Layers in the Fabric of Mind: A Critical Review of Cognitive Ontogeny

The essay is critically examines the conceptual problems with the influential modularity model of mind. We shall see that one of the essential characters of modules, namely informational encapsulation, is not only inessential, it ties a knot at a crucial place blocking the solution to the problem of understanding the formation of concepts from percepts (nodes of procedural knowledge). Subsequently I propose that concept formation takes place by modulation of modules leading to cross-representations, which were otherwise prevented by encapsulation. It must be noted that the argument is not against modular architecture, but a variety of an architecture that prevents interaction among modules. This is followed by a brief argument demonstrating that module without modularization, i.e. without developmental history, is impossible. Finally the emerging picture of cognitive development is drawn in the form of the layers in the fabric of mind, with a brief statement of the possible implications

Tracing the Biological Roots of Knowledge

The essay is a critical review of three possible approaches in the theory of knowledge while tracing the biological roots of knowledge: empiricist, rationalist and developmentalist approaches. Piaget's genetic epistemology, a developmentalist approach, is one of the first comprehensive treatments on the question of tracing biological roots of knowledge. This developmental approach is currently opposed, without questioning the biological roots of knowledge, by the more popular rationalist approach, championed by Chomsky. Developmental approaches are generally coherent with cybernetic models, of which the theory of autopoiesis proposed by Maturana and Varela made a significant theoretical move in proposing an intimate connection between metabolism and knowledge. Modular architecture is currently considered more or less an undisputable model for both biology as well as cognitive science. By suggesting that modulation of modules is possible by motor coordination, a proposal is made to account for higher forms of conscious cognition within the four distinguishable layers of the human mind. Towards the end, the problem of life and cognition is discussed in the context of the evolution of complex cognitive systems, suggesting the unique access of phylogeny during the ontogeny of human beings as a very special case, and how the problem cannot be dealt with independent of the evolution of coding systems in nature

Consciousness operates beyond the timescale for discerning time intervals: implications for Q-mind theories and analysis of quantum decoherence in brain

This paper presents in details how the subjective time is constructed by the brain cortex via reading packets of information called "time labels", produced by the right basal ganglia that act as brain timekeeper. Psychophysiological experiments have measured the subjective "time quanta" to be 40 ms and show that consciousness operates beyond that scale - an important result having profound implications for the Q-mind theory. Although in most current mainstream biophysics research on cognitive processes, the brain is modelled as a neural network obeying classical physics, Penrose (1989, 1997) and others have argued that quantum mechanics may play an essential role, and that successful brain simulations can only be performed with a quantum computer. Tegmark (2000) showed that make-or-break issue for the quantum models of mind is whether the relevant degrees of freedom of the brain can be sufficiently isolated to retain their quantum coherence and tried to settle the issue with detailed calculations of the relevant decoherence rates. He concluded that the mind is classical rather than quantum system, however his reasoning is based on biological inconsistency. Here we present detailed exposition of molecular neurobiology and define the dynamical timescale of cognitive processes linked to consciousness to be 10-15 ps showing that macroscopic quantum coherent phenomena in brain are not ruled out, and even may provide insight in understanding life, information and consciousness

Merleau-Ponty and neuroaesthetics: Two approaches to performance and technology

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Digital Creativity, 23(3-4), 225 - 238, 2012. Copyright @ 2012 Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/14626268.2012.709941.Assisted by the rapid growth of digital technology, which has enhanced its ambitions, performance is an increasingly popular area of artistic practice. This article seeks to contextualise this within two methodologically divergent yet complimentary intellectual tendencies. The first is the work of the philosopher Merleau-Ponty, who recognised that our experience of the world has an inescapably ‘embodied’ quality, not reducible to mental accounts, which can be vicariously extended through specific instrumentation. The second is the developing field of neuroaesthetics; that is, neurological research directed towards the analysis, in brain-functional terms, of our experiences of objects and events which are culturally deemed to be of artistic significance. I will argue that both these contexts offer promising approaches to interpreting developments in contemporary performance, which has achieved critical recognition without much antecedent theoretical support

Twilight States: Sleepwalking, Liminal Consciousness, and Sensational Selfhood in Victorian Literature and Culture

Twilight States: Sleepwalking, Liminal Consciousness, and Sensational Selfhood in Victorian Literature and Culture argues that sleepwalking was everywhere in nineteenth-century culture, both as a topic for scientific, legal, and public debate, but also as a potent symbol in the Victorian imagination that informed literature and art. Furthermore, the nineteenth-century interest in the somnambulist was provoked by what the figure represented and revealed to the Victorians: namely, themselves. The sleepwalker represented the hidden potential within the self for either greatness or deviance, or, more mundanely, simply a fuller existence than consciousness has an awareness of. Sleepwalking writ large the multi-layered self at a time when the self—by psychiatry and society at large—was being accepted as increasingly multivalent. The sleepwalker was a visible and often sensational embodiment of the multilayered consciousness that became the accepted model of the mind over the course of the nineteenth century, visibly demonstrating what doctors and philosophers suggested that the mind could do. By connecting literary representations of sleepwalkers in the works of Wilkie Collins, Thomas Hardy, Bram Stoker, and Sheridan Le Fanu to both nineteenth-century medical discourses of somnambulism and popular press’s accounts and illustrations of altered states, we see that the discourses surrounding the figure of the somnambulist indicate that it was a cultural receptacle for fears associated with the changing scientific and political landscape, but also a locus for hopes about human potential and innate goodness: an ambivalence possible because of the sleepwalker’s liminality

A Cognitive Science Based Machine Learning Architecture

In an attempt to illustrate the application of cognitive science principles to hard AI problems in machine learning we propose the LIDA technology, a cognitive science based architecture capable of more human-like learning. A LIDA based software agent or cognitive robot will be capable of three fundamental, continuously active, humanlike learning mechanisms:\ud 1) perceptual learning, the learning of new objects, categories, relations, etc.,\ud 2) episodic learning of events, the what, where, and when,\ud 3) procedural learning, the learning of new actions and action sequences with which to accomplish new tasks. The paper argues for the use of modular components, each specializing in implementing individual facets of human and animal cognition, as a viable approach towards achieving general intelligence