China Maritime Report #49: The PLAN Corruption Paradox: Insights from the 1st Destroyer Flotilla

Main Findings Like all organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suffers from endemic corruption, defined as the personal abuse of power for selfish ends. Corruption occurs when PLAN leaders use their power to: 1) influence personnel decisions in exchange for money and/or favor; and 2) extract kickbacks for influencing decisions in the contracting/procurement process for equipment and materiel, construction projects, and other service requirements. Despite widespread corruption in the PLAN, the service has continued to grow and modernize at an astonishing rate. One explanation for this paradox is that the PLAN has strived to keep corruption from infecting the personnel selection process in operational units, which matter most for combat power generation. For at least two decades, the PLAN’s anti-corruption “watchdog”—the Discipline Inspection Commission—has prioritized scrutiny over those units and personnel most directly responsible for the “preparation for military struggle.” This top-down approach has combined with efforts by the units themselves—likely driven by the self-interest of the unit Party Committee, which must answer for poor unit performance—to enact policies to ensure that the best candidates are chosen for leadership positions. The case of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla illustrates policies adopted by operational units to ensure the integrity of the personnel selection process. These include formulating clear regulations stipulating minimum qualifications for leadership positions, adopting strict standards for officer evaluation, and carrying out a transparent selection process. The Flotillas’ personnel selection process entails knowledge and skills competitions judged by senior unit members and incorporates feedback and inputs from other members of the unit. Due to the approaches adopted by units such as the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, individuals in positions of power have less leeway to engage in corrupt behavior, thereby increasing the probability that the most capable officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) will be selected for leadership positions.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1049/thumbnail.jp

Proportionality: Can’t Live With It But Can’t Live Without It

Perhaps no other word in the international humanitarian law lexicon evokes more interest and emotion than proportionality. How States implement the rule of proportionality is perhaps the most hotly debated aspect of international humanitarian law. The indeterminate nature of the rule allows for its meaning to conform to whatever its reader wants it to mean. This is a consequence of the variables related to key provisions of the rule: How do we assess military advantage? What makes an anticipated military advantage “concrete and direct”? And most problematic of all, what is the meaning of the term “excessive”? All of these concerns raise troubling questions. Can the proportionality rule truly matter without consensus on what amounts to non-compliance? Does the rule’s indeterminacy undermine its value as a legal tool? This essay will consider several aspects of the proportionality rule: first, why it still reflects a critically important principle of military operations despite its indeterminacy; second, its limited operational efficacy as a civilian risk mitigation measure; and third, why shifting the focus to the principle of constant care and the subordinate rule of precautions in the attack will advance the humanitarian interests of the law

Toward a Sea-Power Strategy—Chinese Communist Party Debates and Consensus Building under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping

China’s rise as a major maritime and naval power in recent decades resulted from a deliberate policy choice, but that choice was not an uncontroversial one. Internal Chinese Communist Party debate about naval power was resolved by balancing entrenched continental interests, resulting in an integrated but possibly compromised policy approach

CMSI Translations #13: Mission Command Is Not The Antidote

“Mission command” (renwushi zhihui) has become a buzzword across all branches of the U.S. military. The concept came into being in the early 19th century, borne from Prussian military experience, and became a treasured concept in Prussian/German military doctrine. Simply put, mission command is the delegation of decision-making power. The reason for delegating or subordinating decision-making is because, when compared with higher echelon command, front line units often have better situational awareness of their given area, and delegation of decision making authority can allow them to fully utilize this cognitive advantage and seize the time critical battle initiative.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1012/thumbnail.jp

Episode 19: Maritime Sabotage: The Hidden War Underseas

Guests James Langan, Andrew Rolander, and co-host Jahara ‘Franky’ Matisek join Dave Brown to discuss Maritime Sabotage; the deliberate targeting of undersea, pipelines, ports and energy hubs. It’s a story of hidden infrastructure, high stakes and shadowy actors who operate just below the threshold of open war – i.e. maritime irregular warfare. Articles: What is known about the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosions?, N. Adomaitis & J. Ahlander, Reuters, 22 Aug 2025 (possible paywall) Italian police arrest Ukrainian man over Nord Stream pipelines blast, K. Connolly, Guardian, 21 Aug 2025 How NATO Patrols the Sea for Suspected Russian Sabotage, D. Michaels, WSJ, 30 Mar 2025 (paywall) Maritime Sabotage: Lessons Learned and Implications for Strategic Competition, A. Powel et al, CNA, October 2021 Implementing Agreement to Enhance Protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure, R. Pedrozo, Stockton Center for International Law, 106 INT’L L. STUD. 146 (2025) Irregular Warfare on the Sea Floor and the Case for National Resilience, A. Rolander, SWJ, 30 May 2025 How to Counter Chinese Sabotage of Taiwan’s Undersea Cables, T. Boyle, Just Security, 20 May 2025 Sensors, AI Possible Solutions to Preventing Undersea Cable Sabotage, S. Magnuson, National Defense Magazine, 13 May 2025 Guests: Lt. Col. Jahara Franky Matisek, Ph.D. is a command pilot with over 3,700 hours in the C-17, E-11 BACN, T-6 and T-53 and is a Project Mercury innovation coach. He was recently a military professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College and served at the U.S. Air Force Academy as an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department. He has published over 120 articles on warfare, strategy, and national security and been a Fellow at AFWERX, Payne Institute for Public Policy, European Resilience Initiative Center, Modern War Institute, and Irregular Warfare Initiative. He has been a Co-PI on three DOD research projects on security assistance and Russian influence operations. James Langan is a military policy advisor for the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) at the UK Ministry of Defence, where he focuses on hybrid threats such as the Russian Shadow Fleet and sabotage to Critical Undersea Infrastructure. Prior to this he was awarded a Chief of Airstaff Fellowship to complete a MPhil in European Security at the University of Cambridge. He was also the UK militaries’ chief Information Operations and StratCom instructor and deployed as Commanding Officer of the British militaries’ Combat Camera Team during the 2021 Kabul and 2023 Sudan evacuations. James has also worked as a European energy commodities trader and currently participates in the RUSI Maritime Sanctions Task Force. His research interests include Russian political economy, and the history of international sanctions policy. Andrew M. Rolander is a senior IW analyst for Joint Staff J7 in the Office of Irregular Warfare and Strategic Competition (OIWC), responsible for formulating strategy and doctrine for the Joint Force. Andrew has expertise in special forces, intelligence, and para-military operations. He served as an intelligence analyst for the FBI and the CIA, and conducted fellowships on IW with USMC University, Grand Strategy as a George C. Marshall fellow, and History and Statecraft for the Clements Center, University Texas. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in maritime strategy and warfighting with the War Studies Department at King’s College London, and a Doctorate in National Security at the Institute of World Politics.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1018/thumbnail.jp

