Rozrachunki inteligenckie w noweli Ömera Seyfettina „Biały tulipan”

The subject of this article is the novella The White Tulip by Ömer Seyfettin (1884–1920), one of the most important novelists of Turkish literature. The novella was published in 1914 and is set in Seres town occupied by the Bulgarians during the First Balkan War. In the article were made to reveal the meaning layer of the novella, in which the author, as an Eastern nationalist, reckons with the earlier manifestations of Eastern nationalism in Turkey. At a deeper layer, there are also the author’s reservations about the nationalist ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress, which began to take on an increasingly radical and racist character on the eve of the WWI. In this context, it seems as if two opposing tendencies coexisted in Seyfettin’s thought: on the one hand, he tries in The White Tulip to arouse a “national feeling” in the reader by means of very provocative images of violence, and on the other hand, to set moral boundaries for Turkish nationalism so that it does not take on a predatory character.Przedmiotem rozważań niniejszego artykułu jest nowela Biały tulipan autorstwa Ömera Seyfettina (1884–1920), jednego z najważniejszych nowelistów literatury tureckiej. Nowela została opublikowana w 1914 r. i jej akcja toczy się w mieście Seres okupowanym przez Bułgarów podczas pierwszej wojny bałkańskiej. W artykule starano się ujawnić warstwę znaczeniową noweli, w której autor jako nacjonalista wschodni rozlicza się z wcześniejszymi przejawami wschodniego nacjonalizmu w Turcji. W głębszej warstwie istnieją także zastrzeżenia autora wobec nacjonalistycznej ideologii Komitetu Jedności i Postępu, która w przededniu I wojny zaczęła przybierać coraz bardziej radykalny i rasistowki charakter. W tym kontekście jakby dwie przeciwstawne tendencje współistniały w myśli Seyfettina: z jednej strony stara się on w Białym tulibanie wzbudzić u czytelnika „poczucie narodowe” za pomocą bardzo prowokacyjnych obrazów przemocy, a z drugiej – wyznaczyć moralne granice dla tureckiego nacjonalizmu, tak by nie nabrał on drapieżnego charakteru

Attila nutritus in Engadi or the knowledge of late antique historical geography in mediaeval Hungarian chronicles

The 10th chapter of the Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum written by Simon of Kéza contains a puzzling phrase: Attila (...) nutritus in Engadi. So far, no attempt has been made to explain it. According to the authors of the following article, Simon took it from the Latin translation of the Onomasticon of Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 339) by St. Jerome. In all likelihood, Simon gained access to Jerome’s codex during his trip to southern Italy. It is necessary to distinguish three stages of the rise and change of the scholarly tradition about Attila as the ancestor of the Arpad dynasty and the Huns as the ancestors of the Hungarians: 1) Attila is viewed as the ancestor of Almos and Arpad; 2) Aquila in the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle as the founder of the Hungarian state, which was an attempt at a Christian rationalization of the story of the Turul, an ethnogenetic story about the Hungarians and their dynasty; 3) the inclusion of the Huns in Hungarian history by Simon of Kéza while removing Attila from among the ancestors of the dynasty. The mention of Engaddi (attesting to Simon's knowledge of the latin topography of Palestine, ultimately derived from Eusebius of Caesarea) likens him to the biblical David showing that, like the great warrior-king of Judah and Israel, Attila was the preeminent ruler of the Huns, i.e. the Hungarians, and at the same time legitimizes him, placing him, and, not least, his people, in the horizon of the world of Mediterranean civilization.The 10th chapter of the Chronica de Gestis Hungarorum written by Simon of Kéza contains a puzzling phrase: Attila (...) nutritus in Engadi. So far, no attempt has been made to explain it. According to the authors of the following article, Simon took it from the Latin translation of the Onomasticon of Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 339) by St. Jerome. In all likelihood, Simon gained access to Jerome’s codex during his trip to southern Italy. It is necessary to distinguish three stages of the rise and change of the scholarly tradition about Attila as the ancestor of the Arpad dynasty and the Huns as the ancestors of the Hungarians: 1) Attila is viewed as the ancestor of Almos and Arpad; 2) Aquila in the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle as the founder of the Hungarian state, which was an attempt at a Christian rationalization of the story of the Turul, an ethnogenetic story about the Hungarians and their dynasty; 3) the inclusion of the Huns in Hungarian history by Simon of Kéza while removing Attila from among the ancestors of the dynasty. The mention of Engaddi (attesting to Simon's knowledge of the latin topography of Palestine, ultimately derived from Eusebius of Caesarea) likens him to the biblical David showing that, like the great warrior-king of Judah and Israel, Attila was the preeminent ruler of the Huns, i.e. the Hungarians, and at the same time legitimizes him, placing him, and, not least, his people, in the horizon of the world of Mediterranean civilization

