White Winston Select Asset Funds LLC v. Good Times Restaurants Inc

USDC for the District of Delawar

Tracie Gardner v. Ulta Salon Cosmetics and Fragrance Inc

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Canna-compliance: The Challenges of a Newly Regulated Industry

https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/flyers-2023-2024/1116/thumbnail.jp

PJM Power Providers Group v. FERC

Agenc

The Origins and Future of International Data Privacy Law

Data privacy law varies widely across jurisdictions worldwide. Amidst sophistries and jurisdictional conflicts between lawmakers in Europe and the United States, a largely unregulated cross-border data industry emerged, prepared to exploit an unaware or overwhelmed general public. Without governmental support, privacy itself is in grave danger. The people, as true bearers of the fundamental right to privacy, must be put back in control of their data by governments that are aware of their ever-conflicting roles as protectors and aggressors. Scholars like Ari Ezra Waldman, in its book “Industry Unbound,” have criticized the common notice and consent approach to privacy as mere performance, calling for more governmental regulation instead of private enforcement. What they often overlook is the international dimension of the issue at hand, the specific and complex history of privacy as a philosophical and legal concept, and the inherent need to ultimately put people in control, not governments. By recollecting the function and value of privacy, of data, and of corresponding legislation, lawmakers all over the world might be able to enter into a new era of privacy awareness. This article explores possible solutions from an international perspective, based on the historical and philosophical foundations of privacy itself, and a comparison between the privacy history of the United States, Germany, and the European Union

Judicial Clerkship Opinion Writing Conference

The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law (Catholic Law) hosted its fourth annual Judicial Clerkship Opinion Writing Conference from Thursday, February 22 through Saturday, February 24. This year’s conference brought to campus thirty-six rising law clerks who in the upcoming year will serve in the chambers of either the Federal Circuit Courts, the Federal District Courts, or the State Appellate Courts. It provided these clerks opportunities for learning the particulars of judicial opinion writing and allowed them to experience the supportive and connected community at Catholic Law. This unique undertaking by the Law School serves both the bench and bar by training law students in an important skill

Viewing Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 608(b) as Parts of the Same Legislative Scheme: The Tightening of Rule 404(b) Makes It the Right Time to Clarify Rule 608(b)

Part I of this Essay argues that the substantive and procedural standards for admitting bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b) have been toughened. As a matter of substance, several courts have repudiated the use of buzzwords such as “res gestae,” and other courts now subject prosecution proffers to more rigorous scrutiny when the government endeavors to invoke such theories as the doctrine of objective chances, the inextricable intertwinement doctrine, and proof of plan. Perhaps even more importantly, on the procedural front, there are now pretrial notice requirements that give the defense much more time to evaluate and critique the prosecution’s claims that the evidence in question possesses legitimate, noncharacter relevance. For their part, many appellate courts are pressuring trial judges to administer limiting instructions that single out the supposed noncharacter theory and explain the theory in clear, detailed terms. Part I concludes by predicting that in the long term, the tightening of Rule 404(b)’s substantive and procedural standards will give prosecutors a powerful incentive to resort to Rule 608(b) as an alternative justification for informing the jury of the accused’s other misdeeds. Currently, prosecutors make minimal use of Rule 608(b). Prosecutors prefer Rule 404(b) as a theory of admissibility because it permits the substantive use of extrinsic testimony about an accused’s other misconduct. Given the courts’ past receptivity to Rule 404(b) evidence, prosecutors have felt little need to turn to Rule 608(b), which allows the testimony to be used only for the limited purpose of impeachment and restricts resort to extrinsic evidence. For the last three decades, I have made it a practice to scan every opinion published in a Federal Supplement advance sheet. It speaks volumes that the typical Federal Supplement advance sheet contains multiple 404(b) cases but no 608(b) cases. In the near future, that might change. Part II discusses the problems that will arise if prosecutors begin to shift toward Rule 608(b). Part II points out that Rule 608(b) is the subject of several splits of authority. To begin with, may the proponent employ Rule 608(b) if the act in question has already been the subject of a conviction? In addition, during 608(b) cross-examination, to what extent—if any—may the cross-examiner use documentary evidence to pressure the witness to concede their performance of the untruthful act? Finally, despite the rule’s seemingly explicit ban on “extrinsic evidence” of the act, may the cross-examiner confront the witness if a judge or jury has made a finding rejecting the witness’s testimony on a prior occasion? As we shall soon see, there is some case law on each of these issues. However, compared to the volume of Rule 404(b) decisions, the bodies of relevant Rule 608(b) case law are small. To date, these issues have not been especially troublesome because, again, by a wide margin, prosecutors have usually opted to take the Rule 404(b) route rather than the Rule 608(b) track. In addition to identifying the splits of authority, Part II evaluates the conflicting views on these issues. I hope that by calling the attention of Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (the “Committee”) to these issues and describing the competing policy considerations, this Essay will persuade the Committee to address these issues and help the Committee choose how to come down on these issues. The resolution of these 608(b) issues arguably requires an amendment to the rule

Racial Targets

It is common scholarly and popular wisdom that racial quotas are illegal. However, the reality is that since 2020’s racial reckoning, many of the largest companies have been touting specific, albeit voluntary, goals to hire or promote people of color, which this Article refers to as “racial targets.” The Article addresses this phenomenon and shows that companies can defend racial targets as distinct from racial quotas, which involve a rigid number or proportion of opportunities reserved exclusively for minority groups. The political implications of the legal defensibility of racial targets are significant in this moment in American history, where race relations have become polarized and the conservative, pro-business U.S. Supreme Court may weigh in on the legality of voluntary goals set by some of the largest companies in the country. Large companies have historically been granted discretion to choose their strategies for paving the way toward equal employment opportunity for people of color. The Article grapples with whether this corporate-discretion ideal would inform the legal posture of racial targets