An obligation of disobedience to the law under a corrupt regime. What might it look like and when does it arise? Nazi Germany, a Case Study.

The law is generally thought of as an instrument of social manageability, which is used for the common good. Historically, this has not been the only purpose of the law. Law has been wielded as an instrument of oppression, to strip people of their rights, and permit the massacre of millions of people. Using Nazi Germany as a case study, this paper explores the limitations of legal authority, and ascertains how we should respond when the law permits extreme injustice. It begins by examining different approaches to determining whether a law is valid. This is followed by a consideration of whether we are under any general obligation to obey the law. Lastly, whether an obligation for disobedience exists, and what form such disobedience may take, is then explored. This paper concludes that in certain circumstances we should disobey the law, or at a minimum; think twice before obeying. The Nuremberg Trials and the grudge informer case are used to highlight that blind obedience or passive acquiescence to unjust laws will not suffice. Additionally, the disobedient under an unjust regime will not be able to satisfy the requirements for civil disobedience under traditional liberal theories of civil disobedience, such as those of Carl Cohen and John Rawls. Consequently, we must accept a more radical definitions of civil disobedience, such as that put forward by Robin Celikates, to accommodate civil disobedience under an unjust regime. Alternatively, this paper suggests that revolutionary disobedience remains open to the disobedient who wishes to challenge an unjust ruler

“The Unacknowledged Legislators?” Poetry and Law

This essay argues that poetry can and should be used by both legal professionals and students as a tool to better understand marginalised perspectives in the justice system, and foster a greater sense of empathy. Poetry has been neglected from study because of its treatment as “exceptional”; because traditional law and literature analysis favours narrative; and because poetry is largely seen as too abstract or personal to be of use. This essay argues that the way poetry can operate, with a more unconstrained use of language and less reliance on narrative, can better engage the emotional response of readers. Legal professionals and students can engage with poetry on this emotional level to bring a more empathetic and humanistic approach to their profession. This essay closes with an analysis of three poems to show how poetry can be looked at with a legal eye. The poems are Witnesses by Fleur Adcock, A Rope for Harry Fat by James K. Baxter, and Law by Charles Bukowski. Witnesses is investigated in the most depth to illustrate the usefulness of close reading. Baxter’s poem shows how real-life events can colour a reading of a poem, complicating the notion of “fictional poetry”. And Bukowski’s poem can be read as an argument against legal positivism