Forging Ahead or Proceeding with Caution; Developing Policy for Generative Artificial Intelligence in Legal Education

Generative Artificial Intelligence is rapidly being integrated into every facet of society, including a growing impact on law schools. It has become abundantly clear that there is a need to develop well-defined governing policies for its use and adoption in legal education. This article offers an introductory analysis of related approaches currently taken in various law schools, exploring the factors influencing these policies and their ethical implication. A comparative review of institutional policies reveals both similarities and unique approaches. Common themes include the need for balance between limited use and outright reliance, as well as the need for transparency and the promotion of academic integrity. Similarly, additional recurring concerns and considerations are explored, such as the potential impact on curricular integration and academic rigor. Ethical and professional implications surrounding using these tools and platforms in legal education set the stage; delving into the importance of understanding the limitations and risks, a discussion of educating students about the appropriate contexts for using AI as a learning tool is presented. Additionally, the unique role of law school faculty governance in shaping these policies is explored, emphasizing the critical decision-making processes involved in establishing enforceable and implementable guardrails and guidelines. By looking at the focus behind policies across multiple institutions, best practices and approaches begin to emerge. Takeaways include future implications and recommendations for law schools and faculty in effectively governing the emerging use of generative artificial intelligence in legal education. The implications go beyond the walls of academia and impact practicing attorneys significantly. To prepare for this reality, law schools must think carefully about and generate policy approaches in line with universal goals and considerations. This article aims to provide valuable insights and recommendations for prudent governance, ultimately contributing to the ongoing discourse on its responsible and effective use within the legal academic sphere

In re: Discipline of Hardeep Sull, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. 13 (2025)

AN attorney had violated NRPC 1.15 and 1.16(d) to deposit an advanced fee into the firm’s client trust account and failing to account for and refund client funds after the client terminated her representation

Vaughn vs. State, 114 Nev. Adv. Op. 6 (Feb. 6, 2025)

A conviction under NRS 239.330(1) requires proof that the document at issue, if genuine, could have been filed, registered, or recorded in a public office under U.S. or Nevada law

Public Defender Workload and the Promise of Gideon

Gideon v. Wainwright, which was decided in 1963, held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel for poor people charged with crimes in state court.1 Over the six decades since Gideon was decided, states have grappled with how to provide public defense services

Backman v. Gelbman [State of Nevada], 141 Nev. Adv. Op. 8 (Feb. 13, 2025)

This case pertains to the determination of which child support order controls the calculation of a 20-percent change in income in NRS 125B.145(4). Under this statute, the district court is required to conduct a review of the child support order when the obligor parent’s gross monthly income changes by at least 20-percent. In interpretating NRS 125.145(4), the district court did not require a review hearing when a 20-percent change in income had not occurred since the most recent hearing. However, the Nevada Court of Appeals held that a proper interpretation of the statute’s limit on judicial discretion requires mandatory review when a 20-percent change has occurred from the time of the last substantive order which set forth the child support obligation. Additionally, the Nevada Court of Appeals clarifies that prima facie evidence is the standard for determining whether sufficient evidence exists to prove these changed circumstances

Protective Ins. Co. v. State, Comm’r of Ins., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. 3 (Jan. 16, 2025)

NRS 696B.420(1) creates a priority schedule regarding the order that groups can recover funds from an insolvent insurance company. At issue before the Nevada Supreme Court is whether Protective Insurance company falls into the highest priority category in subsection (b) of the statute or the residuary category in subsection (g) to recover funds from Spirit Auto Risk Retention Group, an insurance company that became insolvent. The Court held that Protective falls into the residuary category in subsection (g), affirming the decision of the district court

BOURNE VS. VALDES, M.D., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. 30 (June 12, 2025)

As a matter of first impression, the Nevada Supreme Court determined the “suicide rule” is not a complete defense to claims of medical malpractice. Suicide does not relieve a medical provider of liability for the patient’s death. The determination is instead resolved under the established framework of medical malpractice law