may contribute to the growing literature on artificial moral agency. While doing so, they could also think about how the said concept could affect other important philosophical concepts

Philosophy of Computer Science: An Introductory Course

There are many branches of philosophy called “the philosophy of X,” where X = disciplines ranging from history to physics. The philosophy of artificial intelligence has a long history, and there are many courses and texts with that title. Surprisingly, the philosophy of computer science is not nearly as well-developed. This article proposes topics that might constitute the philosophy of computer science and describes a course covering those topics, along with suggested readings and assignments

Originalism As Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique

My essay was intended as a critique of originalism from the perspective of intellectual history. I pointed out that originalism lacked a rigorous empirical method for analyzing what texts meant in the past. I suppose in some sense it is flattering that Solum has devoted much of his recent article to an attack on my earlier essay. Of course, flattery aside, it would have been more useful if Solum had stated my thesis correctly. For purposes of clarity, I have juxtaposed Solum’s description of my argument with what my essay actually said. Readers will be able to judge for themselves if Solum correctly captured the original meaning of my words

Beyond the Model Rules: The Place of Examples in Legal Ethics

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct defined the agenda for the post- Watergate renaissance in legal ethics. While there had been some form of codified precepts for American lawyers since at least 1908, Watergate inspired a desire to clean up a disgraced profession. The American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the Model Rules; law schools instituted mandatory courses; and scholars debated and analyzed the new Model Rules. The organized bar devoted much time and attention to developing these guidelines. The mainstream media covered both the bar\u27s original efforts and the subsequent adoption of the Model Rules by particular jurisdictions. Today, forty-three American jurisdictions have adopted ethics guidelines based closely on the Model Rules

“Beyond Standard Legal Positivism and ‘Aggressive’ Natural Law: Some Thoughts on Judge’ O’Scannlain’s ‘Third Way’”

With his contribution on "The Natural Law in the American Tradition," Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain has begun the indispensable task of laying the groundwork for sound jurisprudential reasoning in the natural law tradition. It is on the basis of this groundwork that we can begin to appreciate what natural law reasoning might mean, and what it does not mean, for contemporary American legal thinking. More specifically, it is on the basis of this groundwork that one can begin to articulate what might be called a "third way" of jurisprudential reasoning. This "third way" would steer clear of two opposed and equally problematic jurisprudential views; that is, it would steer clear of what we might call "standard legal positivism" (on the one hand), and (on the other hand) what Judge O'Scannlain calls the "aggressive" natural law jurisprudence of some contemporary theorists