Motivated by the control theoretic distinction between controllable and
uncontrollable events, we distinguish between two types of agents within a
multi-agent system: controllable agents, which are directly controlled by the
system's designer, and uncontrollable agents, which are not under the
designer's direct control. We refer to such systems as partially controlled
multi-agent systems, and we investigate how one might influence the behavior of
the uncontrolled agents through appropriate design of the controlled agents. In
particular, we wish to understand which problems are naturally described in
these terms, what methods can be applied to influence the uncontrollable
agents, the effectiveness of such methods, and whether similar methods work
across different domains. Using a game-theoretic framework, this paper studies
the design of partially controlled multi-agent systems in two contexts: in one
context, the uncontrollable agents are expected utility maximizers, while in
the other they are reinforcement learners. We suggest different techniques for
controlling agents' behavior in each domain, assess their success, and examine
their relationship.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file