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Pessimistic induction and two fallacies

By J. Saatsi

Abstract

The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises

Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:3352

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