Russia postponed its national vote on constitutional changes to July 1, 2020. Due to restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly from COVID-19, mass protests are unlikely to result. Nevertheless, managing growing social discontent may well be the Kremlin’s next big challenge as it prepares for September’s regional and parliamentary elections. Given its upcoming EU presidency and Council of Europe chairmanship, Germany could make a positive difference in protecting human rights and EU values in Russia

Solntseva, Marina

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www.ssoar.infoProtests in Russia: Supporting Systemic ChangePrior to 2020's ElectionsSolntseva, MarinaVeröffentlichungsversion / Published VersionStellungnahme / commentEmpfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:Solntseva, M. (2020). Protests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to 2020's Elections. (DGAP Kommentar,21). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-69222-6Nutzungsbedingungen:Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zurVerfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen findenSie hier:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.deTerms of use:This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Informationsee:https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0COMMENTARYGerman Council on Foreign RelationsProtests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to  2020’s ElectionsRussia postponed its national vote on constitutional changes to July 1, 2020. Due to restrictions on free-dom of movement and assembly from COVID-19, mass protests are unlike-ly to result. Nevertheless, manag-ing growing social discontent may well be the Kremlin’s next big chal-lenge as it prepares for September’s regional and parliamentary elections. Given its upcoming EU presidency and Council of Europe chairmanship, Germany could make a positive dif-ference in protecting human rights and EU values in Russia.A wave of more than 12,000 recur-ring demonstrations in Moscow and other regions has made 2019 to 2020 the most intensive point of protest in Russia’s recent history. Though the COVID-19 crisis coincidentally helped the Kremlin to lower the potential for protest, it could not make ongoing demonstrations disappear. Dissatisfac-tion among the Russian population is growing and posing a significant chal-lenge to the Kremlin, especially due to the upcoming plebiscite on con-stitutional amendments on July 1 and regional elections on September 13, 2020. While the protests are unlike-ly to bring about any systemic change, Germany and the EU could, however, certainly contribute to the improve-ment of the worsening human rights situation in Russia.COVID-19 COULD NOT UNDERMINE THE TREND OF MASS PROTESTAs many European countries affected by the coronavirus crisis, Russia im-posed a ban on holding public events during the pandemic; but it also con-stricted freedom of speech by adopt-ing a national law to stop the spread of fake news on COVID-19. The ban on public events was adopted by regional authorities, and it differed from region to region. Some allowed a maximum of 50 participants, others allowed for up to 100 or 1,000 people to gather. While protests against upcoming constitu-tional amendments that enable Presi-dent Vladimir Putin to remain in power longer were allowed in cities such as Perm, Chita, and Omsk even as late Marina SolntsevaProgram Assistant, Robert Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central AsiaNo. 21June 2020Protests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to 2020’s Elections2No. 21 |  COMMENTARYas the end of March, other places im-posed a complete ban.In Moscow and Saint Petersburg, the ban affected all protests regardless of their scope, including single-person pickets. These were the only type of protest that did not require the prior consent of the authorities. After prom-inent journalist and Moscow legisla-tor Ilya Azar was jailed on May 28 after holding a solo picket despite Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin’s ban on public events, a series of peaceful single pro-tests occurred all over Russia. The solo pickets held in solidarity with Azar ended in more arrests and attracted international attention. Council of Eu-rope Human Rights Commissioner Dunja Mijatovic stated that “COVID-19 cannot be an excuse to clamp down on freedom of expression.”While the coronavirus lockdown gave authorities in Moscow and several other Russian regions the perfect op-portunity to test new QR systems for the digital surveillance of freedom of movement, it also gave birth to new and creative forms of digital protest. For example, on Yandex Maps – the Russian alternative to Google Maps and the most detailed cartographic service in the country – users staged virtual protests against self-isolation by blocking virtual traffic or by drop-ping pins near local governmental buildings and writing messages with demands (see image).When taken as a whole and compared to the rallies that took place from 2011 to 2013, the latest demonstrations in-dicate deeper changes in Russian so-ciety, particularly at the regional level. Even if taking to the streets does not bring about any overarching politi-cal change, protesters are develop-ing the skills to organize themselves into groups and promote their own agenda by means of publicly express-ing their discontent. Their progress is best proven by the release of journalist Ivan Golunov and political science stu-dent Egor Zhukov in 2019 in response to the public outcry that followed their arrests on fabricated charges. The joint “NO!” campaign against constitution-al change, which is already supported by almost 300 regional and munici-pal deputies, is another issue that the Kremlin has to address.THE PROTESTS ARE STILL FRAGMENTED AND SMALLBy suppressing demonstrations and ig-noring the underlying problems that in-cite them, the Russian government has only increased tensions and further po-liticized protest actions. Still, neither an All-Russian protest movement nor a single agenda item that could unite re-gional activities has emerged. In 2018, protests against increasing the retire-ment age had a chance of becoming a unifying element on the national level, but the protesters’ aspirations vanished right after pension reform was adopt-ed. Currently, wider protest agendas are diverse: there are, to cite only two prominent examples, protests against the isolation of the Russian internet and environmental actions against Mos-cow’s waste disposal policies that af-fect other regions. Although protests in the capital in the summer of 2019 against the authorities’ politically-mo-tivated rejection of independent candi-dates from its City Duma election were attended by 22,000 to 60,000 people (according to different assessments) and continue today, these numbers still only represent a small percentage of the megapolis’ population of twelve million. While these demonstrations provoked some sympathetic respons-es throughout Russia, the issues that caused them mostly remain a concern for Muscovites.The geographic diversification of pro-tests is, however, an interesting trend. While in the early 2010s