Elusive Empowerment: Emerald Mining in Ndola Rural under Kenneth Kaunda’s One-Party State

One of the hallmarks of Kenneth Kaunda’s tenure in office was the nationalisation of Zambia’s large-scale copper mines. Yet after the Matero Reforms of 1969, which purported to empower Zambians through the public ownership and management of the country’s largest export industry, President Kaunda and his colleagues curiously decided to partner with a foreign investor (Hagura Mining) in the 1980s to develop the emerald mining sector in Ndola Rural (now Lufwanyama), while Zambian artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM) were sidelined. Drawing upon archival documents, newspaper coverage, and a select number of interviews, this paper seeks to examine this apparent shift in mining governance under Kenneth Kaunda. Instead of facilitating financial access or establishing an equipment hire scheme for ASM, the Reserved Minerals Corporation – a subsidiary of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) –sought to restrict access to emerald deposits and preferred partnering with a foreign investor. These decisions were largely attributable to the “prevailing wisdom” at the time regarding mineral extraction (i.e. a preference for large-scale mining that can be more easily taxed and regulated) and the foreign exchange crunch of the 1980s. By prioritising large-scale production, Zambian policymakers undermined their own stated developmental goals that aimed at diversification and empowerment - both of which ASM would have facilitated - and entrenched an economic model that was dependent on foreign investment. Unfortunately, this model’s failure continues to have reverberations for emerald mining in Lufwanyama today

Beliefs and Probabilities: The Errors That Remain Are Mine Alone

Imagine that the preface to a professor’s book implicitly asserts that all the propositions in the rest of his or her book are true, but explicitly acknowledges that experience would suggest some errors remain among those propositions. The prof thereby seems paradoxically to believe inconsistent statements. But in fact this famous preface paradox is an illusion. The first statement is a belief reflecting epistemic uncertainty, while the second is a probabilistic statement about aleatory uncertainty. If one were to convert the probability into a belief, one would see that the author rationally holds perfectly consistent beliefs. Likewise the lottery paradox resolves. Remarkably, resolution of these philosophy paradoxes sheds important light on legal evidence and proof: once one realizes that legal factfinding deals in beliefs, not probabilities, many of the law’s proof paradoxes vaporize. All those paradoxes reveal a generally applicable and powerful principle of rational thought: if in the presence of epistemic uncertainty a person believes fact x and believes fact y because each passes the threshold for belief, then the person believes x AND y together. The explanation lies in the fact that epistemic uncertainty calls for nonadditive logic, which employs the MIN rule for conjunction rather than the product rule. The significance is broad, as it maps where one can logically believe a string of beliefs as a narrative chain

A Pandemics Treaty: A Boon for Africa

This article illustrates the weaknesses of the current global health framework. It highlights two pillars a new treaty regime ought to be built upon. The analysis seeks to establish how these pillars could have helped Africa during the pandemic and can indeed help Africa in future pandemics. The analysis suggests the need for a unified global health regime or pandemics’ treaty that promotes a level legal and political playing field regarding future pandemics. The treaty could focus on coordination of research and development; build a stronger global framework that reinforces legal obligations and norms; provide for universal access to medicines, vaccines, and medical infrastructure

Defamation 2.0

There is a literal prohibition in the media bar that media lawyers cannot represent plaintiffs in suits for defamation. The stated principle behind this rule—a rule that can result in excommunication from the premier media law organization if it is violated—is that playing both sides of the defamation game is disloyal to traditional media actors because any chance of victory could inadvertently distort the law of defamation to increase the risk of frivolous suits against media outlets or other innocent third parties. But has the maxim finally gone too far? Fueled by a new model where media profits are driven by views, both the mainstream media and social media platforms have restructured their business in a way that calls for the revisitation of the prohibition. Specifically, if one examines the disturbing rise of misinformation and disinformation, the clear trend is toward knowing falsehoods by media outlets and media pundits. There are numerous recent lawsuits against the media for engaging in misinformation, including the Sandy Hook lawsuit against Alex Jones, suits by poll workers in Georgia against the Gateway Pundit and One America News Network (OANN), and of course, Dominion and Smartmatic’s suits against Fox and other media pundits for erroneous statements in the aftermath of the 2020 election. This Article argues that “Defamation 2.0”—suits by media lawyers against media companies and media pundits that spread misinformation and disinformation—can significantly improve media accountability by seeking to obtain the truth and to push for apologies and corrections on equal footing with misinformation. In addition, the link between misinformation and political violence is now well-established, and defamation lawsuits offer the possibility of holding not only the media accountable but also social media platforms where the content is or has been created by the platform. In so doing, it offers the possibility of protecting democracy against erosion by forces threatening to undermine U.S. institutions and seeking to inflame and foment violence such as the January 6 insurrection or mass shootings throughout the United States

