Optimal Demand Response Strategy in Electricity Markets through Bi-level Stochastic Short-Term Scheduling

Current technology in the smart monitoring including Internet of Things (IoT) enables the electricity network at both transmission and distribution levels to apply demand response (DR) programs in order to ensure the secure and economic operation of power systems. Liberalization and restructuring in the power systems industry also empowers demand-side management in an optimum way. The impacts of DR scheduling on the electricity market can be revealed through the concept of DR aggregators (DRAs), being the interface between supply side and demand side. Various markets such as day-ahead and real-time markets are studied for supply-side management and demand-side management from the Independent System Operator (ISO) viewpoint or Distribution System Operator (DSO) viewpoint. To achieve the research goals, single or bi-level optimization models can be developed. The behavior of weather-dependent renewable energy sources, such as wind and photovoltaic power generation as uncertainty sources, is modeled by the Monte-Carlo Simulation method to cope with their negative impact on the scheduling process. Moreover, two-stage stochastic programming is applied in order to minimize the operation cost. The results of this study demonstrate the importance of considering all effective players in the market, such as DRAs and customers, on the operation cost. Moreover, modeling the uncertainty helps network operators to reduce the expenses, enabling a resilient and reliable network.A tecnologia atual na monitorização inteligente, incluindo a Internet of Things (IoT), permite que a rede elétrica ao nível da transporte e distribuição faça uso de programas de demand response (DR) para garantir a operação segura e económica dos sistemas de energia. A liberalização e a reestruturação da indústria dos sistemas de energia elétrica também promovem a gestão do lado da procura de forma otimizada. Os impactes da implementação de DR no mercado elétrico podem ser expressos pelo conceito de agregadores de DR (DRAs), sendo a interface entre o lado da oferta e o lado da procura de energia elétrica. Vários mercados, como os mercados diário e em tempo real, são estudados visando a gestão otimizada do ponto de vista do Independent System Operator (ISO) ou do Distribution System Operator (DSO). Para atingir os objetivos propostos, modelos de otimização em um ou dois níveis podem ser desenvolvidos. O comportamento das fontes de energia renováveis dependentes do clima, como a produção de energia eólica e fotovoltaica que acarretam incerteza, é modelado pelo método de simulação de Monte Carlo. Ainda, two-stage stochastic programming é aplicada para minimizar o custo de operação. Os resultados deste estudo demonstram a importância de considerar todos os participantes efetivos no mercado, como DRAs e clientes finais, no custo de operação. Ainda, considerando a incerteza no modelo beneficia os operadores da rede na redução de custos, capacitando a resiliência e fiabilidade da rede

A Bilevel Game-Theoretic Decision-Making Framework for Strategic Retailers in Both Local and Wholesale Electricity Markets

This paper proposes a bilevel game-theoretic model for multiple strategic retailers participating in both wholesale and local electricity markets while considering customers\u27 switching behaviors. At the upper level, each retailer maximizes its own profit by making optimal pricing decisions in the retail market and bidding decisions in the day-ahead wholesale (DAW) and local power exchange (LPE) markets. The interaction among multiple strategic retailers is formulated using the Bertrand competition model. For the lower level, there are three optimization problems. First, the welfare maximization problem is formulated for customers to model their switching behaviors among different retailers. Second, a market-clearing problem is formulated for the independent system operator (ISO) in the DAW market. Third, a novel LPE market is developed for retailers to facilitate their power balancing. In addition, the bilevel multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game forms an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) problem, which is solved by the diagonalization algorithm. Numerical results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the EPEC model and the importance of modeling customers\u27 switching behaviors. We corroborate that incentivizing customers\u27 switching behaviors and increasing the number of retailers facilitates retail competition, which results in reducing strategic retailers\u27 retail prices and profits. Moreover, the relationship between customers\u27 switching behaviors and welfare is reflected by a balance between the electricity purchasing cost (i.e., electricity price) and the electricity consumption level

A Bilevel Game-Theoretic Decision-Making Framework for Strategic Retailers in Both Local and Wholesale Electricity Markets

