China's ties with the South Pacific - development assistance, trade, investment, involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative, and more - have grown substantially since the early years of the new century. Australia and New Zealand (NZ), the traditional dominant powers in this region, have recently upped their game in order to balance Chinese activities.
The South Pacific, a huge but sparsely populated world region, is no stranger to geopolitical competition. China and Taiwan, jostling for diplomatic recognition, used to be the key protagonists.
Australia's and NZ's regional dominance has been challenged by China's growing presence. China offers alternative options in terms of funding and policy to Pacific Island countries (PICs). PICs, seeking to increase their agency by diversifying political and economic relationships, generally welcome China's more intensive engagement.
In the face of China's growing regional engagement, Australia and NZ have reenergised their relations with PICs, increasing aid and diplomatic efforts. Australia's in particular are driven by a strong security imperative.
The unwillingness of Australia's conservative federal government to move away from coal remains a strong irritant for PICs, while NZ under Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has made climate policy a defi ning strand of regional policy.
Australia's and NZ's planned COVID-safe travel zone could potentially be extended to PICs. Such a move would help PICs cushion the effects of the pandemic on their economies and become an exemplar of regional lea dership.
The South Pacific is facing greater geopolitical competition. Yet the region is not really on the radar of European foreign policy establishments, despite the European Union being an important cooperation partner. Increased exchanges with governmental and non-governmental actors in Australia and NZ can help foster greater understanding of the complex dynamics in the South Pacific. Such activities are, however, no substitute for deep, sustained engagement with PICs themselves
