Local Power Play: The Post-Election Repression And Local Governance

Abstract

We explore the aftermath of electoral defeats for incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes, positing that they escalate repression in response. While prevailing research on competitive authoritarian regimes typically analyses incumbent repression at the national level, we focus on its effects on local political actors. Our argument centres on subnational variation in repression, influenced by the incumbent’s strength within the local city council. Specifically, incumbents tend to employ legislative blockage to hinder opposition mayors from efficiently delivering public goods when their party holds a majority of seats in the city council. We present original data on legislative proposals in city councils and employ a mixed-method approach to investigate this phenomenon. The 2019 local elections in İstanbul offer a unique opportunity to probe the dynamics of repression against the opposition at the local level. Our findings underscore that repression neutralizes emerging political leaders, thereby undermining municipal administration in the process