Justice, Recovery, Resilience, and Redemption: A Story of Unlikely Connections

On Tuesday, February 18, 2025, Catholic Law’s Office of Student Life hosted an inspiring event titled Justice, Recovery, Resilience, and Redemption: A Story of Unlikely Connections. The panel featured a compelling discussion between Laurie Besden, a former defendant; Judge William Carpenter; and FBI Special Agent Stephanie Shark. Together, they shared an extraordinary story about the transformative power of justice, recovery, and second chances

The President’s Authority to Impose Tariffs

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) empowers the President to “regulate . . . importation.” In Learning Resources v. Trump, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that such language did not empower the President to impose tariffs. The District Court reasoned that there was a distinction between the power to “regulate” and the power to “tax,” and that tariffs required a power to tax. This Essay explains why the District Court was wrong. The Constitution’s original meaning and Supreme Court precedent indicate that tariffs can be an exercise of Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce, not just an exercise of Congress’s power to tax. Thus, by empowering the President to “regulate . . . importation,” IEEPA empowers the President to regulate importation through a traditional and familiar means: tariffs. What’s more, although IEEPA delegates broad tariff authority to the President, the delegation does not run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine; that doctrine recognizes that Congress may delegate more freely in the foreign affairs context. Nor does the delegation run afoul of the major questions doctrine, given that the President is not claiming “unheralded” powers. Congress has delegated foreign import authority to the President for over two-hundred years, and the statutory language in IEEPA has been understood as delegating tariff authority for the last fifty years

Constitutional Theory and the Problem of Disagreement

For decades, constitutional theory has been haunted by the problem of disagreement: the reality that we are deeply divided on fundamental questions of justice and the good society. Theorists have generally responded to the problem of disagreement in one of two ways. One approach minimizes the extent to which constitutional theories rely on controversial moral premises and instead grounds constitutional theories in widely endorsed social practices. The other generally discards any social practices that reflect disagreement with the controversial moral views that the theorist holds.Neither approach is sound. Constitutional theory requires both controversial moral claims and attention to social practices; it requires both ideal and practical constitutional theory. Indeed, we can see how to address the seemingly modern problem of disagreement by attending to the work of an ancient constitutional theorist: Cicero. Despite being the subject of intense scholarly interest outside of the legal academy over the last few decades, Cicero’s work has been almost entirely overlooked by American constitutional theorists. But if we examine, refine, and revise his arguments about ideal and practical constitutional theory, we will find that the two major approaches to the problem of disagreement proposed by American constitutional theorists are mistaken.Because constitutional theory necessarily makes strong moral claims, it is not well-suited to mitigating the effects of disagreement, even as it must take into account non-ideal social practices. Rather, the task of ameliorating the problems stemming from disagreement falls to constitutional design: the enterprise of constructing a constitution that can channel disagreements productively, forge consensus, and produce a stable constitutional order. The failure to distinguish between constitutional theory and constitutional design when addressing the problem of disagreement has led to deep confusion within constitutional theory. Mitigating the problem of disagreement is a task of constitutional design, and whether that task succeeds depends on our role acting within that design as citizens, not as theorists

The Real Impact of General Deterrence: Empirical Insights from the Robbery Data of Three American Cities

General deterrence theory relies on the critical assumption that prospective offenders will be deterred from committing crimes when they are aware of the apprehension and punishment of others. This idea has been reiterated across thousands of years of Western political thought and has significant implications in modern American criminal sentencing, though it has not been historically subjected to rigorous testing. The recent availability of voluminous crime data permits a deeper examination of the real impact of sentencings on crime trends and allows the opportunity for previously impossible analyses regarding the efficacy of general deterrence. To examine whether there is evidence to support the critical assumption underlying general deterrence, this article examines five years of robbery data from three geographically, politically, and demographically diverse American cities: Boston, Massachusetts; Mesa, Arizona; and Washington, District of Columbia. By analyzing robbery trends in relation to the announcement of robbery sentences in these cities, the author seeks to determine whether there is an offense-relative general deterrence relationship between sentences and subsequent robberies committed within each community. An integrative data analysis also examines the aggregate data from these three cities to identify broader patterns indicative of the efficacy of general deterrence in criminal sentencing

Domestic Relations: Cases and Materials (10th ed.)

The Tenth Edition of this casebook continues to provide edited judicial opinions from state, federal, and international courts that illustrate the evolution—and dynamism—of domestic relations, coupled with compelling factual scenarios that illustrate common law and statutory complements. The substance of this casebook is the law among the states that affects the entire family, from assisted reproductive technology to termination of parental rights, incorporating uniform legislation and shifting judicial perspectives; this is not a niche casebook. Specifically, this Tenth Edition expands treatment of nonmarital contracting, domestic abuse, and state and federal responses to developments involving abortion, school vouchers, and gender neutrality.There are multiple Problems spread throughout the chapters, drawn from actual state and federal judicial opinions, which test student understanding and illustrate the real-life consequences of the legal issues being discussed. And the casebook has been structured to provide a logical and concise progression of material, from nonmarital cohabitation to adoption of adults. This logical sequencing permits the book to be used for two, three or four credit courses, especially since there is a statutory supplement offering a more comprehensive view of the ways that statutes affect family law throughout the states.https://scholarship.law.edu/fac_books/1152/thumbnail.jp

Constitutional Theory at a Catholic University

On Tuesday, March 18th, 2025, CIT Director J. Joel Alicea was officially installed as the inaugural St. Robert Bellarmine Chair at the Columbus School of Law. The day began with Prof. Alicea delivering his Chair Lecture, Constitutional Theory at a Catholic University, to an audience of students, faculty, and members of the public. In his lecture, Prof. Alicea explored three fundamental questions relating to the study of constitutional theory at a Catholic University: In what ways does constitutional theory benefit from the intellectual disposition of a Catholic university? What might be the potential drawbacks or risks involved in studying constitutional theory at a Catholic university? How can one gain the benefits of engaging in constitutional theory at a Catholic university while avoiding any potential risks that attend that setting

Personhood After \u3ci\u3eDobbs\u3c/i\u3e

Following the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade in 2022, unsettled questions remain about the constitutional status of unborn children. With good reason, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization did not address whether unborn children are persons within the original meaning of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The historical evidence, however, is now well-established that when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, the word “person” had a settled public meaning that included every human being—children in the womb among them. And if unborn human beings were included within the original public meaning of “person” in 1868, then the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection to “any person” must extend to unborn human beings. The question of prenatal personhood, then, is likely unavoidable after Dobbs. This Article considers what a path toward resolving that question might look like. Part I explains why the majority’s opinion in Dobbs is consistent with and even favorable toward a future constitutional rule securing the equal protection of the laws to unborn children. Part II responds to common practical objections to personhood and shows why recognition of prenatal personhood would restore the traditional consonance of Anglo-American law relating to fetal rights, not disrupt it. Part III addresses the role that each branch of the federal government may play in recognizing constitutional equal protection for unborn persons—such as through Section 5 enforcement legislation, executive order, or judicial decision

Fight for Your Right (to Repair)

In his article, Sam Bonfiglio brings to light how the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in its current iteration implicates consumer’s right to repair their purchased devices. He argues that Section 1201 of the DMCA unfairly impedes upon both a consumer’s right to choose their desired service location as well as their right to attempt service themselves. He argues these restrictions ultimately force consumers to use a manufacturer’s licensed channel of service, effectively granting them a monopoly. The article advocates for the reintroduction of the Freedom to Repair Act to amend the DMCA to commercialize the market for these services while simultaneously protecting manufacturer’s interests