A few years ago, judicial councils composed primarily of judges were viewed as a panacea for virtually all problems of court administration in Europe. The burgeoning literature on judicial councils has shown that this is not necessarily thecase. This article builds on this literature, but it argues that judicial self governance is much broader phenomenon than judicial councils and may also take different forms. Therefore, it is high time to look beyond judicial councils and to view judicial self–governance as a much more complex network of actors and bodies with different levels of participation of judges. To that end this article conceptualizes judicial self governance and identifies crucial actors within the judiciary who may engage in judicial governance (such as judicial councils, judicial appointment commissions, promotion committees, court presidents and disciplinary panels). Subsequently,it shows that both the forms, rationales, and effects of judicial self governance have varied across Europe. Finally, this article argues that it is necessary to take into account the liquid nature of judicial self governance and its responsiveness to political, social, and cultural changes. Moreover, the rise of judicial self governance is not necessarily a panacea, as it may lead to political contestation and the creation of new channels of politicization of the judiciary