872,251 research outputs found

    Black & Davidson on Metaphor

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    Most theories of metaphor look at what occurs inside a metaphorical phrase and posit a shift in meaning in the metaphorical words. This includes the classic “Models and Metaphor,” by Max Black, who distinguishes between the literal words of the phrase and the metaphorical words. On this view, the two interact in such a way that the meanings of the metaphorical words change. In another view, Donald Davidson takes a radical stance in his “What Metaphors Mean” to assert that the words in a metaphor mean nothing other than their original, literal meaning. Both theories suffer from problems: Black fails to explain how the metaphorical words change in meaning. Davidson, on the other hand, while succeeding in refuting most of the “other meaning” theories, only weakly suggests “use” of metaphor to explain its power. In this paper, I will clarify the two respective theories and attempt to reconcile or fuse them. We will find that Black looks to the language itself and finds a shift in meaning, while Davidson asserts that meaning stays literal, and we must instead look at what occurs between the speaker and hearer. An examination of Davidson’s later theory of interpretation applied to Black’s theory of metaphor will clarify Davidson’s ‘use’ as well as allow for literal meaning to stay in metaphor

    Universality caused: the case of renormalization group explanation

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    Recently, many have argued that there are certain kinds of abstract mathematical explanations that are noncausal. In particular, the irrelevancy approach suggests that abstracting away irrelevant causal details can leave us with a noncausal explanation. In this paper, I argue that the common example of Renormalization Group explanations of universality used to motivate the irrelevancy approach deserves more critical attention. I argue that the reasons given by those who hold up RG as noncausal do not stand up to critical scrutiny. As a result, the irrelevancy approach and the line between casual and noncausal explanation deserves more scrutiny

    Abstraction and its Limits: Finding Space for Novel Explanation.

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    Several modern accounts of explanation acknowledge the importance of abstraction and idealization for our explanatory practice. However, once we allow a role for abstraction, questions remain. I ask whether the relation between explanations at different theoretical levels should be thought of wholly in terms of abstraction, and argue that changes of variable between theories can lead to novel explanations that are not merely abstractions of some more detailed picture. I use the example of phase transitions as described by statistical mechanics and thermodynamics to illustrate this, and to demonstrate some details of the relationship between abstraction, idealization, and novel explanation

    Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Critique of Darwin

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    Despite his position as one of the first philosophers to write in the ‘post-Darwinian’ world, the critique of Darwin by Friedrich Nietzsche is often ignored, for a host of unsatisfactory reasons. I argue that Nietzsche’s critique of Darwin is important to the study of both Nietzsche’s and Darwin’s impact on philosophy. Further, I show that the central claims of Nietzsche’s critique have been broadly misunderstood. I then present a new reading of Nietzsche’s core criticism of Darwin. An important part of Nietzsche’s response can best be understood as an aesthetic critique of Darwin, reacting to what he saw as Darwin’s having drained life of an essential component of objective aesthetic value. For Nietzsche, Darwin’s theory is false because it is too intellectual, because it searches for rules, regulations, and uniformity in a realm where none of these are to be found – and, moreover, where they should not be found. Such a reading goes farthest toward making Nietzsche’s criticism substantive and relevant. Finally, I attempt to relate this novel explanation of Nietzsche’s critique to topics in contemporary philosophy of biology, particularly work on the evolutionary explanation of culture

    A ConversĂŁo da ConsciĂȘncia como princĂ­pio da moralidade

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    Kant mostra que uma teoria fundamental da normatividade e da moralidade nĂŁo pode dar nem uma explanação nem uma prova da normatividade, mas apenas pode articular e explicitar sua origem. Ela pode fazer isso indicando o lugar ou o topos e a virada ou a trope de seu originar. Conforme Kant, o topos da normatividade Ă© a vontade enquanto razĂŁo prĂĄtica e sua trope Ă© o uso geral desta razĂŁo que tipicamente Ă© instrumental, no sentido da reflexĂŁo. A trope da origem da moralidade Ă© a autonomia, i.e., a virada da razĂŁo prĂĄtica sobre si mesma, tornando-se pura neste ato. Nisso, a razĂŁo prĂĄtica estabelece sua prĂłpria forma como lei para si mesma, na forma do imperativo categĂłrico. Em consequĂȘncia disso, a Ă©tica fundamental serve duas funçÔes : formalmente, ela fornece evidĂȘncia da originalidade e autenticidade da moralidade; materialmente, ela fornece um princĂ­pio criteriolĂłgico para o conteĂșdo da moralidade. O artigo argumenta que Kant estava certo em sua visĂŁo da fundamentação da Ă©tica, mas estava errado com relação Ă  maneira como ele tentou cumprir as exigĂȘncias estabelecidas. O topos da normatividade e, em consequĂȘncia disso, da moralidade, nĂŁo pode ser a razĂŁo, mas precisa ser a consciĂȘncia ou, mais exatamente, o saber de se ; e sua trope fundamental nĂŁo pode ser reflexĂŁo e, depois, autonomia, mas precisa ser o que pode ser descrito como conversĂŁo da consciĂȘncia. Essa conversĂŁo pode ser identificada com o philein no sentido de AristĂłteles. Este “amar amigĂĄvel” tem quatro aspectos diferentes: desejo, cognição, benevolĂȘncia e reconhecimento. Quando este philein for recĂ­proco e estiver continuamente vivido, nasce a philia, a amizade. Essa Ă© descrita, consequentemente, como o topos da origem de normatividade e moralidade

    Session 4: Evolutionary Indeterminism

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    Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Workshop in History and Philosophy of Biology, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, March 23-24 2001 Session 4: Evolutionary Indeterminis
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