A programming and a modelling perspective on the evaluation of Java card implementations

Java Card Technology has provided a huge step forward in programming smart cards: from assembler to using a high level Object Oriented language. However, the authors have found some differences between the current Java Card version (2.1) and main stream Java that may restrict the benefits of using Java achievable in smartcard programming. In particular, efforts towards evaluating Java Card implementations at a high level of assurance may be hampered by the presence of these differences as well as by the complexity of the Java Card VM and API. The goal of the present paper is to detail the differences from a programming and a modelling point of view

Authentication : can mobile environments be secured?

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 29-32).A mobile system is defined as a network in which one or more of the interconnection links is a wireless medium. Wireless media include but are not limited to, cellular or radio transmissions, satellite services, and wireless computer networks. The fundamental operations of storage, processing, and transmission of information are undergoing such rapid improvement that the application of securing mobile systems cannot keep up with the rate of advance. This research analyzes security problems and investigates possible solutions that stem from the absence of a "fixed" link between the user and service provider in mobile systems. This research approaches all security issues from the authentication standpoint, i.e. the process of reliably verifying the identity of two parties in a communication channel. Once identities have been verified, the channel authenticity must be maintained. Mobile communication systems that utilize three systems, symmetric ciphers, public key systems, and zero-knowledge techniques, are shown to be highly secure. The level security is not degraded due to the absence of a "fixed" link between the user and service provider

DHWM: A Scheme for Managing Watermarking Keys in the Aquarelle Multimedia Distributed System

International audienceThis paper presents secure architecture and protocols for managing Intellectual Property Rights in distributed content databases in a close environment. The implementation of this architecture is cur- rently being realized in the European project AQUARELLE. Registered users will access on the Internet to high value content through secure servers. The main interest of this paper is protocols and architecture de- veloped for using watermarking technologies, with a clever and efficient key management based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol and Trusted Third Parties (TTP). This paper presents a short survey of watermarking technologies. Next Aquarelle background is specified, along with the chosen watermarking algorithm, which is convenient for the project. Next the DHWM key exchange is presented, based on the simple idea that watermarking and verification can be separated. This scheme uses the Diffie-Hellman key- exchange protocol. Next some hints on the implementation of the scheme and on its correctness are given

A B model for ensuring soundness of a large subset of the Java Card virtual machine

AbstractJava Cards are a new generation of smart cards that use the Java programming language. As smart cards are usually used to supply security to an information system, security requirements are very strong. The byte code interpreter and verifier are crucial components of such cards, and proving their safety can become a competitive advantage. Previous works have been done on methodology for proving the soundness of the byte code interpreter and verifier using the B method. It refines an abstract defensive interpreter into a byte code verifier and a byte code interpreter. However, this work had only been tested on a very small subset of the Java Card instruction set. This paper presents a work aiming at verifying the scalability of this previous work. The original instruction subset of about 10 instructions has been extended to a larger subset of more than one hundred instructions, and the additional cost of the proof has been managed by modifying the specification in order to group opcodes by properties

Security Protocols and Evidence: Where Many Payment Systems Fail

As security protocols are used to authenticate more transactions, they end up being relied on in legal proceedings. Designers often fail to anticipate this. Here we show how the EMV protocol – the dominant card payment system worldwide – does not produce adequate evidence for resolving disputes. We propose five principles for designing systems to produce robust evidence. We apply these principles to other systems such as Bitcoin, electronic banking and phone payment apps. We finally propose specific modifications to EMV that could allow disputes to be resolved more efficiently and fairly