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On the problem of network monopoly

By J. McHardy, M. Reynolds and S. Trotter

Abstract

We introduce a new regulatory concept: the independent profit-maximising agent, as a model for regulating a network monopoly. The agent sets prices on cross-network goods taking either a complete, or arbitrarily small, share of the associated profit. We examine welfare and profits with and without each agent type under both network monopoly and network duopoly. We show that splitting up the network monopoly (creating network duopoly) may be inferior for both firm(s) and society compared with a network monopoly "regulated" by an agent and that society always prefers any of the four agent regimes over network monopoly and network duopoly.\u

Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Sheffield
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:9990

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