Analyzing Nozick’s reasons against living in an Experience Machine

Robert Nozick’s goal in his chapter on Happiness from The Examined Life is to demonstrate that there is something that we value outside of how our lives feel to us internally. To this end, he introduced the Experience Machine thought experiment. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, he elaborates on three values that matter in addition to internal experience which ought to dissuade us from plugging in. In this essay I attend to each of the three arguments he posits, arguing that none of Nozick’s three values should convince us as reasons against plugging into the Experience Machine. We are thereby left with no reason against plugging into the machine, and yet dread of plugging in remains. I address this remaining strong conviction against entering the machine. Finally, I address the recent status-quo argument, which suggests the Experience Machine experiment is subject to this bias

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Do We Need Moral Facts?

In this article I answer Gilbert Harman’s objection to the possibility of objectivity in the field of ethics, namely, that there is no such thing as a “moral fact.” I analyze the argument using terminology from G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica and try to apply it to utilitarian moral theory. After demonstrating that utilitarianism does not, in fact, make any appeal to moral facts, I then consider the implications of Harman’s theory for the field of ethics as a whole. I conclude that his argument is based on a misunderstanding of ethics and that values are not to be found in the world, but are to be found in us. I then give some closing remarks about one possibility for the construction of an objective system of ethics which finds its basis in the subject

The Role of Free Speech in a Democracy: A Critique of Rawls’s Political Theory

In The Basic Liberties and Their Priority (1993), John Rawls attempts to supply a robust political theory that answers the criticisms leveled at his earlier work, A Theory of Justice (1971). Central to Rawls’s arguments is his conception of the person and the implications it has on the two principles of justice made famous in Theory. Yet answering these criticisms leads Rawls to make some questionable arguments regarding the priority of the basic liberties and how they may be made to cohere with one another. In particular, section 10 sees Rawls advocate a near absolute right of free speech by drawing on his theory of the person and attempting to illustrate how the basic liberties may be adjusted at later stages. Thus, this essay will be devoted to critically discussing Rawls’s views on his perceived right of free speech. Particularly, it will be argued that Rawls takes an approach to free speech that is far too narrow and seemingly tailored to his general theory and conclusions. Free speech is not a pure good as Rawls seems to suggest, but rather entails consequences with which any well-governed society must be concerned

An Argument for the Censorship of Hate Speech

Here it will be argued that censoring the expression of what I will call hateful beliefs is justified. I will present the framework and position of John Stuart Mill on the freedom of expression, which posits that no censorship is justifiable, and then present an argument against Mill’s view. I will begin by discussing Mill’s utilitarianism, his concepts of the harm principle and the tyranny of the majority, and then explain his arguments for total freedom of expression. Afterwards, I will argue that Mill’s reasoning, while generally correct, does not apply in cases of hate speech. Following this, I will argue hate speech is gravely harmful, and so should be censored on the basis of Mill’s own stance on utilitarianism and the harm principle

The Meaning of a Just Existence as understood through the Self, the Soul, and God: An examination of what it means to have a meaningful existence through the lenses of Plato, Shakespeare, Descartes, Pascal, Kierkegaard, The Bible, and the correlation this has with the self and God

In this paper, I will argue what it means to achieve a good life, which cannot be found in the Platonic world but rather in the various schools of thought that have included the principles of love, equality, and freedom. By drawing on the works of Plato, Descartes, and Biblical authors, and with references to Kierkegaard, Pascal, and Shakespeare, I will show that to reach a meaningful existence you must incorporate principles of ‘The Self’, Equality, the ‘Soul’, and God. From this, I will demonstrate exactly why these principles are necessary to push past the limiting and hierarchical realm of the finite. Lastly, I will show why it is important to not only recognize the Infinite but commit to living by the principles of the Infinite as well

Who Needs Value-Free Science? Defending Objectivity in Not-So-Value-Free Science

This essay is both a defense and a critique of value-free science. It is a defense in that I shall endeavor to demonstrate how science is often influenced by values that distort, misrepresent, or even completely falsify scientific data. I argue that there are many circumstances where values do not play a legitimate role in scientific inquiry, and thus are rightly barred. However, I shall also critique the notion of value-free science by demonstrating that values can (and do) play a legitimate and indeed vital role in the functioning of science. The worry, it seems, is that if science is not value-free, then it cannot be objective. Contrary to this assertion, I will argue that the conflation of value-freedom with objectivity is mistaken. First, I will begin by examining the arguments both for and against value-free science. Second, I will disentangle the notion of value-freedom from objectivity in order to reveal that the two are by no means the same. This will help to set up my defense of objectivity, where I shall reconcile value-motivated science with the possibility of objective knowledge. My thesis is that values are a necessary component of scientific inquiry, and that the lack of value-freedom in science does not compromise the pursuit of objectivity.&nbsp