33 research outputs found

    QuanShield: Protecting against Side-Channels Attacks using Self-Destructing Enclaves

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    Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow user processes to create enclaves that protect security-sensitive computation against access from the OS kernel and the hypervisor. Recent work has shown that TEEs are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that allow an adversary to learn secrets shielded in enclaves. The majority of such attacks trigger exceptions or interrupts to trace the control or data flow of enclave execution. We propose QuanShield, a system that protects enclaves from side-channel attacks that interrupt enclave execution. The main idea behind QuanShield is to strengthen resource isolation by creating an interrupt-free environment on a dedicated CPU core for running enclaves in which enclaves terminate when interrupts occur. QuanShield avoids interrupts by exploiting the tickless scheduling mode supported by recent OS kernels. QuanShield then uses the save area (SA) of the enclave, which is used by the hardware to support interrupt handling, as a second stack. Through an LLVM-based compiler pass, QuanShield modifies enclave instructions to store/load memory references, such as function frame base addresses, to/from the SA. When an interrupt occurs, the hardware overwrites the data in the SA with CPU state, thus ensuring that enclave execution fails. Our evaluation shows that QuanShield significantly raises the bar for interrupt-based attacks with practical overhead.Comment: 15pages, 5 figures, 5 table

    Undermining User Privacy on Mobile Devices Using AI

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    Over the past years, literature has shown that attacks exploiting the microarchitecture of modern processors pose a serious threat to the privacy of mobile phone users. This is because applications leave distinct footprints in the processor, which can be used by malware to infer user activities. In this work, we show that these inference attacks are considerably more practical when combined with advanced AI techniques. In particular, we focus on profiling the activity in the last-level cache (LLC) of ARM processors. We employ a simple Prime+Probe based monitoring technique to obtain cache traces, which we classify with Deep Learning methods including Convolutional Neural Networks. We demonstrate our approach on an off-the-shelf Android phone by launching a successful attack from an unprivileged, zeropermission App in well under a minute. The App thereby detects running applications with an accuracy of 98% and reveals opened websites and streaming videos by monitoring the LLC for at most 6 seconds. This is possible, since Deep Learning compensates measurement disturbances stemming from the inherently noisy LLC monitoring and unfavorable cache characteristics such as random line replacement policies. In summary, our results show that thanks to advanced AI techniques, inference attacks are becoming alarmingly easy to implement and execute in practice. This once more calls for countermeasures that confine microarchitectural leakage and protect mobile phone applications, especially those valuing the privacy of their users

    Efficiently Hardening SGX Enclaves against Memory Access Pattern Attacks via Dynamic Program Partitioning

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    Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware transactions, enabled by Intel TSX, that return control to the software upon unexpected cache misses and interruptions so that the existing side-channel attacks exploiting these micro-architectural events can be detected and mitigated. However, existing hardening schemes scale only to small-data computation, with a typical working set smaller than one or few times (e.g., 88 times) of a CPU data cache. This work tackles the data scalability and performance efficiency of security hardening schemes of Intel SGX enclaves against memory-access pattern side channels. The key insight is that the size of TSX transactions in the target computation is critical, both performance- and security-wise. Unlike the existing designs, this work dynamically partitions target computations to enlarge transactions while avoiding aborts, leading to lower performance overhead and improved side-channel security. We materialize the dynamic partitioning scheme and build a C++ library to monitor and model cache utilization at runtime. We further build a data analytical system using the library and implement various external oblivious algorithms. Performance evaluation shows that our work can effectively increase transaction size and reduce the execution time by up to two orders of magnitude compared with the state-of-the-art solutions

    Using Metrics Suites to Improve the Measurement of Privacy in Graphs

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    The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.Social graphs are widely used in research (e.g., epidemiology) and business (e.g., recommender systems). However, sharing these graphs poses privacy risks because they contain sensitive information about individuals. Graph anonymization techniques aim to protect individual users in a graph, while graph de-anonymization aims to re-identify users. The effectiveness of anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms is usually evaluated with privacy metrics. However, it is unclear how strong existing privacy metrics are when they are used in graph privacy. In this paper, we study 26 privacy metrics for graph anonymization and de-anonymization and evaluate their strength in terms of three criteria: monotonicity indicates whether the metric indicates lower privacy for stronger adversaries; for within-scenario comparisons, evenness indicates whether metric values are spread evenly; and for between-scenario comparisons, shared value range indicates whether metrics use a consistent value range across scenarios. Our extensive experiments indicate that no single metric fulfills all three criteria perfectly. We therefore use methods from multi-criteria decision analysis to aggregate multiple metrics in a metrics suite, and we show that these metrics suites improve monotonicity compared to the best individual metric. This important result enables more monotonic, and thus more accurate, evaluations of new graph anonymization and de-anonymization algorithms

