THE POTENTIAL INTERCONTINENTAL RAILWAY BETWEEN SIBERIA AND ALASKA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS AND FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES

This article argues that if the U.S. government wished to construct an intercontinental railway between Siberia and Alaska, then the directly impacted Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) and federally recognized Tribes nearby would need to first consent to and authorize the construction. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971, ANCs own Native land in Alaska, while federally recognized Tribes have no reservations in Alaska (with one exception) and almost no legal claims to the title of the land. ANCs and federally recognized Tribes are also distinct entities with occasionally differing interests. Construction managers might be tempted to receive consent from ANCs (the landowners) for the tracks and conduct minimal consultation with the federally recognized Tribes. But the railway could harm the Tribes’ means of subsistence and way of life through increased traffic, human populations, and pollution. The U.S. government has a long history of taking Native land for railway construction projects, and this scenario could become history repeating itself. This article examines the needed authorization from federally recognized Tribes for the railway in the interest of respecting Tribal sovereignty and self-determination and upholding the federal Indian trust responsibility and relationship

Strategically Restated Defaults

Business and commercial statutes are composed almost entirely of default rules, which parties may override via agreement or adopt via silence. Drafters of these statutes, and theories about the substance of default rules, assume that parties indeed adopt statutory default rules via silence. Against this backdrop, this Article examines unexpected behavior by parties to business and commercial agreements: parties often restate statutory default rules in their agreements rather than adopting those rules via silence. Based on a review of actual limited partnership agreements and security agreements, this Article identifies five unique species of restatement-bald, tweak, refill, baseline, and context restatements-and provides examples of each. This Article considers the implications of this unexpected behavior. First, this Article analyzes the strategic reasons that parties restate statutory defaults in their business and commercial agreements rather than adopting those rules via silence. Second, this Article argues that a restated statutory default should be interpreted identically to the restated statute, contrary to the Delaware Supreme Court\u27s holding in Murfey v. WHC Ventures, LLC, 236 A.3d 337 (Del. 2020). Finally, this Article considers how the theories of statutory defaults should be adapted in recognition of the strategic reasons that parties restate statutory defaults in their agreements

STRESS AND PUBLIC CRIMINAL DEFENSE: COMPARING MALE AND FEMALE DEFENDER EXPERIENCES AND COPING STRATEGIES

Little research has focused on stress and coping strategies among public defenders, and none compares the experiences of male and female defenders. As frontline workers, critical to the due process of law, understanding and eradicating stress is essential to their well-being and the fair treatment of defendants. Employing thematic analysis of public defenders’ responses to open-ended questions, this study found gendered differences in how male and female defenders described their work motivations, challenges, and strategies for dealing with stress. Both male and female public defenders confront the stresses of injustice and heavy workloads. Female defenders, however, are more likely to experience gender discrimination and disrespect and the added stress of family and parenting responsibilities. Emotion-focused and recovery coping strategies were adopted far more often by public defenders than problem-focused approaches, but male defenders expressed psychologically detaching from work far more often than female defenders. The differences in male-female defender experiences and coping strategies, directions for future research, and the need for nuanced and distinct solutions for public defender stress are discussed

WE CAN PROTECT THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” AS LONG AS THEY STAY OUT OF THE HYDROLOGICAL CYCLE

The water cycle, including its oceans, surface water, wetlands, water vapor, clouds and groundwater, has resulted in a patchwork of statutes and regulations that fail to comprehensively protect the “waters of the United States.” This is not a simple fix, and requires Congressional positivism rather than decades of relying on the judicial branch to resolve statutes that are ultimately not designed for true water protection. It is Congress’s role to resolve the wetlands protection issue, and it has avoided the responsibility probably for lack of a good solution. It would likely take a Constitutional amendment to bring the hydrologic cycle of the United States into the protection of the Clean Water Act