Representative Sara Jacobs and Senator Dick Durbin Take Aim at the DoD Law of War Manual – and Miss

In a letter recently sent to the Department of Defense General Counsel, two lawmakers – Representative Sara Jacobs and Senator Dick Durbin – present a number of suggested revisions to the DoD Law of War Manual. In Part I, this Article conducts a critical assessment of the substantive suggestions. By adopting an approach that emphasizes maintaining the delicate balance between humanitarian considerations and military necessity, the critical assessment concludes that the suggested revisions to the Manual are inadvisable. Part II then considers the Jacobs-Durbin letter in the broader context of public discourse and separation of powers. This component of the inquiry determines that the letter represents an unwarranted attempt by legislators with no actual authority or apparent individual expertise to infringe upon commander in chief authority vested in the executive by virtue of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The Article then concludes by reflecting on the proper means by which legislators interested in engaging with the DoD on matters related to the Law of War Manual should consider connecting with the General Counsel in the future

Introduction: The Life and Legacies of Kenneth Kaunda in Southern Africa

Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda (known widely as KK), passed away on 17 June 2021 at the age of 97. This marked the end of an era for many, and not only in Zambia. Kaunda belonged to the last of a generation of African leaders who fought for independence from colonial rule and had his own brand of political and economic philosophies (Cheeseman and Sishuwa, 2021). Given the momentous occasion of the passing of one of Africa’s biggest icons, as editors we felt it was timely to organise a conference dedicated to Kaunda and his legacy, which took place in Lusaka in November 2021. This special issue features papers presented at this conference

Learning from Zambia\u27s Economic Policy Reversals

The economic policies of Zambia’s first independent government, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), had disastrous results - turning Zambia from a middle-income into a least developed country. Following a difficult adjustment period, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s reversal of many UNIP policies led to over a decade of rapid growth and falling poverty. Despite their apparent success, policies such as privatisation were unpopular and the Patriotic Front administration from 2011 reverted to many of UNIP’s policies. This led once again to low growth and Zambia defaulting on its debt. As the United Party for National Development administration seeks to repair the damage, this article highlights four key economic lessons from the UNIP era which are crucial for sustainable growth and poverty reduction: (1) fiscal discipline is vital; (2) investment must be economically viable; (3) government should focus on public services and leave business to the private sector; and (4) untargeted subsidies do not help the poor

Zambia’s Missing Narrative of Structural Adjustment

In 1991, Zambia launched one of the most orthodox structural adjustments programs (SAPs) in Africa. The last and longest chapter of its fitful history with the IMF and World Bank, Zambia’s SAP commenced during the euphoria following the ouster of long-time President Kenneth Kaunda, when it was presented as the only strategy for dealing with the country’s economic collapse. What followed was one of Africa’s most striking experiments with rapid liberalisation, leading to budgetary stabilisation and increased investment but also sudden unemployment and impoverishment. If in retrospect liberalisation seems inescapable, given the ballooning debt of Kaunda’s last years, Zambians at the time envisioned alternative futures. The years leading up to the 1991 election saw vibrant debate among activists about how to fix the country’s failing economy, with reform plans ranging from marketisation to redistribution. After 1991, however, the newly elected Movement for Multiparty Democracy shelved these proposals in favour of a SAP championed by international donors. As a result, many economic ideas advanced at the time have been forgotten, and structural adjustment has come to seem inevitable. As part of a wider book project on ahistoricism in international development, my paper tries to recover Zambia’s “missing narrative” of economic reform by surveying local debates on political and economic change in the 1980s and 1990s. Examining how SA won out over alternatives has implications for our understanding of the politics of economic reform in the decades of neoliberal ascendanc

Kaunda and the Liberation of Namibia: Towards an Assessment

When he died in June 2021, Kenneth Kaunda was widely hailed for his support for Southern African liberation movements. This paper considers the case of Namibia and the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and asks how Kaunda went about trying to bring about the liberation of Namibia in the 1970s and 1980s. He initially let SWAPO military operations take place from Zambia. SWAPO had its headquarters in Zambia in the 1970s, and many thousand Namibian refugees settled in Zambia. In international fora Kaunda gave SWAPO full support, and he backed the establishment of a United Nations (UN) Institute for Namibia in Lusaka. But he was willing to engage with the apartheid regime to try to facilitate the UN process towards independence for Namibia, he ended SWAPO’s military activity from Zambian soil, and he intervened decisively against democratic forces in an internal crisis in SWAPO. Though he continued his personal attempts at mediation in the early 1980s, they achieved little, and his most important contribution to Namibia’s liberation was probably the influence he wielded as a key figure in the meetings of the leaders of the Frontline States