Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic
for many applications. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and
awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of
which he is unaware without there being an explicit fact that the agent knows
he is unaware of. We propose a logic for reasoning about knowledge of
unawareness, by extending Fagin and Halpern's \emph{Logic of General
Awareness}. The logic allows quantification over variables, so that there is a
formula in the language that can express the fact that ``an agent explicitly
knows that there exists a fact of which he is unaware''. Moreover, that formula
can be true without the agent explicitly knowing that he is unaware of any
particular formula. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the
logic, using standard axioms from the literature to capture the quantification
operator. Finally, we show that the validity problem for the logic is
recursively enumerable, but not decidable.Comment: 32 page
