Kilka uwag o racjonalności. Wprowadzenie.

Rationalism is an attempt to describe the nature of reason and to delimit its scope. All types of rationalism treat reason as a high value not only cognitive but also moral. This article is a short historical synthesis showing certain crucial points in the history of understanding reason and rationality. It also draws some points of evolutionary shifts or revolutionary changes. Reason as logos and reason as ratio, reason of the Enlightment scientism and irrationalism and finally the search for new rationality. The article also poses the question whether the cognitive standpoint, on the ground of which rationalism developed, is fundamental in human life.Rationalism is an attempt to describe the nature of reason and to delimit its scope. All types of rationalism treat reason as a high value not only cognitive but also moral. This article is a short historical synthesis showing certain crucial points in the history of understanding reason and rationality. It also draws some points of evolutionary shifts or revolutionary changes. Reason as logos and reason as ratio, reason of the Enlightment scientism and irrationalism and finally the search for new rationality. The article also poses the question whether the cognitive standpoint, on the ground of which rationalism developed, is fundamental in human life

Czy po Heideggerze i Levinasie możliwa jest etyka w tradycyjnym tego słowa znaczeniu?

The author tries to answer the question whether thinking is possible as a type of knowledge about human behaviour. To this end, he compares two thinkers, who, while differing considerably from one another, are similar in that they reject the traditional philosophy of existence, and use language with multiple meanings. Heidegger considered ethics as something of fundamental importance, but differing from ethics as knowledge, or as normative science. Levinas, on the other hand, believed ethics was the first philosophy, but did not treat it as normative. He argued that ethics was not cultivation of good, nor even a system of values, but a relationship with others. Heidegger criticized traditional ethics and morality, treating them as immature, juvenile even. Nevertheless, there is something in his writings that suggests what he had in mind was the necessity of existence. The ethics criticized by Heidegger or by modern French anti-humanists as well as Levinas reemerges in the form of humanities, as a discipline which puts man in the centre of the universe and defines actions that are appropriate for him. Shouldn’t we, however, following the train of Kant’s thought on the role of judgment, affirm the ontological difference Heidegger talked about? Since Kant accepted valuation of beauty, one can hazard a guess there exists a certain minimum of substantiation; if not of moral truth, then at least of substantiation at the level of meaning. Subjectivity must be shown as the power to create meaning, and thus to take moral action. Ethics after Heidegger still seems to be possible.The author tries to answer the question whether thinking is possible as a type of knowledge about human behaviour. To this end, he compares two thinkers, who, while differing considerably from one another, are similar in that they reject the traditional philosophy of existence, and use language with multiple meanings. Heidegger considered ethics as something of fundamental importance, but differing from ethics as knowledge, or as normative science. Levinas, on the other hand, believed ethics was the first philosophy, but did not treat it as normative. He argued that ethics was not cultivation of good, nor even a system of values, but a relationship with others. Heidegger criticized traditional ethics and morality, treating them as immature, juvenile even. Nevertheless, there is something in his writings that suggests what he had in mind was the necessity of existence. The ethics criticized by Heidegger or by modern French anti-humanists as well as Levinas reemerges in the form of humanities, as a discipline which puts man in the centre of the universe and defines actions that are appropriate for him. Shouldn’t we, however, following the train of Kant’s thought on the role of judgment, affirm the ontological difference Heidegger talked about? Since Kant accepted valuation of beauty, one can hazard a guess there exists a certain minimum of substantiation; if not of moral truth, then at least of substantiation at the level of meaning. Subjectivity must be shown as the power to create meaning, and thus to take moral action. Ethics after Heidegger still seems to be possible.

Nicholas Lash, Pytanie o Boga. Świętość, mowa i milczenie, tłum.

Nicholas Lash w swojej książce - w myśl samego tytułu - koncentruje się na problematyce Boga. W jego rozważaniach pojawiają się odniesienia do wszystkich Osób Trójcy Świętej. W pewnym sensie to właśnie doktryna trynitarna stanowi główny przedmiot analiz zawartych w Pytaniu o Boga

Racjonalność modlitwy.

In the paper author argues for the thesis that in confrontation of two kinds of rationality, that is natural cognition of the inherent mind and supernatural cognition in the light of the revealed truth, it is the latter that has the advantage. Then he analyses a prayer (taken as one of the results of the supernatural cognition) as a rational language act and points 5 conditions which seem to be necessary to make the prayer an instrument of shaping a rational attitude towards both God and world.In the paper author argues for the thesis that in confrontation of two kinds of rationality, that is natural cognition of the inherent mind and supernatural cognition in the light of the revealed truth, it is the latter that has the advantage. Then he analyses a prayer (taken as one of the results of the supernatural cognition) as a rational language act and points 5 conditions which seem to be necessary to make the prayer an instrument of shaping a rational attitude towards both God and world

Benny Levy, Levinas: Dieu et la philosophie, Lagrasse 2009, Verdier poche, s. 473.

