Collective guilt feeling revisited

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to evaluate the notion of collective guilt feeling both in the light ofresearch in affectivity and in collective intentionality. The paper is divided into an introduction and three main sections. Section i) highlights relevant features of guilt-family emotions such as the relation between feeling guilt and objective guilt, the relation between feeling guilt and its content, and the relation between feeling guilt and the 'self'. Moreover, the distinction between feeling guilt and feeling regret is given due attention. Section ii) examines Margaret Gilbert's arguments in favor of a collectivist view of collective guilt feeling (displayed as "We feel guilt for p"), according to which groups do genuinely feel guilt. Against the collectivist position I argue for an individualist "membership account" of collective guilt feeling in terms of individual members' we-feeling of guilt. The membership account of collective guilt feeling is vindicated on grounds of a naturalist and nonjudgmentalist understanding of emotions, as well as on the logic of personal pronouns. It combines individualism regarding the subject of the feeling with collectivism regarding the irreducibility of we-feelings and provides, as I further argue, the required moral force attributed to collective guilt feeling. The concern of section iii) is the question of the appropriate emotional response to collective wrongdoing. I argue against the view that group members are categorically "committed to feel guilt as a body" for wrongdoings committed by the group. Given that individual members often do not participate in their groups' wrongdoings, it seems unjust to impose a requirement for feeling guilt upon them. I suggest that in a general account of the appropriate assessment of collective wrongdoing, feeling regret is the better candidate than feeling guilt for the role of the minimally required emotional response