Hired Guns : Establishing the Scope of the Proper Cross-Examination and Argument Relating to Expert Witness\u27 Compensation in Criminal Trials

The outcomes of criminal cases can turn on the credibility of the parties’ expert witnesses. The compensation such experts receive in exchange for their work on cases can undermine their credibility, as it provides the experts with a financial incentive that might bias them in favor of the parties who retain them. While concerns with such bias have existed for decades, courts have been inconsistent in the defining the permissible scope of cross-examination and argument on the issue. Some courts have unduly curtailed such cross-examination and argument. Courts have also been inconsistent in their views of whether calling such expert witnesses “hired guns” is proper argument. The present article begins with an overview of the issue, providing examples of the types of cases in which the issue may arise. The article then explores the general standards of conduct that govern the conduct of both prosecutors and defense counsel. Next, the article proposes standards defining the scope of proper cross-examination and argument on the issue. Finally, it proposes standard jury instructions that can be used to undermine the effect of improper argument on the issue

36th Father Mike Show

Thursday, March 21, 2024 | 6:00 PM Doors Open, 6:30 PM Show Starts | Dahnke Ballroom, 7th Floor, Westside of Notre Dame Stadium Tickets are on sale now! This event is expected to sell out, so snap yours up soon! If you would like to participate in this year\u27s Father Mike Show through an in-person or video act, please register your acts via the interest forms below. The deadline to submit an act is Friday, March 8, 2024, at 5 pm EST. Submit your live acts here. Submit your video acts here.https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndls_posters/1826/thumbnail.jp

European Union/OECD/International - Klaus Vogel Lecture 2023: The Past, Present and Future of Destination-Based Income Taxation.

A significant obstacle to the unilateral adoption of the OECD’s Pillar One are tax treaties since many countries cannot override tax treaties unilaterally. In his Klaus Vogel Lecture for 2023, Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah asks what are the chances for adopting a true multilateral convention for income taxation

What Matters in Moore

Why does the pending Moore case in the Supreme Court matter? The obvious answer is that if the Court decides that realization is a constitutional requirement for an income tax, the holding will have significant implications for the existing income tax regime. Depending on how broad the decision is, it could enable constitutional challenges to subpart F, the global intangible low-taxed income regime, partnership and subchapter S taxation, and sections 275, 877A, 1256, and 1259, to name just a few. And even if most or all of these challenges are ultimately decided against the taxpayers (for example, because realization does not apply to corporate taxpayers, because partnership taxation is just about aggregation, because subchapter S is generally elective, and because the other sections mentioned above are excise, not income, taxes), this will take time. Meanwhile, taxpayers would rely on Moore as substantial authority and not pay tax on a lot of income

Burning the Candle at Both Ends: A Case for the Right to Counsel at the State Habeas Level

Shinn v. Ramirez is the latest in a line of court decisions that place debilitating restrictions on the habeas corpus process, making it more difficult than ever for ineffective assistance of counsel claimants to prevail on a federal habeas claim. Paired with the growing restrictions placed on the criminal appellate process, both by the states and by the Supreme Court, these decisions make it near-impossible for many criminal defendants to challenge their convictions and guarantee their rights. The decision not to guarantee counsel at the state habeas level is grounded in logic that predated these restrictions. The state habeas hearing has become, for many defendants, the first opportunity to challenge their convictions. For some, it may even be the only opportunity. Due to the increased importance of the state habeas petition itself and the opportunity for evidentiary development at this stage, it is high time to reconsider this decision. Without a right to counsel at the state habeas proceeding, defendants harmed by ineffective assistance of counsel at prior hearings will face the habeas corpus process without the necessary assistance to make an adequate claim. Without guaranteed counsel, defendants are often forced to represent themselves, leading to faulty evidentiary records. Due to the decision in Shinn, these mistakes cannot be corrected at the federal habeas stage. Therefore, in order for indigent defendants to prevail on their ineffective assistance claims at the federal habeas level, counsel must be provided. The right to counsel stems from the idea that indigent defendants will be left without the same quality of defense afforded to wealthy ones. Like the criminal trial and appellate stage, the state habeas hearing has taken on a level of critical importance: it is the last opportunity to develop the evidentiary record used to support a particular claim. In a system where many petitioners, either through counsel’s error or due to state procedural rules, will not be given an opportunity to bring their appeal, the state habeas claim may be the only chance they have to develop this claim. Without affording indigent state habeas petitioners an attorney, a line has been drawn between wealthier and poorer petitioners. To preserve the opportunity to bring a habeas petition for all criminal defendants, and not just those who have the funds, the decision not to afford state habeas petitioners a right to counsel must be reconsidered

