In search of grammaticalization in synchronic dialect data: General extenders in north-east England

In this paper, we draw on a socially stratified corpus of dialect data collected in north-east England to test recent proposals that grammaticalization processes are implicated in the synchronic variability of general extenders (GEs), i.e., phrase- or clause-final constructions such as and that and or something. Combining theoretical insights from the framework of grammaticalization with the empirical methods of variationist sociolinguistics, we operationalize key diagnostics of grammaticalization (syntagmatic length, decategorialization, semantic-pragmatic change) as independent factor groups in the quantitative analysis of GE variability. While multivariate analyses reveal rapid changes in apparent time to the social conditioning of some GE variants in our data, they do not reveal any evidence of systematic changes in the linguistic conditioning of variants in apparent time that would confirm an interpretation of ongoing grammaticalization. These results lead us to questio

EXPERIMENTAL AND CALCULATED RESULTS OF A FLUTTER INVESTIGATION OF SOME VERY LOW ASPECT-RATIO FLAT-PLATE SURFACES AT MACH NUMBERS FROM 0.62 TO 3.00

Flutter investigation of very low aspect-ratio flat-plate surfaces at subsonic and supersonic spee

Chronicle of a referendum foretold: what next for the Malvinas/Falklands?

The announcement of the result of the March 2013 referendum on whether the Falklands/Malvinas should remain a British overseas territory came as no surprise in either Britain or Argentina, or on the South Atlantic islands themselves. Indeed, perhaps the biggest shock of all was the news that three inhabitants actually voted against remaining under British rule. As bewildered Kelpers in the close-knit island community speculated on where the voices of dissent had come from, in the aftermath of the referendum we consider what has really changed and offer insight into what will happen next. In particular, we argue that it is in both British and Argentine self-interest to change their stances in order to resolve the issue

Some aspects of the epistemology of William of Ockham

The background section of the article deals with Aquinas's and Scotus's definition of the relation between intellect and senses. It is shown that Aquinas postulated a species in terme diary between the two, while Scotus only postulated it for abstractive cognition . Ockham removes the intelligible a species altogether, stressing the reliability of intuitive cognition as the basis of certitude about p re se n t situations, while perfect intuitive cognition is the basis of certitude about past situation . Ockham 's theories of the habitus are discussed as seeming to contradict the principle of the razor, but are demonstrated not to involve external intermediaries. Ockham 's epistemology safeguards the intrinsic psycho ­ logical unity of man and allow s a more direct know ledge of the wrold, in that it derieves universals from particulars and does sway with Aquinas's unwieldy theories of illumination and abstraction. Because all knowledge begins with intuitive cognition, an empirical scientific method is for the first time justified

Evolutionary and Ecological Determinism of Host Specificity in Arthropod Parasites

Understanding why some diseases infect more species than others is crucial for predicting where and when disease will spread, which can inform the management of wildlife, agriculture, and human health. Currently, large scale patterns of host-parasite dynamics are being studied to understand where to look for and how to manage emerging human diseases (Leroy 2005; Benelli 2018). Previous research has used the Global Mammal Parasite Database (GMPD) to look at host breadth—the number and diversity of species a pathogen can infect—for various groups of parasites, e.g. helminths, arthropods, fungi, etc., from a host-centric perspective (Stephens et al. 2017; Park et al. 2018). However, this approach does not allow me to draw conclusions about the evolution of host breadth within a given parasite or among a group of parasites. The Cressler lab has addressed this problem by using a parasite phylogenetic tree to map the generalism scores—how many hosts it can infect and how closely related, in evolutionary time, are the hosts the parasite can infect—on to. With this approach, it will be possible to address how host-breadth evolves within a group of parasites. First, the pattern of host breadth within a group of mammal-infecting arthropods was determined. arthropod data was chosen from the GMPD because arthropods are a common and abundant parasite of mammals, additionally genetic information of these species is well researched and easily accessible. This research will provide a bigger picture of how host-breadth has evolved within arthropod parasites. It is hypothesized that patterns of arthropod host specificity cannot be explained by simple directional evolution towards host generalism, rather that ecological and evolutionary factors interact to produce differences in host-breadth between closely related arthropods. These findings are important for disease management because they could provide explanations into what ecological and/or evolutionary factors inform host-breadth. These factors could then be used as to predict when and from where new diseases will emerge. The results of this study will provide a detailed analysis of possible ecological and evolutionary factors that cause patterns of host-breadth in arthropods. This information is crucial in understanding the transmission risk of arthropod parasites to humans, and the underlying model could provide a basis for understanding the transmission of emerging zoonotic diseases. This project will be carried out under the mentorship of Dr. Cressler, who specializes in disease ecology and evolution, and graduate student Alaina Pfenning

Thought and being in the opening transitions of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit".

My thesis attempts to provide a new account of the opening transitions of My thesis attempts to provide a new account of the opening transitions of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (i.e. the transitions of sections A.-C.(AA.)) as the basis for a critical assessment of that work. My account is motivated by two interpretative difficulties that often prove divisive for commentators. First, the difficulty of how we are to understand the transition from section 'A. Consciousness' to section 'B. Self-Consciousness': and second, the difficulty of precisely what Hegel means by identifying Kantian Idealism as the "same kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as Scepticism" (PS 238. p. 144). albeit a positive rather than a negative expression of this ambiguity, in section C.(AA.). I argue that these two difficulties are related, insofar as Hegel's reaction to Scepticism informs his critique of Kant, which in turn affects the conception that Hegel has of his own project in the Phenomenology and of the manner in which it is to be structured. I contend that, for Hegel, a key problem to be addressed is the failure of previous philosophical positions to investigate the general form of judgement (the subject/predicate relation) in a sufficiently critical manner. This failure, for Hegel. leads to a distorted view, to the effect that thought and being are irreparably separated. which he takes to be at the heart of Kantian theoretical philosophy, and which precludes the possibility of giving true philosophical proofs. 1 argue that the correction of such a distorted view is a main aim of the Phenomenology and that, in the transitions from A. to C.(AA.). Hegel provides an in principle proof of the unity of thought and being.(i.e. the transitions of sections A.-C.(AA.)) as the basis for a critical assessment of that work. My account is motivated by two interpretative difficulties that often prove divisive for commentators. First, the difficulty of how we are to understand the transition from section 'A. Consciousness' to section 'B. Self-Consciousness': and second, the difficulty of precisely what Hegel means by identifying Kantian Idealism as the "same kind of self-contradictory ambiguity as Scepticism" (PS 238. p. 144). albeit a positive rather than a negative expression of this ambiguity, in section C.(AA.). I argue that these two difficulties are related, insofar as Hegel's reaction to Scepticism informs his critique of Kant, which in turn affects the conception that Hegel has of his own project in the Phenomenology and of the manner in which it is to be structured. I contend that, for Hegel, a key problem to be addressed is the failure of previous philosophical positions to investigate the general form of judgement (the subject/predicate relation) in a sufficiently critical manner. This failure, for Hegel. leads to a distorted view, to the effect that thought and being are irreparably separated. which he takes to be at the heart of Kantian theoretical philosophy, and which precludes the possibility of giving true philosophical proofs. 1 argue that the correction of such a distorted view is a main aim of the Phenomenology and that, in the transitions from A. to C.(AA.). Hegel provides an in principle proof of the unity of thought and being

He Met Her On The Stairs : Song

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