"A Post-Keynesian View of Central Bank Independence, Policy Targets, and the Rules-versus-Discretion Debate"

This paper addresses three issues surrounding monetary policy formation: policy independence, choice of operating targets, and rules versus discretion. According to the New Monetary Consensus, the central bank needs policy independence to build credibility; the operating target is the overnight interbank lending rate, and the ultimate goal is price stability. This paper provides an alternative view, arguing that an effective central bank cannot be independent as conventionally defined, where effectiveness is indicated by ability to hit an overnight nominal interest rate target. Discretionary policy is rejected, as are conventional views of the central bank's ability to achieve traditional goals such as robust growth, low inflation, and high employment. Thus, the paper returns to Keynes's call for low interest rates and euthanasia of the rentier.

Analysis on Keynes General Theory and the Transformation of Modern Capitalism

Beginning in the late 1950s during the industrial revolution, new classical macroeconomists began to disagree with the methodology employed by Keynes and his successors. Keynesians emphasized the dependence of consumption on disposable income and, also, of investment on current profits and current cash flow, through the concept of “The General Theory” principles. In addition, Keynesians hypothesized a Phillips curve that tied nominal wage inflation to unemployment rate. Meanwhile, in support to these theories, Keynesians typically traced the logical foundations of their model using introspection and supported their assumptions with statistical evidence. The result of this shift in methodology produced several important divergences from Keynesian Macroeconomics: that is, independence of Consumption and current Income (life-cycle permanent income hypothesis), irrelevance of Current Profits to Investment (Modigliani–Miller theorem), long run independence of inflation and unemployment (natural rate of unemployment), the inability of monetary policy to stabilize output (rational expectations) and lastly, irrelevance of Taxes and Budget Deficits to Consumption (Ricardian equivalence). Meanwhile, some eminent scholars ascribed modern capitalism to the financial institutions, Unemployment and inflation, business cycle, and fluctuations in Phillips curve assumed by Keynes. Although acknowledging some evidence in support of these modern interpretations of capitalism, this current paper argues that Keynes also developed the fundamental elements of a general theory of unemployment, business cycle and potential instability under capitalism, without having clearly unscrambled these elements from more institutionally specific ideas. Such a general theory applies to all types of capitalist economy, but still is institutionally specific, referring to capitalism. The paper extracts this more general message, which was partly obscured by Keynes's emphasis on modern financial institutions, investments and unemployment. Keywords: Capitalism, Keynesianism, Phillips curve, Investment, Modern-Capitalism, “The General Theory” Unemployment, Financial Institutions and Neo-Keynesian and Classical Theory

(Post) Keynesian alternative to inflation targeting*

While the mainstream policies can not be surpassed in the enchanted ‘optimizable'world, (Post) Keynesians have to resign themselves to manage without magic wand inthe uncertain real world. The paper discusses the monetary rules proposed in the recentPost Keynesian literature. It argues that the long-term interest rate is too imperfectlycontrolled for such rules being feasible. Consequently, the quest for credibility isirrelevant, for it makes not much sense to wonder whether authorities will honour theircommitment on an unfeasible ideal target. The right question is whether authoritiespursue convincing objectives so as to move the conventional expectation of the future(and the related interest rate) towards full employment. It is a matter of confidence.The basic principles involved in such an approach to economic policy are discussed.Interest rate rule; Inflation targeting, PostKeynesian, Monetary policy

Between the cup and the lip

The paper states that, although Post Keynesian interest rules may be feasible and sustainable in favourable circumstances, there is a shared difficulty as for the setting of long-term interest rates in a context of strong uncertainty and shifting liquidity preference. According to Keynes theory of the interest rate, the variation in the long-term interest rate that authorities are seeking for must correspond to the market convention, in order to preserve the state of the confidence and avoid disruptive shifts in the demand for money. It is argued that authorities should therefore announce a long-term interest rate target in accordance with the normative objective the opinion has debated on and agreed with. Also, such a conventional target cannot be very distant from the current rate, and the short-term rates authorities control should be adjusted gradually (but not slowly). Moving the interest rate convention is harder to get in the context of the current crisis, because of the deleterious effects on private and public accounts, and thereby on the state of confidence, that the innumerable amounts of bad debts have carried. We put forward strong arguments in favour of reducing the amount of bad debts by means of temporary large public deficits and accommodating monetary policies (which is not to say permanent large deficits and inflationary policies), even though long-term interest rate do not respond much to the short-term impulses of central banks.interest rate; rule; convention; monetary policy; financial crisis

(Post) Keynesian alternative to inflation targeting

While the mainstream policies can not be surpassed in the enchanted ‘optimizable'world, (Post) Keynesians have to resign themselves to manage without magic wand inthe uncertain real world. The paper discusses the monetary rules proposed in the recentPost Keynesian literature. It argues that the long-term interest rate is too imperfectlycontrolled for such rules being feasible. Consequently, the quest for credibility isirrelevant, for it makes not much sense to wonder whether authorities will honour theircommitment on an unfeasible ideal target. The right question is whether authoritiespursue convincing objectives so as to move the conventional expectation of the future(and the related interest rate) towards full employment. It is a matter of confidence.The basic principles involved in such an approach to economic policy are discussed