Chorwacki film fabularny jako medium pamięci wojny lat 90. XX w. w krajach byłej Jugosławii

The article is an attempt to present selected Croatian new war films as media of memory of the war of the 1990s in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The authoress is primarily interested in the narrative structure of the presented forms of mediated memory. In the three analysed films, a medium of memory is identified as: ideological (Madonna, Neven Hitrec, 1999), mimetic (Witnesses, Vinko Brešan, 2003), and poietic (The Living and the Dead, Kristijan Milić, 2007), which allows her to draw conclusions about the heterogeneous, dialectical nature of the corpus of Croatian new war films.Artykuł jest próbą zaprezentowania wybranych chorwackich (nowych) filmów wojennych jako mediów pamięci wojny lat 90. XX w. w krajach byłej Jugosławii. Autorkę interesuje przede wszystkim struktura narracyjna prezentowanych form pamięci zapośredniczonej. W trzech analizowanych filmach dopatruje się ona medium pamięci o charakterze: ideologicznym (Bogurodzica, Neven Hitrec, 1999), mimetycznym (Świadkowie, Vinko Brešan, 2003) i pojetycznym (Żywi i martwi, Kristijan Milić, 2007), co pozwala jej wysnuć wnioski o niejednorodnym, dialektycznym charakterze samego korpusu chorwackich (nowych) filmów wojennych

The „limited recognition” problem and the international presence of the Republic of Kosovo

This paper aims to examine the connection between foreign policy of the states with limited recognition and their security. Author analyzes the position of Kosovo in international relations. Explaines differences between de facto states, quasi-states, unrecognized states, pseudo states and states with limited recognition, arguing that Kosovo should be consider as the latter. Author also points out consequences of international recognition (including the case of Kosovo), shows the main goals of foreign policy of this state and relations between Kosovo and international governmental organizations, which conduct ‘engagement without recognition policy’ and selected countries, which recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state. The paper is based on examination of primary and secondary sources, critical analysis of sources and data analysis. Author argues that limited recognition of Kosovo has a direct influence on foreign policy of this state. This foreign policy is strictly connected with security issues. However, limited recognition reduced foreign policy of Kosovo and made that this country cannot be a party of military pacts, which is crucial in maintaining peace and security in this country.This paper aims to examine the connection between foreign policy of the states with limited recognition and their security. Author analyzes the position of Kosovo in international relations. Explaines differences between de facto states, quasi-states, unrecognized states, pseudo states and states with limited recognition, arguing that Kosovo should be consider as the latter. Author also points out consequences of international recognition (including the case of Kosovo), shows the main goals of foreign policy of this state and relations between Kosovo and international governmental organizations, which conduct ‘engagement without recognition policy’ and selected countries, which recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state. The paper is based on examination of primary and secondary sources, critical analysis of sources and data analysis. Author argues that limited recognition of Kosovo has a direct influence on foreign policy of this state. This foreign policy is strictly connected with security issues. However, limited recognition reduced foreign policy of Kosovo and made that this country cannot be a party of military pacts, which is crucial in maintaining peace and security in this country

Historical policy of communist Romania in the opinions of PPR diplomacy

The article proposes to look at the phenomenon of the historical politics of the authorities of communist Romania through the prism of opinions on this subject from the diplomacy, also communist, of the Polish People's Republic. It is about opinions of representatives of a state whose citizens during the communist period were not subjected to and did not succumb to such strong political indoctrination as in other satellite states of the Kremlin on the subject of a state which, from the 1960s onwards, conducted the most independent and distanced foreign politics from the Kremlin among these satellites and which went furthest among these states in instrumentally using historical politics and the often accompanying nationalism for political purposes. As the Polish observers have argued, the Romanian authorities saw in the image of Romanians and Romanian history created by them a valuable tool to shape for themselves the favor of society, its views and public sentiment depending on the political demand of the moment. It was most controversial among Poles, but supported by the Romanian public, that the Romanian authorities used history to more or less openly attack the Soviet Union in the name of defending their sovereignty. The Polish authorities also viewed with distance the theory deriving modern Romanians from the ancient Dacians and generally considered Romanian historiography to be biased and unreliable. In spite of the fall of communism, unlike in Poland, the picture of Romanian history shaped earlier, with a strong nationalist accent, is still readily accepted by Romanians.The article proposes to look at the phenomenon of the historical politics of the authorities of communist Romania through the prism of opinions on this subject from the diplomacy, also communist, of the Polish People's Republic. It is about opinions of representatives of a state whose citizens during the communist period were not subjected to and did not succumb to such strong political indoctrination as in other satellite states of the Kremlin on the subject of a state which, from the 1960s onwards, conducted the most independent and distanced foreign politics from the Kremlin among these satellites and which went furthest among these states in instrumentally using historical politics and the often accompanying nationalism for political purposes. As the Polish observers have argued, the Romanian authorities saw in the image of Romanians and Romanian history created by them a valuable tool to shape for themselves the favor of society, its views and public sentiment depending on the political demand of the moment. It was most controversial among Poles, but supported by the Romanian public, that the Romanian authorities used history to more or less openly attack the Soviet Union in the name of defending their sovereignty. The Polish authorities also viewed with distance the theory deriving modern Romanians from the ancient Dacians and generally considered Romanian historiography to be biased and unreliable. In spite of the fall of communism, unlike in Poland, the picture of Romanian history shaped earlier, with a strong nationalist accent, is still readily accepted by Romanians

