A climate of increasing deregulation in traditional highway transportation,
where the private sector has an expanded role in the provision of traditional
transportation services, provides a background for practical policy issues to be investigated.
One of the key issues of interest, and the focus of this chapter, would
be the equilibrium decision variables offered by participants in this market. By assuming
that the private sector participants play a Nash game, the above problem can
be described as a Bi-Level Variational Inequality (BLVI). Our problem differs from
the classical Cournot-Nash game because each and every player’s actions is constrained
by another variational inequality describing the equilibrium route choice of
users on the network. In this chapter, we discuss this BLVI and suggest a heuristic
coevolutionary particle swarm algorithm for its resolution. Our proposed algorithm
is subsequently tested on example problems drawn from the literature. The numerical
experiments suggest that the proposed algorithm is a viable solution method for
this problem
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