Studying Conspiracy Theory after the (Current) Rise of Right-Wing Populism

The American historian Richard Hofstadter intended his still-influential essay on the “Paranoid Style in American Politics,” which initiated the modern study of conspiracy theories, as a response to the mid-1950s rise of right-wing populism in the US. Reflecting on the lessons we can learn from the insights and weaknesses of Hofstadter’s timely intervention into contemporary politics, as well as the author’s three decades studying conspiracy theories, the chapter asks how current academic work, which takes place within and responds to another rise in rightwing populism, should understand and intervene in the present and prepare for the future

Rachel Spivack v. City of Philadelphia

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Sara Coon v. County of Lebanon

USDC for the Middle District of Pennsylvani

USA v. Danny Aument

USDC for the District of Delawar

Timothy Ryan v. USA

USDC for the District of New Jerse

Eric Rambert v. Warden Greene SCI

USDC for the Eastern District of Pennsylvani

Student Life E-Newsletter April 01, 2024

https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/studentlife/1154/thumbnail.jp

Government Misinformation Platforms

There is a harmful mismatch between how information published by the government is perceived—as highly trustworthy—and the reality that it is often not. This Article shows that the government frequently collects information from third-party private entities and publishes it with no review or vetting. Although this information is riddled with errors and inaccuracies, scholars, policymakers, and the public treat the information with unwarranted confidence because it derives from the government. Further, institutional imprimatur (and consequent trust) attaches to information even tangentially associated with the government and to information where the government explicitly disclaims review. This Article highlights the ubiquity of government platforms for private, unvetted information that is easily misinterpreted as authoritative. For example, the EPA encourages the public to rely on emissions data supplied by companies and unreviewed by the agency, the FDA disseminates official-looking information about drugs that is generated by drug manufacturers and posted without agency evaluation, and the CDC publicizes a database of potential vaccine side-effects to which anyone can submit unverified reports. Many policies push open access to government information under the belief that the public can use this information for valuable ends. Greater access to government information is also touted as promoting transparency and democratizing governance. This Article argues that, contrary to scholarly consensus, policies to promote openness may instead spread misinformation, which often works against the goal of the institution disseminating the information and has broader social harms. These harms are aggravated by a growth in public access to government information via private intermediaries. Existing policy tools—disclaimers and sanctions—offer only an incomplete solution to the problem of government misinformation. This Article proposes new solutions including mechanisms to correct inaccurate information and methods to package information in ways that render it less misleading. Without reform, the push towards open access to government information may erode, not build, trust in government