Everything, Everywhere, All at Once: Boethian Eternality, Synchronic Contingency, and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge

Abstract

The writings of Boethius (480-524) were deeply influential in the development of latermedieval thought. His most influential contribution was his work on the problem of free will anddivine foreknowledge. Boethius explored these ideas in his two commentaries on Aristotle's DeInterpretatione 9 and in his later work The Consolation of Philosophy. His proposed solution,divine eternality, continues to be a prevalent view in contemporary arguments surroundingforeknowledge. But his proposed model for divine foreknowledge runs into certain puzzles that itdoes not have the tools to answer. Thus, many people have rejected his solution in favor ofalternative views. I hope to show that a revised model of divine foreknowledge can answer theseobjections. In order to do this, it will be necessary to take a foray into the work of a much latermedieval author, John Duns Scotus (1265-1308), who was a pivotal figure in the history of thefree will debate. Scotus&rsquo; own solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge, which I will referto as the synchronic model, faces problems similarly definitive to Boethius. But, he makessubstantial progress in explaining human and divine freedom. In this thesis I will argue that ahybrid Synchronic-Eternality model offers a compelling way forward in resolving the puzzle ofdivine foreknowledge and free will. This thesis will first trace out Boethius own view, drawing on both his earlycommentaries and the consolation, in order to show the space that Boethius carves out forcontingency. Then, this thesis will explore certain definitive problems facing Boethius&rsquo; account.Next, it will then explore Scotus&rsquo; own work on contingency and freedom, before surveying theproblems with his solution. Finally, the paper will conclude by proposing an alternative modelfor divine foreknowledge, the Synchronic-Eternality model, which relies on the contributions ofboth Scotus and Boethius, and exploring potential objections to the view</p