A Post-Keynesian macroeconomic policy mix as an alternative to the New Consensus approach

In a Post-Keynesian (PK) model we show that inflation targeting monetary policies, as the main stabilisation tool proposed by the New Consensus Model (NCM), in the short run are only adequate for certain values of the model parameters, but are either unnecessary, counterproductive, or limited in their effectiveness for other values. Taking into account medium-run cost and distribution effects of interest rate variations renders monetary policies completely inappropriate as an economic stabiliser. Based on these results we argue that the NCM macroeconomic policy assignment should be replaced by a PK assignment. Enhancing employment without increasing inflation will be possible if macroeconomic policies are coordinated along the following lines: The central bank targets distribution between rentiers, on the hand, and firms and employees, on the other hand, and sets low real interest rates, wage bargaining parties target inflation and fiscal policies are applied for short- and medium-run real stabilisation purposes.Macroeconomic policies, New Consensus Model, Post-Keynesian Model, inflation targeting

Between the cup and the lip: On Post Keynesian interest rate rules and long-term interest rates management

This paper has been presented at the IEPI-Laurentian U. conference: 'The political economy of central banking', Toronto, 27-28 May 2009. It provides substantial developments of the main ideas contained in a previous paper prepared for the Post Keynesian Economics Study Group workshop: Inflation targeting: is there a credible alternative? Balliol College, Oxford, Friday 4 April 2008 (rewritten in association with M. Hayes and published as "Post Keynesian alternative to inflation targeting", Intervention, 6 (1), 67-81.).The paper states that, although Post Keynesian interest rules may be feasible and sustainable in favourable circumstances, there is a shared difficulty as for the setting of long-term interest rates in a context of strong uncertainty and shifting liquidity preference. According to Keynes theory of the interest rate, the variation in the long-term interest rate that authorities are seeking for must correspond to the market convention, in order to preserve the state of the confidence and avoid disruptive shifts in the demand for money. It is argued that authorities should therefore announce a long-term interest rate target in accordance with the normative objective the opinion has debated on and agreed with. Also, such a conventional target cannot be very distant from the current rate, and the short-term rates authorities control should be adjusted gradually (but not slowly). Moving the interest rate convention is harder to get in the context of the current crisis, because of the deleterious effects on private and public accounts, and thereby on the state of confidence, that the innumerable amounts of bad debts have carried. We put forward strong arguments in favour of reducing the amount of bad debts by means of temporary large public deficits and accommodating monetary policies (which is not to say permanent large deficits and inflationary policies), even though long-term interest rate do not respond much to the short-term impulses of central banks

"Financial Stability, Regulatory Buffers, and Economic Growth: Some Postrecession Regulatory Implications"

Over the past 40 years, regulatory reforms have been undertaken on the assumption that markets are efficient and self-corrective, crises are random events that are unpreventable, the purpose of an economic system is to grow, and economic growth necessarily improves well-being. This narrow framework of discussion has important implications for what is expected from financial regulation, and for its implementation. Indeed, the goal becomes developing a regulatory structure that minimizes the impact on economic growth while also providing high-enough buffers against shocks. In addition, given the overarching importance of economic growth, economic variables like profits, net worth, and low default rates have been core indicators of the financial health of banking institutions. This paper argues that the framework within which financial reforms have been discussed is not appropriate to promoting financial stability. Improving capital and liquidity buffers will not advance economic stability, and measures of profitability and delinquency are of limited use to detect problems early. The paper lays out an alternative regulatory framework and proposes a fundamental shift in the way financial regulation is performed, similar to what occurred after the Great Depression. It is argued that crises are not random, and that their magnitude can be greatly limited by specific pro-active policies. These policies would focus on understanding what Ponzi finance is, making a difference between collateral-based and income-based Ponzi finance, detecting Ponzi finance, managing financial innovations, decreasing competitions in the banking industry, ending too-big-to-fail, and deemphasizing economic growth as the overarching goal of an economic system. This fundamental change in regulatory and supervisory practices would lead to very different ways in which to check the health of our financial institutions while promoting a more sustainable economic system from both a financial and a socio-ecological point of view.Financial Crisis; Financial Regulation; Banking Supervision; Sustainability

"A Post Keynesian Perspective on the Rise of Central Bank Independence: A Dubious Success Story in Monetary Economics"

This paper critically assesses the rise of central bank independence (CBI) as an apparent success story in modern monetary economics. As to the observed rise in CBI since the late 1980s, we single out the role of peculiar German traditions in spreading CBI across continental Europe, while its global spread may be largely attributable to the rise of neoliberalism. As to the empirical evidence alleged to support CBI, we are struck by the nonexistence of any compelling evidence for such a case. The theoretical support for CBI ostensibly provided by modeling exercises on the so-called time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy is found equally wanting. Ironically, New Classical modelers promoting the idea of maximum CBI unwittingly reinstalled a (New Classical) “benevolent dictator” fiction in disguise. Post Keynesian critiques of CBI focus on the money neutrality postulate as well as potential conflicts between CBI and fundamental democratic values. John Maynard Keynes’s own contributions on the issue of CBI are found worth revisiting.Central Banks; Central Bank Independence; Democratic Accountability; Monetary Policy; Time-inconsistency