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The presidential address: truth: the identity theory

By Jennifer Hornsby

Abstract

I want to promote what I shall call (unoriginally, and for the sake of its having a name ) ‘the identity theory of truth’. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable.\ud A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory’s conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell’s Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part II, I elaborate on the conception of thinkables, with a view to demonstrating that the identity theory’s conception of truth is defensible. Part III is concerned with the theory’s relation to some recent work on the concept of truth: I hope to show that the identity theorist not only has a defensible conception of truth, but also, in the present state of play, has appropriate ambitions

Topics: phil
Publisher: Wiley
Year: 1997
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.bbk.ac.uk.oai2:100
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