EXAMINING IDAHO’S ELECTION LAWS: STRICT STANDARDS AND THE CRITICAL ROLE OF CONTEXT IN STATE ELECTION SYSTEMS

Recent attention to elections has brought a wave of new voting laws throughout the U.S., and now, to Idaho. Despite presenting no evidence of voter fraud, the Idaho Legislature eliminated student ID cards and limited the types of proof of residency documents that may be used to prove eligibility to vote. These laws together have created significant burdens on groups like voters experiencing homelessness and students, without providing effective alternatives. This Comment examines Idaho’s new voting laws and compares the overall state of Idaho’s election law to those of other states with similar restrictions. Now, Idaho has some of the strictest election laws in the United States. This Comment then analyzes the constitutionality of the new laws and the likelihood of successful challenges brought under the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Constitution. These new laws implicate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and several provisions under the Idaho Constitution. Courts and litigants should consider the comprehensive burden of Idaho’s election laws when evaluating constitutional claims. Finally, this Comment discusses recommendations and alternatives that could improve election integrity and conformity without undermining the rights of Idaho\u27s most vulnerable voting groups

Episode 19: Cathy Cox (GA State College & State University) Shares Her Experience Leading in Higher Education

Cathy Cox (President of GA State College & University, former Dean of Mercer Law School, former President of Young Harris College, former GA Secretary of State) talks with us about her experiences as both a president and dean in universities in Georgia

Why Can\u27t I Have a Robot Lawyer? Limits on the Right to Appear Pro Se

Some rights are more favored-and some rights are more disfavored than others. The right to self-representation is a disfavored right Despite its historic roots, the right has been subjected to judicially imposed limits that have reduced its scope. The limits on the right to self-representation include restrictions on the type of litigant that can avail themselves of the right, bars regarding the personal characteristics of litigants, barriers on the types of assistance a pro se litigant may receive, and procedural limitations on how a litigant may invoke the right. This Article is the first to study these established limitations on the right to appear pro se and consider how those limits will impact litigants who seek to use new artificial intelligence technology to assist them in their court proceedings. I contend that a litigant who seeks to appear pro se with the assistance of artificial intelligence would implicate the same concerns that resulted in the implementation of these historically established parameters of the right to self-representation. I then provide a framework for how courts should address this technology when it inevitably-appears in courtrooms alongside pro se litigants

Episode 23: Retrospective - Emerson Wright (Stetson) Asks Us All About the TLE Podcast

Emerson Wright (Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law) picks our brains about our favorite guests, what our goals have been, and what the future might bring

Episode 20: Kellye Testy (LSAC) Talks Leadership in Legal Academics

Kellye Testy (President & CEO of the Law School Admission Council) talks with us about her time as a law school dean, as well as how she helps law students succeed even before they enter law school

Rule 11 Is No Match for Generative Al

In a series of high-profile ethics debacles, attorneys who used generative Al technology found themselves in hot water after they negligently relied on fictitious cases and false statements of law crafted by the technology. These attorneys mistakenly relied upon the output they received from a generative Al product without verifying and validating that output. Their embarrassing ethical breaches made national news, and spurred judges to implement standing orders that require attorneys to disclose their use of Al technology. Scholars were quick to criticize these standing orders\u27 and the standing orders are rife with problems. But are they needed? Or are the standing orders redundant because Civil Rule of Procedure 11 can address this problem? Generative Al and the filing of briefs that contain fictitious cases and false statements of law is testing the reach of Rule 11, which is coming up lacking. This Article is the first to study and evaluate whether Rule 11 can effectively address litigant use of generative Al output that contains fictitious cases and false statements of law. In this Article, I contend that, while the failure to perform adequate research is conduct that can be reached through Rule 11, the rule is not well-suited to the task of regulating this behavior, and Rule 11\u27s inadequacy is likely spurring the creation of these standing orders. I then analyze the benefits and detriments that inure from these standing orders, setting forth various considerations for judges and jurisdictions to weigh when evaluating whether to impose their own standing orders, revise current standing orders, or promulgate local rules to regulate litigant use of generative Al technology