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Free-riding, carbon treaties, and trade wars: the role of domestic environmental policies

By Lisandro Abrego and Carlo Perroni

Abstract

This paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model of North-South trade with carbon emissions to explore the strategic, open-economy implications of price and quantity based instruments for CO2 emission reduction. We compute non-cooperative environmental and trade policy equilibria and Nash bargaining outcomes in environmental policies with side payments of cash. Results show that quotas can lead to higher internalization levels in a non-cooperative zero-tariff equilibrium in comparison with emission fees. If tariffs are also chosen non-cooperatively, the form of policy instrument used affects equilibrium tariffs, with quotas leading to lower trade barriers, particularly under a regional carbon treaty

Topics: HF, GE
Publisher: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Year: 1998
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:2116

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