Nicolai Hartmann’s Concept of Critique

Abstract

This article explores Nicolai Hartmann’s concept of “critique” (Kritik) and his critical method. The most important components of Hartmann’s critical philosophy are the distinction between problem-thinking and system-thinking (problem-oriented and system-oriented thinking), the criterion of presuppositionlessness (neutral attitude, “this side” stance, which also highlights the priority of the phenomena over theory), the preference accorded to the natural attitude (toward the object) as opposed to the reflective attitude, the emphasis on the aporetic, the critique of the common philosophical methods, the critical review of Kant’s philosophy, and lastly the theory of critical realism. Linked to the analysis of Hartmann’s critical ontology, critical epistemology and critical metaphysics I also point out an uncritical concept in those. The discussion of the elements of Hartmann’s critical methodology (transcendental, descriptive, and dialectical) shows that the various meanings of the concept of “critique” in Hartmann’s philosophy converge in the methodology of aporetic phenomenology