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A disjunctive conception of acting for reasons

By Jennifer Hornsby

Abstract

A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons is introduced by way of showing that a view of acting for reasons must give a place to knowledge. Two principal claims are made. 1. This conception has a rôle analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and when the two disjunctivist conceptions are treated as counterparts, they can be shown to have work to do in combination. 2. This conception of acting for reasons safeguards the connection between considerations that move us to act in particular ways and considerations that favour our acting in particular ways

Topics: phil
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.bbk.ac.uk.oai2:433

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Citations

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