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Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions

By Werner Güth, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Elmar Wolfstetter

Abstract

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second–price auctions

Topics: Experiments, Sealed Bid Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Private-Independent Values, 330 Wirtschaft, ddc:330
Publisher: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:edoc.hu-berlin.de:18452/4117
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