This paper proposes a bilevel game-theoretic model for multiple strategic retailers participating in both wholesale and local electricity markets while considering customers\u27 switching behaviors. At the upper level, each retailer maximizes its own profit by making optimal pricing decisions in the retail market and bidding decisions in the day-ahead wholesale (DAW) and local power exchange (LPE) markets. The interaction among multiple strategic retailers is formulated using the Bertrand competition model. For the lower level, there are three optimization problems. First, the welfare maximization problem is formulated for customers to model their switching behaviors among different retailers. Second, a market-clearing problem is formulated for the independent system operator (ISO) in the DAW market. Third, a novel LPE market is developed for retailers to facilitate their power balancing. In addition, the bilevel multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game forms an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) problem, which is solved by the diagonalization algorithm. Numerical results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the EPEC model and the importance of modeling customers\u27 switching behaviors. We corroborate that incentivizing customers\u27 switching behaviors and increasing the number of retailers facilitates retail competition, which results in reducing strategic retailers\u27 retail prices and profits. Moreover, the relationship between customers\u27 switching behaviors and welfare is reflected by a balance between the electricity purchasing cost (i.e., electricity price) and the electricity consumption level

Peer-to-peer energy trading between wind power producer and demand response aggregators for scheduling joint energy and reserve

In this article, a stochastic decision-making framework is presented in which a wind power producer (WPP) provides some required reserve capacity from demand response aggregators (DRAs) in a peer-to-peer (P2P) structure. In this structure, each DRA is able to choose the most competitive WPP, and purchase energy and sell reserve capacity to that WPP under a bilateral contract-based P2P electricity trading mechanism. Based on this structure, the WPP can determine the optimal buying reserve from DRAs to offset part of wind power deviation. The proposed framework is formulated as a bilevel stochastic model in which the upper level maximizes the WPP's profit based on the optimal bidding in the day-ahead and balancing markets, whereas the lower level minimizes DRAs' costs. In order to incorporate the risk associated with the WPP's decisions and to assess the effect of scheduling reserves on the profit variability, conditional value at risk is employed.©2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.fi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed

A regret-based stochastic bi-level framework for scheduling of DR aggregator under uncertainties

A regret-based stochastic bi-level framework for optimal decision making of a demand response (DR) aggregator to purchase energy from short term electricity market and wind generation units is proposed. Based on this model, the aggregator offers selling prices to the customers, aiming to maximize its expected profit in a competitive market. The clients’ reactions to the offering prices of aggregators and competition among rival aggregators are explicitly considered in the proposed model. Different sources of uncertainty impressing the decisions made by the aggregator are characterized via a set of scenarios and are accounted for by using stochastic programming. Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) is used for minimizing the expected value of regret over a set of worst scenarios whose collective probability is lower than a limitation value. Simulations are carried out to compare CVaR-based approach with value-at-risk (VaR) concept and traditional scenario based stochastic programming (SBSP) strategy. The findings show that the proposed CVaR strategy outperforms the SBSP approach in terms of making more risk-averse energy biddings and attracting more customers in the competitive market. The results show that although the aggregator offers the same prices in both CVaR and VaR approaches, the average of regret is lower in the VaR approach.fi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed

The competition and equilibrium in power markets under decarbonization and decentralization

Equilibrium analysis has been widely studied as an effective tool to model gaming interactions and predict market results. However, as competition modes are fundamentally changed by the decarbonization and decentralization of power systems, analysis techniques must evolve. This article comprehensively reviews recent developments in modelling methods, practical settings and solution techniques in equilibrium analysis. Firstly, we review equilibrium in the evolving wholesale power markets which feature new entrants, novel trading products and multi-stage clearing. Secondly, the competition modes in the emerging distribution market and distributed resource aggregation are reviewed, and we compare peer-to-peer clearing, cooperative games and Stackelberg games. Furthermore, we summarize the methods to treat various information acquisition degrees, risk preferences and rationalities of market participants. To deal with increasingly complex market settings, this review also covers refined analytical techniques and agent-based models used to compute the equilibrium. Finally, based on this review, this paper summarizes key issues in the gaming and equilibrium analysis in power markets under decarbonization and decentralization

Optimal Decision Making Framework of an Electric Vehicle Aggregator in Future and Pool markets

Electric vehicle (EV) aggregator, as an agent between the electricity market and EV owners, participates in the future and pool market to supply EVs’ requirement. Because of the uncertain nature of pool prices and EVs’ behaviour, this paper proposed a two-stage scenario-based model to obtain optimal decision making of an EV aggregator. To deal with mentioned uncertainties, the aggregator’s risk aversion is applied using conditional value at risk (CVaR) method in the proposed model. The proposed two-stage risk-constrained decision-making problem is applied to maximize EV aggregator’s expected profit in an uncertain environment. The aggregator can participate in the future and pool market to buy the required energy of EVs and offer optimal charge/discharge prices to the EV owners. In this model, in order to assess the effects of EVs owners’ reaction to the aggregator’s offered prices on the purchases from electricity markets, a sensitivity analysis over risk factor is performed. The numerical results demonstrate that with the application of the proposed model, the aggregator can supply EVs with lower purchases from markets