W 1973 roku Levy został osobistym sekretarzem Sartre'a i pozostał nim aż do jego śmierci, czyli do 1980 roku. Dzięki interwencji Sartre'a u prezydenta Giscarda d'Estaing otrzymał obywatelstwo francuskie i mógł wyjść  z  ukrycia.  Po  latach, w książce Le Livre et les livres z 2003 roku, Levy wyznał: Sartre był dla mnie nie tylko ojcem, lecz także starszym bratem..

Racjonalność procesu argumentacji teologicznej.

Following presentation content synthetic model of rationality of theological argumentation demonstrating these factors which are important for acknowledging whether the argumentation is rational or not, or demonstrating the level of the concentration of rationality. The following paper doesn’t contain analyses concerning rationality of theology as a knowledge but it contains the factors which are important in estimating rationality of mental processes taking part in the process of theological argumentation from psychological point of view. The model concerns theological argumentation as a mental process (including process of reasoning, process of drawing inferences and other mental processes) which is taking part in a mind of theologian speculating on the truths which he/she believes in and which he/she deliberate. This paper shows at one hand a model which can be used by theologian to estimate the rationality of his/her process of theological argumentation and at the other hand a model which can be used by others trying to estimate the rationality of the theologian mental processes. Following presentation content synthetic model of rationality of theological argumentation demonstrating these factors which are important for acknowledging whether the argumentation is rational or not, or demonstrating the level of the concentration of rationality. The following paper doesn’t contain analyses concerning rationality of theology as a knowledge but it contains the factors which are important in estimating rationality of mental processes taking part in the process of theological argumentation from psychological point of view. The model concerns theological argumentation as a mental process (including process of reasoning, process of drawing inferences and other mental processes) which is taking part in a mind of theologian speculating on the truths which he/she believes in and which he/she deliberate. This paper shows at one hand a model which can be used by theologian to estimate the rationality of his/her process of theological argumentation and at the other hand a model which can be used by others trying to estimate the rationality of the theologian mental processes

Lęk przed ekspresją twarzy: refleksja „w ramach" filozofii Emmanuela Levinasa.

The main purpose of the article is to supplement the philospohy of Emmanuel Levinas with the conception of fear. The analysis of certain expressions used in the works of Levinas leads the author to the conclusion that the ethical relation to the face of the Other causes irreversable changes in the self. Jaranowski considers two types of reaction to nakedness (Levinas describes the face of the Other as “naked”) and puts emphasis on the negative one – nakedness is something that should not be exposed, it causes anxiety. The question of nakedness casts light on the problem of the call from the Other as a kind of interruption. For one can not predict all the consequences of responding to the call from the face of the Other. Finally author claims that there is a kind of fear that has its subject in moral obligation as such. The main purpose of the article is to supplement the philospohy of Emmanuel Levinas with the conception of fear. The analysis of certain expressions used in the works of Levinas leads the author to the conclusion that the ethical relation to the face of the Other causes irreversable changes in the self. Jaranowski considers two types of reaction to nakedness (Levinas describes the face of the Other as “naked”) and puts emphasis on the negative one – nakedness is something that should not be exposed, it causes anxiety. The question of nakedness casts light on the problem of the call from the Other as a kind of interruption. For one can not predict all the consequences of responding to the call from the face of the Other. Finally author claims that there is a kind of fear that has its subject in moral obligation as such.

Michała Hellera koncepcja racjonalności jako wartości moralnej.

M. Heller analyses rationality in philosophy and theology of science. Philosophical reflection upon the scientific method lets perceive rationality in it understood as an effective tool of knowing and understanding the world. This possibility is conditioned by a certain structure of both a knowing subject and an object being known. Moreover, theological reflection concerning the successes of science indicates the source of rational structure of the world, which is God’s creative plan. The postulate of rationality is based on the choice of value. Thus it is a moral decision.M. Heller analyses rationality in philosophy and theology of science. Philosophical reflection upon the scientific method lets perceive rationality in it understood as an effective tool of knowing and understanding the world. This possibility is conditioned by a certain structure of both a knowing subject and an object being known. Moreover, theological reflection concerning the successes of science indicates the source of rational structure of the world, which is God’s creative plan. The postulate of rationality is based on the choice of value. Thus it is a moral decision