“The Gun’s Not Mine!”: The Admissibility of Defendants’ Exculpatory Hearsay Statements Under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2) & (3)

Exculpatory hearsay statements made by criminal defendants often warrant admission under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) as excited utterances, under Rule 803(2), or as statements reflecting a then-existing state of mind, under Rule 803(3). Nevertheless, defendants often struggle to have their exculpatory statements admitted pursuant to these rules—even when those statements fulfill their categorical requirements. This Comment surveys the different approaches courts take to determine whether exculpatory hearsay statements made by criminal defendants are admissible under Rules 803(2) and (3). It argues that courts too often misapply these rules to exclude defendants’ exculpatory statements. In particular, courts counteract the rules’ requirements and underlying purposes when using motive to fabricate as a barrier to admission. Further, courts sometimes construe their requirements in an unreasonably narrow manner. This Comment concludes that courts should rely exclusively on the express, categorical requirements of Rules 803(2) and (3) when determining the admissibility of exculpatory hearsay statements. It cautions that courts should apply these requirements correctly and consistently with the drafters’ intentions—without interpreting them more narrowly than intended or barring admission based on sincerity concerns their categorical requirements do not contemplate. Additionally, this Comment posits that imposing a discretionary trustworthiness requirement would risk undue uncertainty and is not needed to deter the dangers posed by fabricated exculpatory statements. Rules 803(2) and (3) provide an objective framework to ensure that only hearsay statements that are sufficiently necessary and reliable are admitted into evidence. And they offer multiple avenues for judges to exclude unreliable evidence. Moreover, existing institutional safeguards adequately mitigate the risks associated with fabricated hearsay statements

453 Cent. Park W. Tenant Assn. v. Park Front Apts., LLC

The court denied the landlord\u27s motion for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss fraud claims in a rent overcharge case. The landlord argued the four-year lookback period could only be pierced for fraudulent schemes to deregulate, not merely overcharge. The court, citing recent Court of Appeals and First Department precedent interpreting a 2024 legislative amendment, held that the fraud exception applies to any fraudulent scheme to evade the protections of the rent stabilization law, irrespective of whether the unit was deregulated

Inga v. Revenco

The court partially granted the landlord\u27s motion to amend the petition to include GCEL applicability and good cause grounds, and partially granted the tenant\u27s motion to amend her answer. It denied the tenant\u27s motion to dismiss outright. While the initial predicate notice served before GCEL\u27s enactment was valid, the petition filed afterward needed to conform. The court allowed the landlord to proceed on the **non-payment of rent** ground, finding it sufficiently pleaded with specific amounts and dates, but dismissed the **nuisance** and **illegal sublet** grounds due to lack of factual specificity in the petition

WILLOUGHBY COURT APARTMENTS LP. v. FISHER

In a holdover case, the court granted the tenant\u27s motion for discovery, allowing the tenant\u27s counsel to inspect and copy the tenant file in a Project-Based Section 8 building. The court noted the landlord failed to allege prejudice or privilege and highlighted that any delay in the proceeding could have been avoided had the landlord complied with the initial request for the file, referencing federal requirements entitling the tenant to view their file

REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, INC. v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK

The court denied a preliminary injunction against New York City\u27s FARE Act, which shifts broker fee payment from tenants to landlords. The judge granted in part the City\u27s motion to dismiss, striking down plaintiffs\u27 First Amendment, New York State Constitution, and state law preemption claims. However, the Contracts Clause claim was allowed to proceed. The court emphasized that it cannot overturn legislation based on policy disagreements

ONE ARDEN PARTNERS LP v. BUTLER

In a nonpayment case, the court awarded the tenant a significant rent abatement (63%) due to severe apartment conditions. The landlord established its prima facie case for arrears. However, the tenant successfully demonstrated a breach of the warranty of habitability, proving extensive rat infestation (15-60% abatement), lead paint and leak issues (15% abatement), and a defective apartment door (7% abatement). The court calculated a total abatement of $37,337.68, reducing the landlord\u27s money judgment to$21,575.02