International Journal of Humanities and Social Science
Abstract
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 20 [Special Issue – October 2012]The importance of an optimal regulatory and enforcement matrix in enhancing securities markets cannot be overemphasized. Countries with deep and vibrant securities markets generally have effective regulatoryand enforcement philosophies. This paper seeks to characterize the regulatory and enforcement paradigms ofKenya’s securities markets in the context of the global regulatory and enforcement philosophies. From the analysis, it is evident that the regulatory paradigm is indissolubly government or national with nominal self-regulation. Although the statutory framework enshrines self-regulation, the relevant provisions are ambiguous and remain ineffectual. The notion of self-regulation remains an illusion. The regulator enjoys plenary legislative and supervisory powers over market intermediaries and listed companies without being subject to meaningful accountability mechanisms. Amendments to the Capital Markets Act and its Regulations have consolidated the Capital Markets Authority’s position as a paramountregulator. Finally, the enforcement history of the Capital Markets Authority discloses no decipherable philosophy. Enforcement actions have been intermittent andreflect
no imperatives.The importance of an optimal regulatory and enforcement matrix in enhancing securities markets cannot be overemphasized. Countries with deep and vibrant securities markets generally have effective regulatory and enforcement philosophies. This paper seeks to characterize the regulatory and enforcement paradigms of Kenya's securities markets in the context of the global regulatory and enforcement philosophies. From the analysis, it is evident that the regulatory paradigm is indissolubly government or national with nominal self-regulation. Although the statutory framework enshrines self-regulation, the relevant provisions are ambiguous and remain ineffectual. The notion of self-regulation remains an illusion. The regulator enjoys plenary legislative and supervisory powers over market intermediaries and listed companies without being subject to meaningful accountability mechanisms. Amendments to the Capital Markets Act and its Regulations have consolidated the Capital Markets Authority’s position as a paramount regulator. Finally, the enforcement history of the Capital Markets Authority discloses no decipherable philosophy. Enforcement actions have been intermittent and reflect no imperatives