Ewolucja osadnictwa na prawie wołoskim w Karpatach polskich

The article aims to present the temporal and spatial evolution of settlements on the basis of the Wallachian law in Polish sections of the Carpathian Mountains. A series of thematic maps have been prepared that show the distribution of settlements over a period of more than 300 years, from the second half of the 14th century to the second half of the 17th century. A total of 479 settlements based on Wallachian law or with a certified Wallachian presence have been documented in the physical-geographical area of the Polish Carpathians. They accounted for 28% of all settlements in the region. It should be noted that 70% (339) of these settlements disappeared as a result of the forced population relocations of 1946-1950. Two phases can be distinguished in the history of Wallachian settlement in the Polish Carpathians. The first (from the second half of the 14th century to the end of the 15th century) was mainly related to the military, guardian function of the settlements - 87 new sites were established at that time. The second phase (from the 16th to the end of the 17th century) was rather determined by economic factors, stimulated by climatic changes during the so-called Little Ice Age. During this period, there was an increase in the dynamics of Wallachian settlement, which resulted in the creation of 392 settlements in the mountainous zone, which had poor conditions for farming (above 500 meters above sea level). Settlement under Wallachian law lost its originally ethnic character, becoming a tool for effective colonization of the Carpathians based on pastoral or pastoral-agricultural economy.Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie czasowej i przestrzennej ewolucji osadnictwa na prawie wołoskim w polskiej części Karpat. Przygotowano serię map tematycznych, które przedstawiają rozmieszczenie osad w okresie ponad 300 lat, od drugiej połowy XIV wieku do drugiej połowy XVII wieku. Na obszarze fizycznogeograficznym polskich Karpat łącznie udokumentowano 479 miejscowości opartych na prawie wołoskim lub z poświadczoną obecnością Wołochów. Stanowiły one 28% wszystkich miejscowości w tym regionie. Należy podkreślić, że 70% (339) tych osad zniknęło w wyniku przymusowych przesiedleń ludności z lat 1946–1950. W historii wołoskiego osadnictwa w polskich Karpatach wyróżnia się dwie fazy. Pierwsza (od drugiej połowy XIV wieku do końca XV wieku) była związana głównie z militarną, strażniczą funkcją osad - powstało wówczas 87 nowych lokalizacji. Druga faza (od XVI do końca XVII wieku) była raczej uwarunkowana przez czynniki gospodarcze, stymulowane zmianami klimatycznymi podczas tzw. Małej Epoki Lodowej. W okresie tym doszło do zwiększenia dynamiki osadnictwa wołoskiego, co zaowocowało stworzeniem 392 osad w strefie górskiej, mającej złe warunki do prowadzenia gospodarki rolnej (powyżej 500 m n.p.m.). Osadnictwo na prawie wołoskim straciło swój pierwotnie etniczny charakter, stając się narzędziem umożliwiającym efektywną kolonizację Karpat w oparciu o gospodarkę pasterską lub pastersko-rolniczą

XXIII Balcanicum, Pogranicza kulturowe w Europie Południowo-Wschodniej, Poznań, 25-26 października 2024 – sprawozdanie z konferencji

