This article argues that the use of credible homeland ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems counterintuitively encourages offense dominance by undermining the deterrence by punishment behind mutually assured destruction (MAD). It contends that while BMD is a defensive technology, under conditions of MAD that defensive capability, if credible, is perceived by adversaries to signal an intention to circumvent deterrence. Fearing an attack with impunity, adversaries increase their supply of offensive weapons, pressuring defenders to improve their BMD capabilities, and an arms race thus emerges. Using detailed case studies of Israel’s missile defense against the Axis of Resistance and Chinese reactions to the United States\u27 growing ambitions for homeland missile defenses, this article demonstrates how defensive technologies provoke offensive buildups, erode strategic trust, and ultimately contribute to international instability. It concludes by urging reconsideration of homeland missile defense development and proposes limited, point-defense solutions as more stabilizing alternatives
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