A study on pay-setting process for executive compensation: focused on the compensation committee

Abstract

自1930年以來，公司管理階層之薪酬問題，一直都是備受關注的焦點，同時也是現今公司治理所要解決的核心問題之一。在2007年美國金融危機以後，美國國會試圖尋求解決發生金融危機的問題，公司管理階層之薪酬決定機制也為其中一個待解決的重要區塊。且隨著美國政府決定出手救援「大到不能倒」的公司，華爾街的高薪階層們仍坐領高薪，因而「肥貓」的薪酬問題愈演愈烈，成了眾矢之的。在這樣的背景下，公司管理階層之薪酬問題廣泛受到批評與質疑，立法管制面上也不斷地檢討、修正、再修正。以往作為公司管理階層薪酬的計算公式被認為促使管理階層短視近利，鼓勵管理階層去承擔過高的風險，因而學說與實務開始檢討如何建立一個管理階層的薪酬決定機制，使薪酬決定結果客觀、合理。 所謂「肥貓」的問題，即需面對的是公司管理階層的薪酬是否過高（excessive compesation）？是否合理？然而，薪酬的種類是複雜的，薪酬決定的過程不但複雜，且深切關係到公司治理的良莠。管理階層之薪酬問題，不僅為代理成本的一環，亦屬於公司治理的重點目標之一。今日關於薪酬決定程序的要求，不僅要求薪酬需與績效連結的公平性要求，且薪酬的決定程序必須同時提供公司管理階層誘因為公司及股東利益及大化而努力，同時亦需避免使管理階層短視近利去承擔過高的風險。薪酬決定制度的設計，亟需符合上揭所示之各種要求，這也是本文所要釐清的重點。 本文共分八章，第一章介紹本研究之研究動機、目的、方法、範圍及架構；第二章從代理成本、股權結構、董事會優位主義、股東會優位主義等觀點說明薪酬委員會與公司治理之關連性；第三章介紹美國的薪酬決定程序、薪酬委員會及薪酬揭露等法制面規範，並介紹沙賓法案及華爾街改革及消費者保護法案等美國法上新發展，以做為我國之借鏡；第四章則介紹中國大陸法制下之薪酬決定程序、薪酬委員會的運作及薪酬揭露等規範；第五章則為我國薪酬決定程序及自2011年開始強制規範上市（櫃）公司設立薪酬委員會；第六章介紹我國法下的薪酬揭露制度及其目的；第七章係對我國目前薪酬決定制度的檢討，擬從法院實務見解出發，探討薪酬決定權在董事會優位及股東會優位間之擺盪，另檢討目前強制設立薪酬委員會之妥適性；第八章為本文之結論。Ever since 1930, executive compensation issue of has always been a public focus, and it remains to be one of the core corporate governance problems yet to be resolved. Post the 2007 financial crisis, the US congress has been searching for the roots causes of the financial meltdown in hope to understand and control these causes to prevent the world financial system to be shaken down again. The regulation and determination of executive compensation have become one of the most important subjects on the agenda of U.S. congress. Notwithstanding the U.S. government spent unthinkable sums of tax payers’ dollars to rescue the “Too-Big-to-Fail” companies, many senior executives of which were still receiving unjustly handsome paychecks and bonuses; this not only stirred up public resentment, and unregulated executive compensation become widely criticized. Within such context, even the legislative reform of executive compensation has been put under political and public scrutiny, and resulted in a series of legislative revisions. The current pay setting process of executive compensation is thought to encourage senior management to pursue short-term gains by taking on excessive risk, hence academics and legislators have been debating and devising a revamped executive pay setting process that determines rational and objective executive compensation. The so-called “Fat Cat” problem, or whether executive compensation is too excessive, or too rational, is all but simple. The process of determining executive compensation is complicated, and ties intricately to corporate governance and performance. It is not only one of corporate shareholder’s “Agency Costs”, but also one of the most important corporate management emphases. The requirements for future pay setting process entail fairly linking compensation to corporate performance, providing incentive for management maximize shareholder interests, and shunning management to pursue short-term gains and take on too much risk. The redesign of executive pay setting process must incorporate the aforementioned themes, which make the motivation of this Article. This Article is divided into eight chapters. Chapter I identifies the motivations, goals, methodologies, scope and framework of this research; Chapter II deliberates how agency costs, ownership structure, director primacy and shareholder primacy explain the relationship between compensation committee and corporate governance; Chapter III introduces the pay setting process, the compensation committee and compensation disclosure ordinances in the U.S.A, in addition, the Chapter also discusses the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and consumer protection Act and other new developments of U.S financial regulation; Chapter IV examines the pay setting process, compensation committee’s operation and pay disclosure regulations; Chapter V focuses on domestic pay setting process and the mandatory establishment of pay committee of all public or OTC traded companies since 2011; Chapter VI delineates the purpose of domestic pay disclosure mechanism and regulations; Chapter VII evaluates current national pay setting structure and the adequacy of mandatory establishment of pay committee; lastly, Chapter VII concludes this Article