The Real World: \u3ci\u3eIqbal/Twombly\u3c/i\u3e The Plausibility Pleading Standard’s Effect on Federal Court Civil Practice

Several publications already exist detailing the evolution of American civil pleading standards, the personalities involved throughout, as well as the differing iterations’ theoretical and philosophical underpinnings. This Article is written not from the viewpoint of a scholar, but a practitioner. It is the practitioner who drafts, files, and defends against these pleadings. It is the practitioner who provides the “boots on the ground” execution of legislative and judicial directives. It is the practitioner who experiences the aspects of litigation that are not ultimately published in a reporter. And it is the practitioner who must explain to his or her clients the meaning of the law, the rulings of the judge, and the ultimate determination of their claims. As such, the first part of this Article seeks to discern the following for Charles E. Clark’s vision of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Conley v.Gibson’s enunciated notice pleading standard, and the current“plausibility pleading” embodied by the Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly rulings: (1) the practical problems each of these standards sought to remedy; (2) the impact on a claim’s chances of proceeding to discovery or undergoing an interlocutory appeal; and(3)the acknowledged concerns arising from this pleading standard. The goal is that by reviewing the benefits and failings of each standard, a clearer picture may form of a standard that would best accomplish the ultimate goal of allowing cases to be decided on their merits

USA v. Alice Chu

USDC for the District of New Jerse

After Affirmative Action

This is a time of crisis in legal education. In truth, we are in the midst of several crises. We are emerging from the COVID pandemic, a period of unprecedented upheaval where law students and law faculty alike struggled through physical challenges, mental health burdens, and decreased academic and professional success. The past few years also have seen a precipitous drop in applications to and enrollment in legal education. Simultaneously, students have been burdened with the skyrocketing costs of attending law school, taking on unmanageable levels of debt. And with the Supreme Court decision in SFFA v. Harvard, we are witnessing the end of affirmative action as we know it. As a result of the combination of these crises, and particularly due to the SFFA decision, we are likely to see a swift and dramatic decline of students of color—particularly Black and Latinx students—entering our nation’s halls of higher education, including our law schools. In this moment of looking to the future to consider “next steps” as we navigate these crises, many advocates and academics are struggling with how to move forward. My proposal is to build belonging. By increasing belonging on campus, law schools can contribute to an increase in retention rates for students of color. This is particularly critical at this moment not only because the numbers of students of color will likely be dwindling, but because the drop in diversity will inevitably cause even greater student marginalization on law school campuses with fewer opportunities for students of color to draw on others from their same background for mutual support. Failing to invest in Black, Latinx, and other students that are particularly affected by SFFA will leave them isolated and alienated, contributing to further academic and professional decline. Instead, by adding to students’ sense of belonging, schools can uplift and encourage them to persist through legal education and maximize their potential in practice. This Article lays a foundation for the importance of creating and sustaining belonging in legal education, particularly for students of color and in this moment where we are searching for answers after affirmative action. In introducing belonging as well as tying it to affirmative action, the Article shares broad context on the term and its application: what it is, why it matters, and how it has been lacking for students of color and other marginalized populations. Finally, this Article argues that increasing levels of belonging could maximize success for students who will need even greater support to survive and thrive in law school in the coming years