Moscow and Saint Petersburg were the main cen-ters of protest, there are now more protests in Russia’s regions than in its capital. The agendas of these regional demonstrations also differ widely from their urban counterparts in that they are centered around socio-econom-ic, regional, and local issues. Typical examples include defending a small park against the construction of a new church in Yekaterinburg, protesting a territorial dispute with Chechnya in Ingushetia, and demonstrating A virtual protest on Yandex Maps in which users dropped pins near local governmental buildings and wrote demands such as, shown here, “Feed my kids and I stay home”Source: Donnews.ru https://www.donnews.ru/V-Rostove-proshel-pervyy-v-istorii- goroda-virtualnyy-miting_106391Protests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to 2020’s Elections3No. 21 |  COMMENTARYagainst the construction of a landfill near the village of Shies in the region of Arkhangelsk.In terms of age groups, according to recent polls by the Levada Analytical Center, the majority of Russian youth remains apolitical despite an increase in the potential to protest among younger Russians. Moreover, their de-mands are mostly focused on particu-lar hometown issues and not unified by any general youth agenda per se.THE REGIME HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR NEARLY UNLIMITED SUPPRESSIONMeanwhile, the regime’s methods of suppressing protests are well devel-oped, coordinated, and function on different levels. Laws to limit assem-bly are in place and legal practice has been established to support them. In particular, the Russian state’s control over freedom of assembly has become systemic and institutionalized in char-acter. Pro-Kremlin mass media have supported these developments with propaganda that labels protests as un-coordinated, unauthorized, and illegal.First, administrative obstacles – such as tough deadlines for applications – have been created for getting demon-strations authorized, effectively turning them into instruments for preventing protest. On June 4, 2020, the Russian Constitutional Court further limited or-ganized protest with its decision that demonstrations, with few exceptions, should only take place in several desig-nated places, the so-called Hyde Parks.Second, during protests, all possible siloviki forces – that is, members of se-curity police and other armed forces – are used to employ various forms of violence against the protesters.Third, after the protests, those who attended can be placed in adminis-trative detention or even criminally prosecuted. During the last eight years, legislation related to protests was gradually toughened up: penalties increased fivefold and involving under-age protesters was penalized. Being found guilty of repeatedly participating in uncoordinated actions can result a prison term of up to eight years. A case in which one is found guilty of organiz-ing multiple mass riots can result in a prison sentence of up to 15 years.Driven by both institutional interest and bureaucratic inertia, institutions and ministries have increased the number of administrative and criminal cases brought against protesters, turn-ing the judicial system into a means for further frightening protesters rather than protecting them. Mass detentions at protest actions are highly likely to result in administrative or criminal verdicts. According to the Judicial De-partment at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 81 percent of all cases opened on administrative viola-tions at demonstrations in 2019 ended with a sentence.In addition, over the last five years, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Rosgvardia (an internal paramili-tary force that reports directly to the president) allocated more than seven billion rubles for the purchase of spe-cial non-lethal riot-control equipment such as water cannons, stun guns, shockproof shields, and pepper sprays. This is about the same amount as the Moscow authorities intended to allo-cate to support people who lost their jobs because of COVID-19. So far, de-spite the low official tolerance for protests, this plethora of non-lethal 4,974CASES HEARD IN  COURTS IN 20194,045FOUND GUILTY KINDS OF PUNISHMENT3,57124921411FINEADMINISTRATIVE DETENTIONMANDATORY LABORSIMPLE WARNING236FOUND NOT GUILTY693OTHER COURT DECISIONSdid the courts consider it possible to impose a penalty lower than that foreseen by the lawIN ONLY31 CASESSource: Cases on administrative violations at the protest actions under 20.2 Article 20.4. of Russian Admin-istrative Offence Code in 2019/Data by Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian FederationProtests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to 2020’s Elections4No. 21 |  COMMENTARYRauchstraße 17/18 10787 BerlinTel. +49 30 2542311-0info@dgap.org www.dgap.org  @dgapevThe German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful foreign and security policy on a German and European level that promotes democracy, peace, and the rule of law. It is  nonpartisan and nonprofit. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).Publisher Deutsche Gesellschaft für  Auswärtige Politik e.V.ISSN 1864-347Editing Helga Beck Layout Luise RombachDesign Concept: WeDoAuthor picture(s) © DGAPThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons  Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0  International License.weapons have only been used as de-terrents. This does not mean, how-ever, that the regime would not put them into actual use should it deem it necessary.THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE NEEDS A NEW APPROACH TO ADDRESS WORSEN-ING HUMAN RIGHTSCurrently, 24.5 percent of all applica-tions submitted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) come from Russia, putting the country in first place for human rights violations in Europe. Since 2015, however, the Rus-sian Constitutional Court has been giv-en the power to ban ECHR decisions if they contradict the Russian constitu-tion. Moreover, one of the suggested constitutional amendments also im-plies the priority of Russia’s national law over international treaties. Thus, if adopted, the new constitution would provide the Kremlin with an escape-way from its international obligations, including on human rights issues.In the short term, the Russian polit-ical system is unlikely to change dra-matically, and the country’s worsening human rights situation is also unlikely to improve. Consequently, a new, tar-geted policy approach by the EU to address the issue of human rights vi-olations is needed. Berlin could use its chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe from November 2020 through May 2021, as well as its upcoming EU pres-idency, as an opportunity to put this issue on the agenda. By doing so, Ger-many would promote fundamental Eu-ropean values by highlighting positive narratives in human rights and ad-dressing human rights violations.

Protests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to 2020's Elections

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Protests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to 2020's Elections

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