The XXIII Balcanicum conference, organised by the Balkan Studies Commission, in cooperation with the Faculty of History of the Adam Mickiewicz University, was held on 25-26 October 2024. The conference XXIII Balcanicum, organised by the Balkan Studies Commission, in cooperation with the Faculty of History of the Adam Mickiewicz University, was held on 25-26 October 2024. The theme of this year's scientific session was formulated as follows: Sites of Memory and Historical Politics in Southeastern Europe. During the conference, 28 papers were presented by researchers from Polish and foreign centres (7), mainly in the form of stationary. The topic of cultural borderlands was analysed by the authors of the papers in an extremely broad way. Among the presentations, there was no shortage of analyses devoted to the impact of cultural borderlands on the functioning of states, national, regional and local communities, families and individuals.W dniach 25-26 października 2024 r. odbyła się konferencja XXIII Balcanicum, zorganizowana przez Komisję Bałkanistyki, we współpracy z Wydziałem Historii UAM. W dniach 25-26 października 2024 r. odbyła się konferencja XXIII Balcanicum, zorganizowana przez Komisję Bałkanistyki, we współpracy z Wydziałem Historii UAM. Temat tegorocznej sesji naukowej był sformułowany następująco: Miejsca pamięci i polityka historyczna w Europie Południowo-Wschodniej. W trakcie konferencji wygłoszono 28 referatów, które przedstawili badacze z ośrodków polskich i zagranicznych (7), głównie w formie stacjonarnej. Tematyka pograniczy kulturowych była analizowana przez autorów referatów w niezwykle szeroki sposób. Wśród prezentowanych wystąpień nie zabrakło analiz poświęconych wpływowi pograniczy kulturowych na funkcjonowanie państw, wspólnot narodowych, regionalnych i lokalnych, rodzin oraz jednostek

Miejsce Pamięci „Danica” w narodowej i lokalnej polityce historycznej oraz kulturze pamięci w Chorwacji i Koprivnicy

The „Danica” Memorial Site in national and local politics of history and culture of memory in Croatia and Koprivnica. The aim of the article is to show the evolution of the attitude of state and local authorities toward the „Danica” Memorial Site located on the place of the first former concentration and transit camp established by the Ustasha regime during World War II (1941–1942). The Memorial Site has been established in Koprivnica in the late 70s and early 80s. The former camp operated for several months in 1941, most often as a transit site for prisoners. The public and symbolic perception of this site constitutes a reflection of changes that have taken place within the historical politics and culture of memory in Croatia over several decades. On the basis of press reports and scholarly literature, steps toward the „memorialization” of the area will be analyzed, and the evolution of the official attitude of the authorities toward what happened at „Danica” during World War II will be presented. In socialist Yugoslavia the heroic struggle of the communist partisans was emphasized above all, then they were supplemented by activities commemorating civilian victims of the war. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, „Danica” was overlooked in the official discourse, the site was neglected and associated with the „unwanted” memory of the communist partisans of World War II. Work on restoring the place to collective memory was not undertaken until the 21st century.W artykule przedstawiono ewolucję stosunku władz państwowych i lokalnych wobec Miejsca Pamięci „Danica” w Koprivnicy, stworzonego na przełomie lat 70. i 80. XX w. na terenie pierwszego obozu kocnentracyjnego, założonego przez ustaszy. Funkcjonował on przez kilka miesięcy 1941 roku, najczęściej był miejscem tranzytowym dla więźniów kierowanych do innych ośrodków. Publiczny i symboliczny odbiór tego miejsca stanowi indykatywny element zmian, które zachodziły w ramach polityki historycznej i kultury pamięci w Chorwacji na przestrzeni kilkudziesięciu lat. Na podstawie relacji prasowych i literatury naukowej zaprezentowane zostaną działania w kierunku „memorializacji” tego obszaru, przedstawiona będzie ewolucja oficjalnego stosunku władz wobec tego, co działo się w „Danicy” podczas II wojny światowej. W socjalistycznej Jugosławii centralne miejsce w polityce historycznej zajmowały dzieje Walki Narodowowyzwoleńczej, prowadzonej przez komunistyczny ruch partyzancki (Narodnooslobodilačka borba; NOB). Był to jeden z niekwestionowanym mitów założycielski socjalistycznej federacji i filar legitymizacji rządów komunistycznych. Akcentowano przede wszystkim bohaterską walkę partyzantów, a miejsce ofiar cywilnych było marginalne. Poświęcone im miejsca pamięci tworzono zazwyczaj w późniejszych dekadach. W przypadku Koprivnicy prace w tym kierunku podjęto w drugiej połowie lat 70., a Miejsce Pamięci „Danica“ otwarto w 1981 r.. Po rozpadzie Jugosławii „Danicę” pomijano w oficjalnym dyskursie a miejsce było zaniedbane i kojarzone z „niechcianą” pamięcią o komunistycznej partyzantce z czasów II wojny światowej. Prace nad przywróceniem tego miejsca w kolektywnej pamięci podjęto dopiero w XXI wieku