Is there a popular backlash against globalization? When did it start and in which forms?
What do we know about its causes? We address these questions in the context of advanced
democracies. We see the ‘globalization backlash’ as the political shift of voters and parties
in a protectionist and isolationist direction, with substantive implications on governments’
leaning and enacted policies. We discuss the empirical evidence on the backlash. We develop
a theoretical discussion within the framework of the crisis of embedded liberalism. We nest
within this framework theoretical results from international economics showing how the
backlash may arise within standard trade models when considering the ‘social footprint’
of globalization. These theoretical insights are consistent with available empirical evidence
pointing to the role of globalization as a driver of the backlash. Yet, globalization is only one
of the drivers of the backlash. There are other economic factors playing a similar role, such
as technological change, fiscal austerity, and immigration. Moreover, cultural concerns such as
status threat, authoritarianism, and nativism do play a relevant role, with a significant interplay
with economic drivers. This calls for a broad and comprehensive approach to the backlash,
both from an academic and from a policy making perspective
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