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Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly

By Rabah Amir and Anna Stepanova

Abstract

We consider the issue of first- versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or complements, dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions. We show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first-mover advantage. For the linear version of the model, we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance. The analysis yields, as the unique equilibrium outcome, sequential play with the low-cost firm as leader

Topics: HB
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2006
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.004
OAI identifier: oai:kar.kent.ac.uk:7198
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