Rationalizing Rape: How Military Appellate Courts Get to Yes

This study examines how military appellate courts rationalize overturning sexual assault convictions through qualitative analysis of opinions finding factual insufficiency. Drawing from cases between 2017-2020, concerning patterns are identified in judicial reasoning that reflect persistent rape myth acceptance despite decades of statutory reform. The analysis reveals that courts frequently question victim credibility based on delayed reporting, counterintuitive victim behavior, and continued contact with perpetrators - factors that trauma research has shown to be common among sexual assault survivors. Of particular concern is courts\u27 treatment of incapacitation cases, where judges often acknowledge significant victim impairment yet find ways to question consent capacity. The findings suggest that recent statutory changes limiting appellate courts\u27 factual sufficiency review authority may be insufficient to address underlying attitudinal barriers to fair adjudication of sexual assault cases. We propose reforms to judicial selection, education, and oversight processes, while acknowledging significant practical and legal challenges to implementation. The study contributes to growing literature on institutional responses to sexual assault by illuminating how rape myths manifest in appellate reasoning. These findings have important implications for military justice reform and broader understanding of how gender bias influences judicial decision-making. Future research comparing military and civilian appellate approaches could provide valuable insights for both systems

Copyright, Creativity, and Skill: Authorship and AI-Assisted Works

Generative artificial intelligence ( Al ) has increasingly become a focal point in legal discussions, raising complex issues across multiple domains, including algorithmic bias, defamation, intellectual property, and privacy. This Article specifically examines the implications of Al-assisted works, with a focus on text-to-image generators, such as Midjourney, that possess the ability to create detailed visual art from simple text prompts. The tools are not, however, limited to simple prompts. Users retain the ability to introduce greater complexity by specifying a host of variables that define the resulting image. Al-assisted art implicates significant legal rights and responsibilities. As to responsibilities: Can the image mislead, defame, or infringe on someone else\u27s rights? As to rights: What are the free speech or intellectual property ownership implications? This Article interrogates the implications of these developments through the lens of copyright law, with a particular focus on the question of authorship. By analyzing how tools like Midjourney create visual art from textual prompts, this Article explores whether and to what extent these Al-generated outputs can be protected under copyright law. It describes current copyright doctrine through a novel framework, demonstrating that copyright law \u27s requirement for creativity pertains to an author\u27s mental acts rather than the technical skill of fixation. The resulting requirement for conception-informed fixation is then applied to Al-assisted works, showing that an author can maintain sufficient creative control of an Al tool\u27s output to meet the mark

On the Double (Derivative): North Carolina Could Single-Handedly Recognize Double Derivative Suits

When a corporation suffers a harm caused by its own directors or officers, most often resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty, and the board does not initiate litigation to remedy the alleged wrong, shareholders may file suit on behalf of the corporation to redress the harm. Courts recognize this cause of action—a single derivative suit—in the name of equity, meaning equitable principles drive a court’s recognition of the action. Consulting the same equitable principles, courts have extended the single derivative suit to shareholders owning shares in a corporation that owns a subsidiary, allowing these shareholders to bring “double derivative” suits on behalf of the corporation’s subsidiary when the subsidiary suffers a similar harm. North Carolina’s courts have not explicitly addressed whether a plaintiff may bring a double derivative claim under North Carolina law. This Comment argues that North Carolina, if given the opportunity, should recognize the double derivative suit because of the suit’s equitable nature, North Carolina’s receptiveness to justifying other business-related causes of action in the name of equity, and the ease at which North Carolina could statutorily recognize the cause of action