    InversOS: Efficient Control-Flow Protection for AArch64 Applications with Privilege Inversion

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    With the increasing popularity of AArch64 processors in general-purpose computing, securing software running on AArch64 systems against control-flow hijacking attacks has become a critical part toward secure computation. Shadow stacks keep shadow copies of function return addresses and, when protected from illegal modifications and coupled with forward-edge control-flow integrity, form an effective and proven defense against such attacks. However, AArch64 lacks native support for write-protected shadow stacks, while software alternatives either incur prohibitive performance overhead or provide weak security guarantees. We present InversOS, the first hardware-assisted write-protected shadow stacks for AArch64 user-space applications, utilizing commonly available features of AArch64 to achieve efficient intra-address space isolation (called Privilege Inversion) required to protect shadow stacks. Privilege Inversion adopts unconventional design choices that run protected applications in the kernel mode and mark operating system (OS) kernel memory as user-accessible; InversOS therefore uses a novel combination of OS kernel modifications, compiler transformations, and another AArch64 feature to ensure the safety of doing so and to support legacy applications. We show that InversOS is secure by design, effective against various control-flow hijacking attacks, and performant on selected benchmarks and applications (incurring overhead of 7.0% on LMBench, 7.1% on SPEC CPU 2017, and 3.0% on Nginx web server).Comment: 18 pages, 9 figures, 4 table

    A Large-Scale Study on the Prevalence and Usage of TEE-based Features on Android

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    In the realm of mobile security, where OS-based protections have proven insufficient against robust attackers, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as a hardware-based security technology. Despite the industry's persistence in advancing TEE technology, the impact on end users and developers remains largely unexplored. This study addresses this gap by conducting a large-scale analysis of TEE utilization in Android applications, focusing on the key areas of cryptography, digital rights management, biometric authentication, and secure dialogs. To facilitate our extensive analysis, we introduce Mobsec Analytika, a framework tailored for large-scale app examinations, which we make available to the research community. Through the analysis of 170,550 popular Android apps, our analysis illuminates the implementation of TEE-related features and their contextual usage. Our findings reveal that TEE features are predominantly utilized indirectly through third-party libraries, with only 6.7% of apps directly invoking the APIs. Moreover, the study reveals the underutilization of the recent TEE-based UI feature Protected Confirmation.Comment: Additional information and artifacts on project page: https://www.cs1.tf.fau.de/android-tee-study

    Approximating ReLU on a Reduced Ring for Efficient MPC-based Private Inference

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    Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows users to offload machine learning inference on untrusted servers without having to share their privacy-sensitive data. Despite their strong security properties, MPC-based private inference has not been widely adopted in the real world due to their high communication overhead. When evaluating ReLU layers, MPC protocols incur a significant amount of communication between the parties, making the end-to-end execution time multiple orders slower than its non-private counterpart. This paper presents HummingBird, an MPC framework that reduces the ReLU communication overhead significantly by using only a subset of the bits to evaluate ReLU on a smaller ring. Based on theoretical analyses, HummingBird identifies bits in the secret share that are not crucial for accuracy and excludes them during ReLU evaluation to reduce communication. With its efficient search engine, HummingBird discards 87--91% of the bits during ReLU and still maintains high accuracy. On a real MPC setup involving multiple servers, HummingBird achieves on average 2.03--2.67x end-to-end speedup without introducing any errors, and up to 8.64x average speedup when some amount of accuracy degradation can be tolerated, due to its up to 8.76x communication reduction

    IoTBeholder: A Privacy Snooping Attack on User Habitual Behaviors from Smart Home Wi-Fi Traffic

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    With the deployment of a growing number of smart home IoT devices, privacy leakage has become a growing concern. Prior work on privacy-invasive device localization, classification, and activity identification have proven the existence of various privacy leakage risks in smart home environments. However, they only demonstrate limited threats in real world due to many impractical assumptions, such as having privileged access to the user's home network. In this paper, we identify a new end-to-end attack surface using IoTBeholder, a system that performs device localization, classification, and user activity identification. IoTBeholder can be easily run and replicated on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices such as mobile phones or personal computers, enabling attackers to infer user's habitual behaviors from smart home Wi-Fi traffic alone. We set up a testbed with 23 IoT devices for evaluation in the real world. The result shows that IoTBeholder has good device classification and device activity identification performance. In addition, IoTBeholder can infer the users' habitual behaviors and automation rules with high accuracy and interpretability. It can even accurately predict the users' future actions, highlighting a significant threat to user privacy that IoT vendors and users should highly concern
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