Episode 8: Interview with John Ferling, Author of Whirlwind and Shots Heard Round the World

This is a special episode of the Strategy Matters Podcast. Host Brendan Neagle talks with historian Dr. John Ferling to explore the strategic lessons of the American Revolution. This special episode reaches back to provide additional perspective on the third Strategy and War case study at the U.S. Naval War College. Although the timing of this episode does not align directly with the American Revolution case study, Dr. Ferling’s insights illuminate many of the course themes that cut across the entire course. Drawing on his books Whirlwind and his new work Shots Heard Round the World, Ferling assesses the Revolution’s strategic environment and international context and the central choices both sides faced at the outset of the conflict. Dr. Ferling dives into the challenges of forging a cohesive strategy from competing colonial interests, George Washington’s strengths and weaknesses as a strategic leader, and how diplomacy combined with military operations to shape the war’s trajectory. He also provides perspective on some of the strengths of British military decision-making, particularly by General Henry Clinton. The conversation closes with reflections on the Revolution’s most important strategic principles and why they still matter for today’s strategists. The opinions expressed on this podcast represent the views of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, The US Navy, or US Naval War College. Guests: Dr. John Ferling is a leading historian of the American Revolution who spent most of his four-decade academic career at the University of West Georgia, where he taught courses on Colonial America, U.S. military history, and the Revolution. The author of numerous works, including Whirlwind and Shots Heard Round the World, Ferling has long combined scholarship with a passion for writing accessible history. His career began with two years teaching high school in Texas before moving into higher education in Texas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and ultimately Georgia. In 2013, he received the Governor’s Award for the Arts and Humanities in recognition of his lifetime contributions to history and civic culture. A lifelong baseball fan, the first major league game he saw was between Pittsburgh and the Brooklyn Dodgers, a game in which Jackie Robinson scored the winning run. For twenty years he timed his research trips to Boston so that the Red Sox were in town. He has a picture of Fenway Park proudly displayed in his office.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/strategy-matters/1007/thumbnail.jp

New Thinking for a New Age—Competing Visions of American Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

The contemporary grand strategy debate between deep engagement and restraint is inadequate both to contemporary geopolitical realities and to the strategies American presidents have actually pursued in recent decades. This updated typology of grand strategies sets the stage for a reinvigorated and more informed debate and research program

Episode 4: A Fort Between Two Waters: Symbolism, Strength, and Strategy in a Hybrid War

Guests Katrina Ponti and Jonathan Romaneski join host Brendan Neagle to unpack the historical significance and strategic effects of operations at Fort Ticonderoga during the American War of Independence. The discussion complements the course materials for American War of Independence case study in the Strategy and War Course at the U.S. Naval War College. The guests explore how the fort’s capture by irregular colonial forces in 1775 revealed the outsized psychological impact of seemingly small operations and the advantages of decentralized execution for insurgents. The discussion then turns to British strategic adjustments and the difficulty of distinguishing between a military objective’s perceived symbolic importance and its true strategic value. Finally, the conversation draws broader lessons on irregular and hybrid warfare, connecting Ticonderoga’s story to modern dilemmas such as gray zone conflicts and the enduring need for adaptability in military planning. The opinions expressed on this podcast represent the views of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, The US Navy, or US Naval War College. Guests: Katrina Ponti, Ph.D. is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. She earned her Ph.D. in history from the University of Rochester in 2022. Before joining the Strategy and Policy Department, she was an Ernest May Postdoctoral Fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Dr. Ponti has published on topics related to the diplomatic and maritime history of the early United States. In addition to her interests in history and policy, she is a trained historical archaeologist. She is an award-winning poet for her fifth grade work about Fort Ticonderoga: Rainy Day at the Mountain Lake Rainy day at the mountain lake What should we do today? Should we go to a fort From that long ago day? Where cannons were brought from one state to the next Over mountains that nearly touch the sky LTC Jonathan Romaneski, U.S. Army, is a military professor in the US Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department. He is a U.S. Army Aviation officer whose previous command and staff positions include extensive time in Europe, the U.S. Military Academy, Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Cavazos, Texas. His most recent assignment was his battalion command tour in Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He has a BA in history from James Madison University and a PhD in military history from the Ohio State University.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/strategy-matters/1003/thumbnail.jp